Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Alberto Perez-Valdez challenged two evidentiary decisions made by a judge of the Walla Walla County Superior Court during a trial that resulted in his conviction for one count of second degree rape of a child and one count of third degree rape of a child. He also challenged the trial court’s denial of his motions for a mistrial based on a statement made by a state witness relating to the credibility of the victims. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making these decisions. Therefore, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Perez-Valdez" on Justia Law

Defendant Jay McKague appealed his conviction for second degree assault, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. Defendant shoplifted a can of smoked oysters from a convenience store. The owner followed Defendant out of the store and confronted him in the parking lot. Defendant punched the owner in the head several times and pushed him to the ground, causing the owner's head to strike the pavement. He was diagnosed with a concussion without loss of consciousness, a scalp contusion and lacerations, and head and neck pain. Defendant was charged with first degree robbery, with third degree theft as an inferior offense, and second degree assault predicated on the infliction of substantial bodily injury. At Defendant's request, the court also instructed the jury on third degree assault as an inferior offense of second degree assault. The jury convicted Defendant of third degree theft and second degree assault. The dissent on the appellate panel took issue with the of the sufficiency of the evidence of “substantial bodily harm.” Specifically, the dissent disagreed with the lead opinion’s citation to a dictionary definition of the term “substantial” as including “something having substance or actual existence.” Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that substantial evidence supported the conviction, but in doing so the Court disapproved of the definition of “substantial bodily harm” applied by the Court of Appeals majority: "[w]e agree … that the majority applied an erroneous definition of 'substantial,' but we nonetheless affirm McKague’s conviction because the evidence was sufficient to show that [the owner's] injuries were 'substantial' under a proper definition." View "Washington v. McKague" on Justia Law

Defendant Chucco Robinson erroneously believed that his earlier juvenile convictions had washed out and no longer counted toward his offender score. Based upon this understanding and after extensive negotiations largely focused on an offender score that would lead to a mutually acceptable sentence, he pled guilty. Before sentencing, he learned that his juvenile convictions would count toward his offender score, significantly increasing the statutory sentencing range he faced. Defendant immediately moved to withdraw his plea. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, finding that Defendant's misunderstanding of the consequences of Washington sentencing law was reasonable, though erroneous, and that the plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The State contended on appeal that the trial judge abused her discretion when she allowed Defendant to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court found the ruling was within the sound discretion of the trial court. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Demar Rhome argued on direct appeal to the Supreme Court that the state and federal constitutions require independent findings of fact that a defendant is competent to waive counsel and represent himself at trial. In November of 2003, 17-year-old Lashonda Flynn was stabbed to death. Seventeen-year-old Kialani Brown confessed to the killing but pointed to Defendant as the mastermind behind the slaying. Defendant was charged in King County Superior Court with first degree murder with a deadly weapon. Defendant's mental competency became an issue at trial. After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the superior court found that the defense had not met the burden of proving Defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Shortly after the competency hearing, Defendant received new counsel. Defendant represented himself throughout his 2006 proceedings with counsel on stand-by. In reviewing his performance during pretrial and trial proceedings, a defense expert opined that Defendant's mental illness impacted his ability to defend himself in court. Defendant was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced to 371 months in prison. Represented by appointed federal public defenders, Defendant filed this original personal restraint petition to challenge the trial court’s decision to allow him to waive counsel and proceed pro se. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant did not demonstrate that federal or state law requires an independent determination of mental competency to proceed pro se when a mentally ill defendant seeks to waive counsel: "[e]ven if such a rule could be crafted from [federal case law] in conjunction with this court’s precedent, Rhome cannot benefit from that rule on a personal restraint petition." The Court also concluded that Defendant failed to show the trial court abused its discretion when it found his waiver of counsel to be knowing and intelligent. The Court dismissed Defendant's petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Rhome" on Justia Law

