Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a fact-finding hearing of "rapid recidivism" was a "sentencing" hearing exempt from the state rules of evidence. After a bench trial, the superior court found Petitioner James Griffin guilty of residential burglary. At sentencing, the judge imposed an exception sentence above the standard range, finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance. In making its determination that the aggravating circumstance existed, the court relied on inadmissible hearsay from the trial. Petitioner appealed his exceptional sentence. Though the appellate court agreed with Petitioner that the trial court relied on inadmissible hearsay, it affirmed the exceptional sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the exceptional sentence and remanded the case for resentencing: "[o]n remand the trial court may receive evidence to justify imposition of the exceptional sentence, and the rules of evidence apply to [Petitioner's] resentencing." View "Washington v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Petitioners Roger Scherner and Michael Gresham were separately charged with child molestation. At trial, relying on the recently enacted RCW 10.58.090, the State successfully introduced evidence that Scherner and Gresham had previously committed sex offenses against other children. In Scherner's case, the superior court ruled that evidence of his prior acts of molestation was also admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a common scheme or plan. In Gresham's case, a different superior court held that evidence of Gresham's prior conviction for second degree assault with sexual motivation was only admissible pursuant to RCW 10.58.090. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court in Scherner's case did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence for the purpose of showing a common scheme or plan and that its failure to give a limiting instruction, once requested, was harmless error. The Court therefore affirmed Scherner's conviction. Because RCW 10.58.090 irreconcilably conflicted with ER 404(b) and governed a procedural matter, the Court held that its enactment violated the separation of powers doctrine and was accordingly unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court held that the admission of evidence of Gresham's prior conviction was not harmless error and reversed his conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Gresham" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Breitung was convicted of assaulting Ossie Cook and Richard Stevenson and of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Cook and Stevenson, both auto mechanics, took a client's truck for a test drive. During the drive they stopped for cigarettes. While at the smoke shop, Cook noticed a woman enter a black sports car and leave. When they left, Cook and Stevenson followed the same route as this woman and continued down a nearby gravel road. As they were leaving, Respondent appeared and walked into the middle of the gravel road ahead of the truck. According to Cook and Stevenson, as they approached Respondent, he pulled a handgun from behind his back, walked to the driver's side window, and pointed it at both men, telling them to stop following his girl friend. At trial, the State proposed jury instructions for second degree assault and second degree unlawful possession. Defense counsel proposed no additional instructions, and Respondent was convicted on all three counts. The Court of Appeals reversed Respondent's assault convictions, holding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request lesser included offense instructions on fourth degree assault. The court also reversed Respondent's conviction for unlawful possession, holding that where as part of a prior conviction the court fails to give notice required by statute, a subsequent conviction for unlawful possession is invalid. Based on the Supreme Court's analysis in "Washington v. Grier," (246 P.3d 1260 (2011)), the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the ineffectiveness claim. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the appellate court in its decision on the failure to give the statutorily required notice of firearm prohibition as part of a prior conviction, finding Washington law "required" reversal of Respondant's possession conviction. View "Washington v. Breitung" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the authority of the Department of Corrections (Department) to deduct funds from an inmate’s trust account. Defendant Chad Alan Pierce filed a personal restraint petition challenging the Department's collection of costs of incarceration and legal financial obligations (LFOs) from his account. He asserted that his judgment and sentence prohibits the Department from making such deductions. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the Department has statutory authority to deduct costs of incarceration independent of the judgment and sentence. In addition, the Department could deduct LFOs while Defendant was confined, and need not issue a notice of payroll deduction before initiating its collection efforts. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pierce" on Justia Law

The primary issue presented by this case was whether the State had jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes who sold unstamped cigarettes without a license at a store that located on trust allotment land outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation. In 2007 and 2008, agents of the Washington State Liquor Control Board purchased cigarettes from the "Indian Country Store" in Puyallup. The cigarette cartons and packs that were purchased did not contain Washington or tribal tax stamps. Consequently, in July 2008 agents went to the store again with a warrant and seized 37,000 cartons of unstamped cigarettes. The owner of the Indian Country Store at the time was Defendant Edward Comenout, an enrolled member of the Quinault Indian Nation. His brother, Robert Comenout Sr., and his nephew, Robert Comenout Jr., were engaged in running the store on a daily basis. Robert Sr. is an enrolled member of the Tulalip Tribes and Robert Jr. is an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation. The Indian Country Store, despite its name, was not on an Indian reservation, but on two trust allotments outside the boundary of any reservation. The State charged all three Comenouts in Pierce County Superior Court with (1) engaging in the business of purchasing, selling, consigning, or distributing cigarettes without a license; (2) unlawful possession or transportation of unstamped cigarettes; and (3) first degree theft. Edward, who was the alleged principal, moved to dismiss on grounds that the State lacked jurisdiction, joined by Robert Sr. and Robert Jr. The superior court denied the motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Comenouts were not exempt from Washington’s cigarette tax. Because RCW 82.24.110 and .500 criminalize the possession of unstamped cigarettes and the unlicensed sale of cigarettes, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss the charges. View "Washington v. Comenout" on Justia Law

