Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Police executed a search warrant and arrested Petitioner Patrick Jimi Lyons when they found a marijuana growing operation on his property. Probable cause for the search warrant was based solely on information from a confidential source. The affidavit for search warrant did not establish timely probable cause because it stated when the officer received the tip, not when the informant observed the criminal activity. The trial court convicted him, but the Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner's conviction. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the search warrant did not satisfy the requirements of the Washington State Constitution article I, section 7, and the trial court properly suppressed evidence obtained in the search. View "Washington v. Lyons" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed Defendant Brian Siers's conviction on one count of second degree assault. That court reversed the conviction because the State did not allege an aggravating factor in the charging document. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on a Supreme Court decision on the issue of whether aggravating factors must be charged in the information. The Court took the opportunity to revisit that decision and held that an aggravating factor is not the functional equivalent of an essential element, and, thus, need not be charged in the information. Because the charging document here contained the essential elements of the crimes charged and Defendant was given notice prior to trial of the State’s intent to seek an aggravated sentence, Defendant’s due process rights were not violated. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Siers" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted the State's motion to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in which granted Respondent Mansour Heidari's personal restraint petition and vacated his second degree child molestation conviction. In doing so, the Court of Appeals declined the State's request to direct entry of a judgment for the lesser included offense of attempted second degree child molestation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly declined to direct the entry of judgment of the lesser included offense, and accordingly affirmed the appellate court’s decision. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Heidari" on Justia Law

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An Auburn city police officer arrested Defendant Dustin Gauntt for possessing marijuana and using drug paraphernalia. An Auburn city prosecutor brought charges against him in Auburn Municipal Court under state law. On appeal of his conviction, Defendant contended that the city did not have the authority to prosecute him for violating statutes the city had not adopted. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, affirming the Court of Appeals and the superior court, and remanded the case back to the Auburn Municipal Court for dismissal. View "City of Auburn v. Gauntt" on Justia Law

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The Lewis County Superior Court found Defendant Michael Caton guilty of failure to report as a sex offender under the former RCW 9A.44.130 (2008). Defendant appealed, arguing among other things that the evidence did not support his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On May 19, 2009, Defendant registered with the Lewis County sheriff's office as a sex offender. On June 9, 2009, he was arrested for a driving offense. On June 10, after Defendant was released from jail, he appeared at the sheriff's office, believing that as a registered sex offender he was required to report to the sheriff after his release from confinement for any offense. But the sheriff's office did not give Defendant a new reporting date, leaving June 16 as the next reporting date. Defendant failed to report on June 16 and instead reported on June 17. The State charged him with failure to register as a sex offender for failing to report in person "on the required day for the 90 day reporting" period. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State had not proved that Defendant failed to report within 90 days of his registration: he reported on June 10 and again on June 17, both dates well within 90 days of his registration date of May 19, 2009. Accordingly, the Court reversed Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Caton" on Justia Law

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Defendant Daniel Snapp was stopped by police when an officer observed air fresheners hanging from Defendant's rear view mirror that blocked the driver's view. Upon further inspection, the officer observed a carabiner that "patched together" the driver's seat belt, which he believed to be insufficient and defective. As the officer pulled Defendant's car over, he testified he saw Defendant dip his right shoulder as if he was placing something under the seat. The officer would ultimately arrest Defendant for driving under the influence, and a search of the car was conducted incident to his arrest. The officer found that Defendant had multiple credit and identification cards with other peoples' identities. The State would charge Defendant with 22 counts of identity theft and for possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from that search, arguing the initial stop was unlawful. Acting pro se, Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review, arguing that the search violated the Washington Constitution. Finding that the warrantless searches of Defendant's vehicle violated his right to privacy, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Snapp" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Daniel Posey,Jr. committed two counts of second degree rape when he was sixteen years old. A jury convicted him, and the superior court sentenced him as an adult. On direct review, the Supreme Court remanded Petitioner's case with instructions that a juvenile court sentence him. Prior to the Court's mandate, Petitioner turned twenty-one. On remand, Petitioner challenged the juvenile court's authority to sentence him. The presiding judge agreed. The superior court resentenced Petitioner as an adult, but imposed a sentence consistent with the standard juvenile range. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the issue of this case was whether legislation relating to juvenile courts could deprive the superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction. The Court held that the legislature did not have the power to alter that constitutional grant of felony jurisdiction. The Court thus affirmed the sentence imposed on remand by the superior court, and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding Petitioner's original sentence. View "Washington v. Posey" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "Blakely v. Washington" (542 U.S. 296 (2004)) applied to Petitioner Michael Rowland's resentencing hearing where he received an exceptional sentence on facts found by the trial court. Petitioner was convicted in 1991 of first degree murder and taking a motor vehicle without permission. In 2007, he challenged his sentence on the basis that his offender score was erroneous. The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded for resentencing. The resentencing court found "Blakely" did not apply and reimposed the exceptional sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: under the circumstances of this case, the Court concluded that "Blakely" did not apply when the trial court neither "touched the actual findings supporting the exceptional sentence nor increased the sentence." View "Washington v. Rowland" on Justia Law

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The principal issue in three consolidated cases was whether certifications attesting to the existence or nonexistence of public records are "testimonial statements" subject to the demands of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,"(557 U.S. 305(2009)), the Washington Supreme Court held the confrontation clause does not forbid the admission of such evidence. "The teaching of 'Melendez-Diaz,' however, is that certifications declaring the existence or nonexistence of public records are in fact testimonial statements, which may not be introduced into evidence absent confrontation." Accordingly, the Court overruled its prior decisions to the extent they were contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. Here, defendants' confrontation rights were violated by admission of testimonial certifications. Excepting the hit and run conviction at issue in "Washington v. Jasper," admission of the certifications was not harmless. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in "State v. Jasper," affirmed the superior court in "Washington v. Cienfuegos," and reversed the superior court in "Washington v. Moimoi." View "Washington v. Jasper" on Justia Law

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Respondent Aaron Hahn asked someone to make a girl "disappear" or appear as if she "never existed" or "just be gone." Respondent was convicted of solicitation to commit first degree murder. Respondent was charged with four counts of third degree child rape, sexual exploitation of a minor, possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and stalking. While confined in jail awaiting trial, Respondent mentioned to another inmate, Mike Hendrickson, that he wished the complaining witness "S.M." was dead and that he would hurt her. Respondent asked Hendrickson if he knew anyone who could "get to" S.M., but Hendrickson said he could not help. Respondent then asked inmate Norman Livengood if he had any mafia connections, stating that he wanted someone hurt or killed. Livengood related the encounter to the police and agreed to cooperate in the resulting investigation. The police obtained a warrant and wired Livengood to record his conversations with Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Respondent was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of "solicitation" to commit fourth degree assault. Because the evidence did not support such an instruction, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Hahn" on Justia Law