Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A mother sought an emergency protection order to keep her soon-to-be ex-husband away from her and their children because, she alleged, he had abused them. The father denied the allegations and sought to cross-examine one of the daughters about her claim that he had repeatedly tried to suffocate her, among other things. Evidence was presented that the daughter was suicidal, was unable to confront her father, and would be significantly traumatized by this cross-examination. The issue this case presented was whether the father had a constitutional or statutory right to question his minor daughter in court before the protection order could be issued. Finding under the facts of this case that he did not, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Aiken v. Aiken" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on under which of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act’s (UIFSA) choice of law rules Washington’s nonclaim statutes fell. Stephanie Bell and Juan Sidran Heflin were the parents of M.H. In 1994, Bell established paternity and obtained an order of child support from an Indiana circuit court. Bell and M.H. lived in Indiana at that time, but Heflin lived in Washington. In 2010, Bell registered the Indiana support order in King County, Washington for enforcement only. After various hearings, the King County Superior Court confirmed the Indiana support order. The parties then entered into a settlement agreement in 2011 where Heflin agreed to pay a sum of$120,000 in monthly payments of $2,000. After Heflin failed to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement, Bell filed the motion for wage withholding in King County Superior Court at issue in this appeal. After finding that Indiana law applied, the superior court issued the wage withholding order. The Court of Appeals reversed the wage withholding order in an unpublished opinion, finding that Washington law applied and the trial court lacked the authority to issues the wage withholding order because a time period in RCW 4.56.210(2) had passed and the Indiana judgment had expired. Bell petitioned for review. Relying on the comments to the model UIFSA and other states' interpretations of it, the Washington Supreme Court held that under UIFSA's choice of law provision, a statute authorizing wage withholding was a "remedy," whereas a nonclaim statute was a "statute of limitation." After comparing the two statutes of limitations applicable in this case, the 20-year Indiana statute of limitation controlled because it was longer. Therefore, the trial court had the authority to enter the wage withholding order, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for entry of judgment in Stephanie Bell's favor. View "In re Paternity of M.H." on Justia Law

In June 2013, C.B.(mother) married R.B. (stepfather). C.B. and R.B. filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to C.W. (biological father) and adoption later that month of T.A.W., C.B.'s biological child and an "Indian child" under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). C.W. was non-Indian, but C.B. was, and an enrolled member of the Shoalwater Bay Tribe. C.W. had been incarcerated at the time of the termination petition on charges relating to drug abuse and domestic violence. C.W.'s parental rights were ultimately terminated. In reaching its decision, the trial court found that ICWA applied to the termination proceedings and that ICWA's requirements were met beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not require C.B. and R.B. to prove that active efforts were undertaken to remedy C.W.'s parental deficiencies prior to terminating his parental rights and made no finding to that effect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding: (1) ICWA and WICWA protected non-Indian and Indian parents alike; (2) the trial court erred by not making an active efforts finding; (3) the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl," (133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013)), was factually distinguishable; and (4) WICWA had no abandonment exception. C.B. and R.B. appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded this case to the trial court so that it could reconsider the termination petition in light of those holdings. View "In re Adoption of T.A.W." on Justia Law

The child (K.M.M.) was in foster care since she was six and a half years old. She was removed from her biological parents' custody in 2009 because their serious substance abuse problems resulted in a neglectful home enviromnent. She was 11 years old at the time of trial in 2013. She had been in two foster care placements and was physically abused in one of those placements. K.M.M.'s biological father completed court-ordered services and remedied the deficiencies identified by the dependency court in prior proceedings. Nevertheless, the trial court terminated his parental rights based on its conclusion that he remained "unable to parent" due to the child's lack of attachment to him. This case required the Washington Supreme Court to determine whether parental rights could be terminated where the father was unable to parent his child due to a lack of attachment and continuing the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the child's emotional development and mental well-being. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that all necessary services have been provided to the father and that the provision of any additional services would have been futile. Furthermore, the record supported the trial court's finding of current parental unfitness based on the father's inability to parent the child. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision to uphold the termination order. View "In re Parental Rights to K.M.M." on Justia Law

