Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Several issues arose after a special deputy prosecuting attorney failed to attend a pretrial hearing and a superior court judge appointed a local defense attorney to take her place. The State appealed the resulting judgment and sentence and the trial court's refusal to vacate its appointment. The Court of Appeals found the appointment was improper and vacated the defendant's guilty plea. Affirming the Court of Appeals' holdings that the State has a right to appeal and that a superior court may appoint an attorney to replace any special prosecuting attorney, the Supreme Court found that the appointed attorney in this case was not qualified to serve as a prosecuting attorney due to a conflict of interest. In addition, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holdings that the "de facto official" doctrine could not save the attorney's appointment and that remand of the case did not violate the double jeopardy clause. The Court reversed the appellate court's holding that on remand, the case be tried to a different judge, noting that nothing in the record of this case suggested the judge displayed "animosity or bias, but simply demonstrated frustration at [the special deputy prosecuting attorney's] repeated failure to appear." View "Washington v. Tracer" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kenneth Budik was one of two victims of a shooting in Spokane. The other victim, Adama Walton, died as a result of the shooting. Based on Petitioner's statements that he did not know who was responsible for the crime, he was charged with, and convicted of, first degree rendering criminal assistance. Insufficient evidence supported Petitioner's conviction; accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated his conviction. The Court held that in order to prove that a defendant has rendered criminal assistance "by use of . . . deception," the State must show that the defendant made some affirmative act or statement; mere false disavowal of knowledge is insufficient to sustain a conviction for rendering criminal assistance. View "Washington v. Budik" on Justia Law

Respondent Lester Ray Jim, an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation, was cited by for unlawfully retaining undersized sturgeon. This occurred at the Maryhill Treaty Fishing Access Site (Maryhill), a plot of land set aside by Congress exclusively for the use of four Columbia River tribes to exercise their treaty fishing rights. The State argued it has rightfully assumed criminal jurisdiction at Maryhill. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that Maryhill was reserved and held by the United States for the exclusive use of tribal members and that the State therefore lacked criminal jurisdiction to cite Respondent. View "Washington v. Jim" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Eastmond was convicted of first degree robbery and first degree burglary. At sentencing, the trial court imposed an enhancement on Petitioner's sentence, based on the jury's determination that he was armed with a deadly weapon. While Petitioner's case was pending, the Supreme Court had decided "Washington v. Recuenco (110P.3d 188 (2005)) in which the Court recognized that sentences like Petitioner's violated the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution. Petitioner then brought a personal restraint petition to challenge the firearm enhancement. The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether in these circumstances prejudice could be conclusively presumed on collateral review, or whether Petitioner needed to demonstrate actual prejudice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the rule announced in "Washington v. Williams-Walker (225 P.3d 913 (2010) did not apply retroactively, and as such, Petitioner needed to demonstrate actual prejudice. Because he had not done so, the Court dismissed his petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Eastmond" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Hurst was charged with a felony, but he was found incompetent to stand trial. He was twice committed to a mental health treatment facility. After two 90-day periods in the facility, Petitioner failed to regain competency. The State sought a third and final mental health treatment period, lasting this time for up to 180 days. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the standard of proof required to commit an incompetent criminal defendant charged with a felony to a third mental health treatment period. Petitioner alleged that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution requires that the standard of proof be "clear, cogent and convincing evidence." The Supreme Court disagreed: "the legislature's selected preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied the Due Process Clause." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court. View "Washington v. Hurst" on Justia Law

A person under arrest for vehicular assault is subject to a mandatory blood test. Prior to the test administered in this case, the arresting trooper asked an interpreter to read the special evidence warning in Spanish to Petitioner Jose Morales. The trooper did not speak Spanish, and could not verify that the warning was actually read to Petitioner. The interpreter was not called to testify at trial nor was any signed special evidence form introduced into evidence. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner was not adequately informed of his right to an independent blood test. View "Washington v. Morales" on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a fact-finding hearing of "rapid recidivism" was a "sentencing" hearing exempt from the state rules of evidence. After a bench trial, the superior court found Petitioner James Griffin guilty of residential burglary. At sentencing, the judge imposed an exception sentence above the standard range, finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance. In making its determination that the aggravating circumstance existed, the court relied on inadmissible hearsay from the trial. Petitioner appealed his exceptional sentence. Though the appellate court agreed with Petitioner that the trial court relied on inadmissible hearsay, it affirmed the exceptional sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the exceptional sentence and remanded the case for resentencing: "[o]n remand the trial court may receive evidence to justify imposition of the exceptional sentence, and the rules of evidence apply to [Petitioner's] resentencing." View "Washington v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Petitioners Roger Scherner and Michael Gresham were separately charged with child molestation. At trial, relying on the recently enacted RCW 10.58.090, the State successfully introduced evidence that Scherner and Gresham had previously committed sex offenses against other children. In Scherner's case, the superior court ruled that evidence of his prior acts of molestation was also admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a common scheme or plan. In Gresham's case, a different superior court held that evidence of Gresham's prior conviction for second degree assault with sexual motivation was only admissible pursuant to RCW 10.58.090. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court in Scherner's case did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence for the purpose of showing a common scheme or plan and that its failure to give a limiting instruction, once requested, was harmless error. The Court therefore affirmed Scherner's conviction. Because RCW 10.58.090 irreconcilably conflicted with ER 404(b) and governed a procedural matter, the Court held that its enactment violated the separation of powers doctrine and was accordingly unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court held that the admission of evidence of Gresham's prior conviction was not harmless error and reversed his conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Gresham" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Breitung was convicted of assaulting Ossie Cook and Richard Stevenson and of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Cook and Stevenson, both auto mechanics, took a client's truck for a test drive. During the drive they stopped for cigarettes. While at the smoke shop, Cook noticed a woman enter a black sports car and leave. When they left, Cook and Stevenson followed the same route as this woman and continued down a nearby gravel road. As they were leaving, Respondent appeared and walked into the middle of the gravel road ahead of the truck. According to Cook and Stevenson, as they approached Respondent, he pulled a handgun from behind his back, walked to the driver's side window, and pointed it at both men, telling them to stop following his girl friend. At trial, the State proposed jury instructions for second degree assault and second degree unlawful possession. Defense counsel proposed no additional instructions, and Respondent was convicted on all three counts. The Court of Appeals reversed Respondent's assault convictions, holding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request lesser included offense instructions on fourth degree assault. The court also reversed Respondent's conviction for unlawful possession, holding that where as part of a prior conviction the court fails to give notice required by statute, a subsequent conviction for unlawful possession is invalid. Based on the Supreme Court's analysis in "Washington v. Grier," (246 P.3d 1260 (2011)), the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the ineffectiveness claim. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the appellate court in its decision on the failure to give the statutorily required notice of firearm prohibition as part of a prior conviction, finding Washington law "required" reversal of Respondant's possession conviction. View "Washington v. Breitung" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the authority of the Department of Corrections (Department) to deduct funds from an inmate’s trust account. Defendant Chad Alan Pierce filed a personal restraint petition challenging the Department's collection of costs of incarceration and legal financial obligations (LFOs) from his account. He asserted that his judgment and sentence prohibits the Department from making such deductions. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the Department has statutory authority to deduct costs of incarceration independent of the judgment and sentence. In addition, the Department could deduct LFOs while Defendant was confined, and need not issue a notice of payroll deduction before initiating its collection efforts. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pierce" on Justia Law