Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve four issues that arose after Defendants Anthony Marquise Emery Jr. and Aaron Edward Olson were convicted at a joint trial of first degree kidnapping, first degree robbery, first degree rape, and first degree accomplice rape. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Olson’s motions to sever, and whether Emery’s counsel was ineffective in failing to move for severance; (2) whether the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument constitute misconduct that entitles Emery and Olson to a new trial; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Emery’s motion for a mistrial based on Olson’s outbursts; and (4) whether Emery is entitled to a new trial based on cumulative error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Olson’s motions to sever, and Emery’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to move for severance; (2) the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument are improper but do not warrant a mistrial; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Emery’s motion for mistrial based on Olson’s outbursts; and (4) Emery is not entitled to a new trial based on cumulative error. Therefore the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Emery" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases, the trial court instructed the jury that it must be unanimous to either accept or reject the aggravating circumstances, contrary to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "State v. Bashaw," (234 P.3d 195 (2010)). However, the nonunanimity rule adopted in "Bashaw" was based on an incorrect rule announced in "State v. Goldberg," (72 P.3d 1083 (2003)). This rule conflicted with statutory authority, "cause[d] needless confusion, [did] not serve the policies that gave rise to it, and frustrates the purpose of jury unanimity." Accordingly, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to reconsider this portion of its holding in "Bashaw" and held that the nonunanimity rule could not stand. The Court affirmed the appellate court in upholding Petitioner Enrique Guzman Nunez's conviction and sentence, reversed the appellate court and reinstated Respondent George Ryan's exceptional sentence, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Guzman Nunez" on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court because they were based on the same facts. Petitioners Robert Brown and Theodore Kosewicz were both involved in the kidnapping, torture, and killing of Sebastian Esquibel. At trial, Brown was convicted of first degree kidnapping and felony murder with the predicate felony being the first degree kidnapping. At a separate trial, Kosewicz was convicted of first degree kidnapping and first degree aggravated murder with the aggravating factor being the first degree kidnapping. On appeal, both Brown's and Kosewicz's first degree kidnapping convictions were overturned because of a charging defect. The Court of Appeals did not overturn Brown's felony murder conviction or Kosewicz's aggravating factor verdict. Brown and Kosewicz argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that reversal of the first degree kidnapping convictions requires reversal of the felony murder and aggravating factor verdict that were based in part on the first degree kidnapping. Upon review, the Court affirmed Brown's felony murder conviction and Kosewicz's aggravating factor verdict. View "Washington v. Kosewicz" on Justia Law

Personal restraint petitioner Eric Flint maintains that his return to total confinement as a result of repeated violations of conditions of community custody violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. He filed his personal restraint in the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition as frivolous, and the Supreme Court granted discretionary review. Upon review, the Court concluded that application of the statute to Petitioner did not create an ex post facto problem and accordingly affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Petitioner's petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Flint" on Justia Law

In 1994, Petitioner Darold Stenson was sentenced to death after he was found guilty of murdering his wife and business partner, Frank Hoerner. In 2009, Petitioner's counsel filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) raising a due process claim based on alleged violations of "Brady v. Maryland,"(373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Petitioner's "Brady" claim pertained to evidence consisting of photographs and an FBI file that the State had access to at the time of trial but did not provide to Petitioner's counsel until 2009. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the State violated Petitioner's rights under the mandates of "Brady" and its progeny. Because the Court held that it did, it reversed Petitioner's aggravated first degree murder conviction and his death sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed Respondent Yussuf Abdulle's first degree theft and forgery convictions based on "Washington v. Davis" (438 P.2d 185 (1968)). The State urged the Court to overrule "Davis", arguing that it is incorrect because it rests on the mistaken view that "Miranda" requires proof of waiver beyond a reasonable doubt and harmful because it keeps relevant evidence from the trier of fact. The Court agreed that "Davis" was incorrect in light of cases that issued from the United States Supreme Court following "Miranda." Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Respondent's convictions. View "Washington v. Abdulle" on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant and arrested Petitioner Patrick Jimi Lyons when they found a marijuana growing operation on his property. Probable cause for the search warrant was based solely on information from a confidential source. The affidavit for search warrant did not establish timely probable cause because it stated when the officer received the tip, not when the informant observed the criminal activity. The trial court convicted him, but the Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner's conviction. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the search warrant did not satisfy the requirements of the Washington State Constitution article I, section 7, and the trial court properly suppressed evidence obtained in the search. View "Washington v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed Defendant Brian Siers's conviction on one count of second degree assault. That court reversed the conviction because the State did not allege an aggravating factor in the charging document. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on a Supreme Court decision on the issue of whether aggravating factors must be charged in the information. The Court took the opportunity to revisit that decision and held that an aggravating factor is not the functional equivalent of an essential element, and, thus, need not be charged in the information. Because the charging document here contained the essential elements of the crimes charged and Defendant was given notice prior to trial of the State’s intent to seek an aggravated sentence, Defendant’s due process rights were not violated. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Siers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's motion to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in which granted Respondent Mansour Heidari's personal restraint petition and vacated his second degree child molestation conviction. In doing so, the Court of Appeals declined the State's request to direct entry of a judgment for the lesser included offense of attempted second degree child molestation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly declined to direct the entry of judgment of the lesser included offense, and accordingly affirmed the appellate court’s decision. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Heidari" on Justia Law

An Auburn city police officer arrested Defendant Dustin Gauntt for possessing marijuana and using drug paraphernalia. An Auburn city prosecutor brought charges against him in Auburn Municipal Court under state law. On appeal of his conviction, Defendant contended that the city did not have the authority to prosecute him for violating statutes the city had not adopted. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, affirming the Court of Appeals and the superior court, and remanded the case back to the Auburn Municipal Court for dismissal. View "City of Auburn v. Gauntt" on Justia Law