"R.P.H." appealed a superior court's denial of his petition to restore his right to possess firearms. In 2000, 13-year-old R.P.H. pled guilty to one count of first degree child rape for sexually assaulting his 11- and 6-year-old sisters. At sentencing, the King County Juvenile Court accepted the State’s recommendation to impose a special sexual offender disposition alternative that included a suspended term of commitment, 12 months of community supervision, sexual deviancy counseling, and various other conditions, including a requirement that R.P.H. "[n]ot possess or use a weapon of any kind." At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court suggested that R.P.H.’s right to possess a firearm could be restored if he successfully completed treatment. Thereafter, R.P.H. successfully completed treatment and fulfilled the other conditions of his alternative disposition. In 2007, R.P.H. petitioned the King County Superior Court to relieve him of the obligation to register as a sex offender and to reinstate his right to possess firearms. The superior court granted R.P.H.'s request to terminate the registration requirement, but denied his motion to restore his right to possess firearms, noting a concern over R.P.H.'s traffic infractions. In ints review, the Supreme Court found it necessary to address only R.P.H.'s assertion that because the requirement he register as a sex offender was terminated by the superior court, his right to possess firearms should be restored. The Court considered the superior court's order discharging R.P.H. from registration as a sex offender to be the equivalent of a certificate of rehabilitation, and therefore, R.P.H. should not be barred from exercising his right to possess firearms. The Court reversed the superior court's decision with respect to R.P.H.'s right to possess firearms. View "Washington v. R.P.H." on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Pannell pled guilty to incest and child molestation. His lengthy sentence was suspended pending satisfactory progress in sexual offender treatment, among other things. Petitioner failed to make satisfactory progress and his suspended sentence was revoked. He contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to credit for the time his sentence was suspended, at least to the extent that his time incarcerated, his time in postconfinement community custody, and his time on the suspended sentence added together exceed the statutory maximum for "class B" felonies. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded Petitioner was not entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent in the community under a special sex offender sentence alternative (SSOSA) before his suspended sentence was revoked. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Washington v. Pannell" on Justia Law

In 1995, Petitioner Jeffrey Coats pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery. He received a standard range sentence of 20 years. His judgment and sentence erroneously stated that the maximum sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery was life in prison. Fourteen years later, he filed a personal restraint petition contending that because of the erroneous statement, his judgment was not valid on its face and therefore he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that despite the error, Peititoner's judgment was valid on its face, and that the sentencing court did not exceed its authority in sentencing Petitioner. The Court remanded the case back to the sentencing court only to correct the erroneous statement pertaining to the sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Coats" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner Robert Danforth went to the King County Sheriff’s Office, described his history of sex offenses, and made explicit descriptions of his plans to molest boys and have intercourse with a child. He repeatedly said that he would act on his plan if he was not committed as a sex offender. The King County prosecuting attorney filed a petition to civilly commit Petitioner, but he moved for summary judgment, arguing that his actions did not constitute a "recent overt act" to qualify him for commitment. The trial court denied his motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon its review, the Supreme Court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found that Petitioner committed a threat when he gave explicit descriptions of his plans to molest boys, and thus satisfied due process requirements that the State show an offender was presently dangerous before he or she was involuntarily committed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts' decisions. View "In re Det. of Danforth" on Justia Law

Former Pierce County Superior Court Judge Petitioner Michael Hecht was convicted of felony harassment and of patronizing a prostitute. The trial court denied his motion for an order of indigency, and the Court of Appeals denied his motion for discretionary review of that order. Petitioner sought discretionary review with the Supreme Court. The superior court denied indigency status on remand from the appellate court, finding that though he was unemployed (from resigning his post shortly after conviction) and had significant debts, the court reasoned Petitioner had "adequate means" to pay for his legal expenses. On discretionary review by the Supreme Court, Petitioner proffered evidence that he had begun receiving food stamps. The Court found that by statute an indigent person includes anyone who "at any stage of a court proceeding" receives certain types of public assistance, including "food stamps or food stamp benefits transferred electronically." Petitioner was therefore presumptively indigent. The Court granted Petitioner's motion for discretionary review and remanded the case back to the superior court for reconsideration of his motion for order of indigency. View "Washington v. Hecht" on Justia Law