H.O. appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child, B.P. H.O., suffered from drug addiction, depression and other mental health issues, and the effects of long term childhood trauma. B.P., suffered too: she was born addicted to methamphetamine, endured withdrawal, was abandoned by H.O. during infancy, and experienced multiple disruptions when forming attachments with H.O. and various foster parents. On the other hand, after several tries, H.O. achieved sobriety; benefited from treatment in a structured environment; and became an attentive and caring mother to another child, A., in that structured environment. She also engaged in partially supervised, therapeutic visitation with B.P., and the two began to form what witnesses at the termination hearing called a social relationship with an emerging emotional attachment. Despite all that, the Department of Social and Health Services recommended termination of H.O.'s parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that where a child has special needs (here, special attachment needs); and where, as here, those special needs were exacerbated by the State's failure to timely provide necessary services to the biological parent; then the State has failed to prove this legislatively mandated prerequisite to termination (absent futility, which was not shown here). View "In re Welfare of B.P." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Washington legislature enacted amendments to the dependency statutes to expressly address incarcerated parents. Those factors barred a court from assuming that incarceration would make it impossible to parent; they focused instead on the sufficiency of the Department of Social and Health Services' (Department) services and the parent's efforts, requiring a court to evaluate those things on a case-by-case basis. Petitioner Edelyn Saint-Louis was incarcerated in the middle of a dependency proceeding that lasted over 2 years, but was released one month and ten days before the termination trial began. The main question presented by this case was one of statutory interpretation: does RCW 13.34.180(l)(t)'s requirement that certain factors be considered at the termination hearing "[i]f the parent is incarcerated" apply if the parent isn't incarcerated at that time? The Supreme Court held that based on the language and purpose of the amendments, that the answer was no. "The provision at issue in this case, by contrast, looks to the incarcerated parent's ability to parent in the future. Limiting its application to those incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing thus fits well into the statutory scheme." View "In re Dependency of D.L.B." on Justia Law

The question presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a third party, a step-grandfather with no legally established relationship to his step-grandson, could petition for visitation rights through a custody proceeding pursuant to chapter 26.10 RCW or under some equitable doctrine. At that time, M.W. was in the physical custody of petitioners Greg and Linda Minium, M.W. 's maternal grandparents. Approximately one month after the accident, the Miniums filed a petition for nonparental custody of M.W. pursuant to RCW 26.10.030(1). The petition named Patti Shmilenko, M.W.'s paternal grandmother, as the sole respondent. In March 2010, the Miniums and Mrs. Shmilenko agreed to the entry of a nonparental custody decree establishing the Miniums as M.W. 's legal custodians and granting visitation rights to Mrs. Shmilenko according to an agreed residential schedule. The record is silent as to why respondent John Shmilenko was not included in the court's orders despite residing in the same household as his wife, but all of the orders explicitly provide for visitation with "Patti Shmilenko." Mr. Shmilenko maintained a relationship with M.W. through his wife's visitation rights. When M.W. reached school age three years later, the parties could not agree on a modified residential schedule. Mrs. Shmilenko subsequently petitioned the superior court to modify the original custody decree and residential schedule, naming both herself and her husband as "requesting parties." In response, the Miniums asked the court to terminate Mrs. Shmilenko's visitation rights, contending that her court-ordered, third-party visitation was unconstitutional and that she also was not entitled to visitation under the equitable doctrine of de facto parentage. The court entered a temporary order amending M.W.'s residential schedule and allowing Mrs. Shmilenko to continue to exercise her own visitation rights pursuant to the parties' prior agreed order, and crossed out a reference to Mr. Shmilenko as a "requesting party." Ultimately, the court entered a final order ensuring that Mrs. Shmilenko would continue to have midweek visits with M.W. during the school year, as well as other visitation during certain weekends, holidays, and vacations. Mrs. Shmilenko petitioned to modify the original custody decree, and concurrently filed a motion to join her husband as an additional party to the underlying nonparental custody proceeding. The court denied that motion but indicated that Mr. Shmilenko would be permitted to state the factual basis for bringing his own third-party custody or de facto parentage action and, if he did bring such an action, it would be consolidated with Mrs. Shmilenko's petition to modify the custody decree. "There is no statutory right to third-party visitation under our laws, and we decline to exercise our equitable powers to create such a right." Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of Mr. Shmilenko's petition and the determination of attorney fees. View "In re Custody of M.W." on Justia Law

