Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Lewis County Superior Court found Defendant Michael Caton guilty of failure to report as a sex offender under the former RCW 9A.44.130 (2008). Defendant appealed, arguing among other things that the evidence did not support his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On May 19, 2009, Defendant registered with the Lewis County sheriff's office as a sex offender. On June 9, 2009, he was arrested for a driving offense. On June 10, after Defendant was released from jail, he appeared at the sheriff's office, believing that as a registered sex offender he was required to report to the sheriff after his release from confinement for any offense. But the sheriff's office did not give Defendant a new reporting date, leaving June 16 as the next reporting date. Defendant failed to report on June 16 and instead reported on June 17. The State charged him with failure to register as a sex offender for failing to report in person "on the required day for the 90 day reporting" period. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State had not proved that Defendant failed to report within 90 days of his registration: he reported on June 10 and again on June 17, both dates well within 90 days of his registration date of May 19, 2009. Accordingly, the Court reversed Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Caton" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Snapp was stopped by police when an officer observed air fresheners hanging from Defendant's rear view mirror that blocked the driver's view. Upon further inspection, the officer observed a carabiner that "patched together" the driver's seat belt, which he believed to be insufficient and defective. As the officer pulled Defendant's car over, he testified he saw Defendant dip his right shoulder as if he was placing something under the seat. The officer would ultimately arrest Defendant for driving under the influence, and a search of the car was conducted incident to his arrest. The officer found that Defendant had multiple credit and identification cards with other peoples' identities. The State would charge Defendant with 22 counts of identity theft and for possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from that search, arguing the initial stop was unlawful. Acting pro se, Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review, arguing that the search violated the Washington Constitution. Finding that the warrantless searches of Defendant's vehicle violated his right to privacy, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Snapp" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Posey,Jr. committed two counts of second degree rape when he was sixteen years old. A jury convicted him, and the superior court sentenced him as an adult. On direct review, the Supreme Court remanded Petitioner's case with instructions that a juvenile court sentence him. Prior to the Court's mandate, Petitioner turned twenty-one. On remand, Petitioner challenged the juvenile court's authority to sentence him. The presiding judge agreed. The superior court resentenced Petitioner as an adult, but imposed a sentence consistent with the standard juvenile range. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the issue of this case was whether legislation relating to juvenile courts could deprive the superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction. The Court held that the legislature did not have the power to alter that constitutional grant of felony jurisdiction. The Court thus affirmed the sentence imposed on remand by the superior court, and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding Petitioner's original sentence. View "Washington v. Posey" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "Blakely v. Washington" (542 U.S. 296 (2004)) applied to Petitioner Michael Rowland's resentencing hearing where he received an exceptional sentence on facts found by the trial court. Petitioner was convicted in 1991 of first degree murder and taking a motor vehicle without permission. In 2007, he challenged his sentence on the basis that his offender score was erroneous. The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded for resentencing. The resentencing court found "Blakely" did not apply and reimposed the exceptional sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: under the circumstances of this case, the Court concluded that "Blakely" did not apply when the trial court neither "touched the actual findings supporting the exceptional sentence nor increased the sentence." View "Washington v. Rowland" on Justia Law

The principal issue in three consolidated cases was whether certifications attesting to the existence or nonexistence of public records are "testimonial statements" subject to the demands of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,"(557 U.S. 305(2009)), the Washington Supreme Court held the confrontation clause does not forbid the admission of such evidence. "The teaching of 'Melendez-Diaz,' however, is that certifications declaring the existence or nonexistence of public records are in fact testimonial statements, which may not be introduced into evidence absent confrontation." Accordingly, the Court overruled its prior decisions to the extent they were contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. Here, defendants' confrontation rights were violated by admission of testimonial certifications. Excepting the hit and run conviction at issue in "Washington v. Jasper," admission of the certifications was not harmless. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in "State v. Jasper," affirmed the superior court in "Washington v. Cienfuegos," and reversed the superior court in "Washington v. Moimoi." View "Washington v. Jasper" on Justia Law

Respondent Aaron Hahn asked someone to make a girl "disappear" or appear as if she "never existed" or "just be gone." Respondent was convicted of solicitation to commit first degree murder. Respondent was charged with four counts of third degree child rape, sexual exploitation of a minor, possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and stalking. While confined in jail awaiting trial, Respondent mentioned to another inmate, Mike Hendrickson, that he wished the complaining witness "S.M." was dead and that he would hurt her. Respondent asked Hendrickson if he knew anyone who could "get to" S.M., but Hendrickson said he could not help. Respondent then asked inmate Norman Livengood if he had any mafia connections, stating that he wanted someone hurt or killed. Livengood related the encounter to the police and agreed to cooperate in the resulting investigation. The police obtained a warrant and wired Livengood to record his conversations with Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Respondent was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of "solicitation" to commit fourth degree assault. Because the evidence did not support such an instruction, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Hahn" on Justia Law

In September 2000, Joshua Dean Scott and his partner in crime, Douglas Sean James-Anderson, robbed a jewelry store in south Tacoma. They brought several guns, including an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle. Alerted by a silent alarm, the police were waiting in the store’s parking lot when Scott and James-Anderson emerged. They both ran, and both were caught. Scott was charged with and convicted of multiple counts of first degree robbery, unlawful possession of firearms, possession of stolen property, and possession of stolen firearms. The jury also found by special verdict that Scott was armed with a deadly weapon while committing most of the counts. On direct review, the Court of Appeals reversed the possession of stolen firearms charges, finding insufficient evidence that Scott knew the guns used in the robbery had been stolen, and remanded for resentencing. Scott was ultimately sentenced to 213 months. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court may refer to verdict forms to determine whether a judgment and sentence is valid on its face and thus not subject to collateral attack under RCW 10.73.090 and whether "Washington v. Recuenco" (180 P.3d 1276 (2008)) applied retroactively to cases that were final when the case was announced. The Court concluded that a court may consult the verdict forms to illuminate whether a judgment and sentence is valid on its face but that "Receunco" is not retroactive. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed this petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Scott" on Justia Law

Appellant Roosevelt Rafelo Johnson Jr. was convicted by a jury of attempted promotion of commercial sexual abuse of a minor based on his interaction with two undercover police officers. The female undercover officers were posing as 17-year-old girls, though both were in their mid to late 20s. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a defendant can be found guilty of attempted promotion of commercial sexual abuse of a minor when the defendant intends the criminal result of the crime, believes that the intended victim is a minor even if the victim is an adult posing as a minor, and takes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Because the evidence was more than sufficient to show that Appellant intended to commit the crime and took a substantial step toward completion, the Court affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Harry Carrier filed an untimely personal restraint petition asserting that his mandatory life sentence under the "two strikes" provision of the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) was invalid. He contended the trial court erroneously counted a dismissed conviction from 1981 as one of the strikes. The Commissioner denied review because Petitioner's judgment and sentence did not itself indicate that the 1981 conviction was dismissed. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's motion to modify and accepted review. Upon review, the Court concluded that the dismissal order attached as an exhibit to Petitioner's personal restraint petition could be considered in determining whether the judgment and sentence is valid on its face. In light of the dismissal order, the Court held that Petitioner's life sentence was invalid because a court may not include a dismissed conviction in a defendant's criminal history as a POAA strike offense. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in which that court reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant Bobby Ray Thompson's motion for postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in considering a postarrest statement that Defendant made to the police, but which was not admitted in evidence. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the trial court improperly relied on Defendant's unadmitted statement in denying the motion for postconviction DNA testing. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Thompson" on Justia Law