The primary issue presented in this case was whether former RCW 9.92.151 (2004) or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution requires a county jail to provide opportunities for an inmate who is yet to be sentenced to earn credit toward early release, also known as "good-time" credit. Petitioner, Teddy Talley argued that the Skamania County Jail and the Department of Corrections (Department) violated the former RCW 9.92.151(1) and the Constitution by not providing opportunities for him to earn good-time credit before his criminal conviction. Skamania County argued that the statutory issue was not properly before the Supreme Court and that its program for earning good-time credit is constitutional. The Department argued that it may rely on a county’s jail-time certification when determining the appropriate amount of good-time credit to apply toward early release. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the matter was properly before it, and that the former RCW 9.92.151 required a county jail to provide opportunities for a presentence inmate to earn good-time credit. The Court did not reach Defendant's constitutional argument. Because the Skamania County Jail policy conflicted with the former RCW 9.92.151, the Court calculated that Defendant should have received an earned early-release credit at the statutory maximum rate of 15 percent. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Talley" on Justia Law

Defendants John Gordon and Charles Bukovsky were each charged with second-degree murder in the beating death of Brian Lewis. The State also sought two aggravating sentencing factors: deliberate cruelty and particular vulnerability of the victim. The jury was instructed to determine whether the aggravators were present, but the instructions did not define "deliberate cruelty" or "particular vulnerability." Defendants did not object to the instructions on that basis. The jury found the defendants guilty and also found the aggravators applied. The trial court imposed exceptional sentences. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the failure to provide detailed instructions defining the meaning of "deliberate cruelty" or "particular vulnerability" was a manifest error of constitutional magnitude that could be addressed for the first time on appeal. The Court held that it is not and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered whether a tribal police officer who observed Defendant Loretta Lynn Eriksen commit a traffic infraction on the Lummi Reservation could validly stop her outside the reservation and detain her until county police arrived. The Court concluded that the tribe’s inherent sovereign powers did not authorize this extraterritorial stop and detention. "While the territorial limits on the Lummi Nation’s sovereignty create serious policy problems, such as the incentive for intoxicated drivers to race for the reservation border, the solution does not lie in judicial distortion of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. Instead, these issues must be addressed by use of political and legislative tools, such as cross-deputization or mutual aid pacts, to ensure that all law enforcement officers have adequate authority to protect citizens’ health and safety in border areas. We urge the Lummi Nation and Whatcom County to work together to solve the problems made evident by this case; but if they can or will not do so, we will not manipulate the law to achieve a desirable policy result." Accordingly, the Court concluded the stop and detention of Defendant were invalid. The Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remand to the district court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Eriksen" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Kenneth Thorgerson on four counts of child molestation. On appeal, he contended that his convictions should be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct at trial. Upon careful review of the trial court’s record, the Supreme Court found that some of the conduct Defendant challenged was not misconduct and that which was did not constitute reversible error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence. View "Washington v. Thorgerson" on Justia Law

Appellant William Brousseau was convicted of first degree rape and of child molestation. The court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether the alleged victim was competent to testify and whether her out-of-court statements were admissible under Washington's child hearsay exception. The court heard testimony from Appellant's witness, a psychologist who had interviewed the child, but did not permit Appellant to call the child as a witness. On appeal, Appellant claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by finding the victim competent without examining her at the competency hearing. He also claimed that the court's refusal to allow testimony from the victim at the competency hearing denied him due process of law. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the child victim was competent to testify. Additionally, the Court held that the state child hearsay exception does not require a child to testify at a child-hearsay hearing and that Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. View "Washington v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

Appellants Kim Koenig, Lawrence Koss and Althea Paulson sought review of two separate superior court orders that enjoined disclosure of investigative records compiled by the Cities of Puyallup and Mercer Island. The records contained results of internal police department investigations whereby Appellants complained of gross officer misconduct. Appellants argued the records were wrongfully withheld. The appellate court affirmed withholding the records, interpreting case law that held police investigative records relating to an arrest was exempt from retention and copying under state law. The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's interpretation: "the statute does not exempt information relating to the conduct of the police during the investigation." The Court reversed the trial courts with direction that the trial courts redact the offending officers' identities, but that the description of the police department's investigation should have been produced. View "Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City Of Puyallup" on Justia Law