M.H.P. was the son of Leslie Bramlett and Paul Parvin. He was less than two years old when dependency proceedings commenced. M.H.P.'s parents experienced repeated episodes of mental illness, substance abuse, and incarceration in the years preceding and following M.H.P.'s birth. The dependency proceedings commenced after Bramlett, accompanied by M.H.P., arrived at an emergency room showing signs of paranoia and threatening the ER staff. M.H.P. was removed from his parents' care; he remained in the custody of the State until a guardianship order was entered more than two years later. The Department of Social and Health Services and Diana Farrow, the court appointed special advocate (CASA) for M.H.P., appealed a superior court order denying their motion to unseal several sets of motions and orders. The underlying documents at issue were filed by M.H.P.'s parents to obtain public funding for expert services in connection with proceedings to terminate their parental rights. The court granted the motions ex parte without holding a hearing or providing notice to the other parties or to the public. After the CASA discovered the disputed orders, the Department moved to unseal the disputed documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the superior court's "indiscriminate ex parte sealing of documents pertaining to motions for public funding for expert services" violated General Rule (GR) 15; the justifications advanced by the superior court did not warrant creating a blanket exemption from GR 15 in parental termination cases; and in its memorandum opinion explaining the disputed orders, the superior court did not apply (or even mention) the "lshikawa" factors that all courts must analyze before granting a motion to seal. View "In re Dependency of M.H.P." on Justia Law

M.S.M.-P. was born in April 2000. His biological parents, S.K. and N.P.'s relationship was marked from the beginning by physical abuse against S.K. S.K. and N.P.'s relationship ended within two weeks of M.S.M.-P.'s birth. During the first three years of M.S.M.-P.'s life, N.P. visited him fewer than 10 times, and he had not seen or had any contact with him since then. In 2002, when M.S.M.-P. was two years old, his mother S.K. began a relationship with A.K. S.K., A.K., and M.S.M.-P. lived together as a family since 2003, and S.K. and A.K. married in 2008. A.K. has cared for M.S.M.-P. since they began living together and has been the only father M.S.M.-P. has known. S.K. and A.K. have had two other children together. In early 2010, A.K. decided to adopt M.S.M.-P. and sought N .P. 's consent. After N .P. refused to consent to the adoption, A.K. filed a petition to terminate N.P.'s parental rights and to obtain permanent custody with the right to adopt. S.K. joined in the petition. In 2012, N.P.'s parental rights to M.S.M.-P. were terminated in a closed proceeding. N.P. 's attorney affirmatively consented to the closure, and soon afterward, M.S.M.-P. was adopted by his stepfather. N.P. sought reversal because the trial court closed the proceeding without analyzing the "Ishikawa" factors. After review, the Supreme Court concluded N .P. waived his right to open proceedings under article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. View "In re Adoption of M.S.M.-P." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Washington legislature enacted a new guardianship statute, chapter 13.36 RCW, to create permanency for children in foster care through the dismissal of dependency and the appointment of a guardian. The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) petitioned for an order appointing a guardian for A.W. and M.W. pursuant to the new statute, and the children's mother, T.P. DSHS filed a dependency petition on behalf of A.W. and M.W based on the former RCW 13.34.030(5)(c) (2003), which stated that the child "[h]as no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for the child, such that the child is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child's psychological or physical development." In December 2009, T .P. agreed to the dependency. In March 2010, the court approved transitioning the children to T.P.'s home contingent on T.P.' s compliance with court ordered services and a DSHS safety plan that continued until the guardianship. In December 2010, the transition to T.P.'s home was terminated. The trial court found that based on T.P.'s substance abuse, poor judgment, incarcerations, chaotic lifestyle, failure to remedy parental deficiencies, and the length of time of this case, there was little likelihood that conditions could be remedied such that the children could be returned to T.P. in the near future. The trial court entered findings and conclusions and an order appointing guardians for A.W. and M.W. pursuant to the new statute. T.P. appealed, arguing that: (1) establishing a guardianship under the new statute using the preponderance of the evidence standard was unconstitutional because it violated due process; and (2) even if preponderance of the evidence was the correct standard, the trial court's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied due process, and that the trial court's record supported the trial court's decision to appoint guardians. View "In re Welfare of A.W." on Justia Law