Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Monte Hunley was convicted by a jury in 2009 of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sentencing court violated Respondent's right to due process by basing the imposed sentence on prior convictions demonstrated only by the prosecutor's written summary and Respondent's failure to object. The appellate court held that violated Respondent's right to due process. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "Washington v. Hunley" on Justia Law

William Munich was shot and killed by his neighbor, Marvin Ballsmider, approximately 18 minutes after he placed his first phone call to the Skagit Emergency Communications Center. The two had been in a property dispute related to access to a driveway and Ballsmider's property. Norma Smith, a Skagit 911 operator, took the call. Smith assured Munich that law enforcement was on the way. Smith entered the call as a priority two weapons offense rather than a priority one emergency call. Based on the code, the dispatched deputy, Dan Luvera, did not activate his emergency lights and only traveled slightly over the speed limit. About seven minutes later, Munich again called 911. Tammy Canniff took the second call, and Munich told her that he was running away from Ballsmider who was following and shooting. The dispatcher informed Deputy Luvera of these facts and the deputy consequently activated his emergency lights and siren and increased his speed. The second call ended with the sound of Munich being fatally shot on the highway. Deputy Luvera arrived two minutes later and arrested Ballsmider for Munich's murder. Munich was running toward the direction from which Deputy Luvera arrived. Munich's estate sued Skagit County, the Skagit County Sheriff's Office, and Skagit Emergency Communications Center (County) for wrongful death, alleging the County negligently responded to the incident. The County moved for summary judgment dismissal of the Estate’s claims asserting it was not liable for Munich's death under the public duty doctrine, specifically that the "special relationship" exception because the County provided no inaccurate or false information that Munich had detrimentally relied on. The trial court denied summary judgment, ruling the special relationship exception did not require false or inaccurate assurances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that where the express assurance promises action there is no falsity requirement because the assurances may be superficially correct but negligently fulfilled. The accuracy, or lack thereof, of an assurance has no bearing on the issue of whether an actionable duty was established. View "Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc'n Ctr." on Justia Law

Lindy Deer was convicted of third degree rape of a child after having sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old boy on multiple occasions. Deer claimed that she was asleep during several acts of intercourse and could not be guilty of rape because she did not act with volition. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Deer's claimed lack of volition amounted to an affirmative defense, for which the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court correctly refused Deer's request to instruct the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was awake during the acts at issue. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Deer" on Justia Law

On direct review, appellant Phiengchai Sisouvanh challenged the adequacy of the competency evaluation she received pursuant to RCW 10.77.060 prior to her trial and conviction for aggravated first degree murder. Sisouvanh met a pregnant woman and offered to give the woman spare baby clothes. Sisouvanh drove the woman to a highway turnout, stabbed her, and then proceeded to a secluded location where she cut the woman’s abdomen open and removed the baby from the woman’s womb. Sisouvanh then drove to another location and called emergency services, reporting that she was giving birth and in need of assistance. She moved into the backseat of her car with her victim’s child, partially undressed herself, and waited for an ambulance to arrive. Sisouvanh was taken to a hospital, where a doctor examined her and discovered that she had not given birth. Although Sisouvanh initially persisted in denying the doctor’s allegation, eventually she admitted that she had cut the baby out of another woman. The doctor contacted police. Sisouvanh immigrated to the United States from Laos at around five years of age and alleges that the court appointed expert who conducted her evaluation failed to properly account for her distinct cultural background as a Laotian immigrant. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. The court-appointed expert who evaluated Sisouvanh reasonably explained the propriety of the tests he administered and his interpretation of Sisouvanh’s behavior, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the expert’s examination and report as having been conducted in a qualified manner sufficient to satisfy RCW 10.77.060. View "Washington v. Sisouvanh" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edward M. Glasmann was convicted of second degree assault, attempted second degree robbery, first degree kidnapping, and obstruction arising from incidents that occurred while he was intoxicated. During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney made an electronic presentation to the jury that graphically displayed his personal opinion that Glasmann was “guilty, guilty, guilty” of the crimes charged by the State. The prosecutor’s misconduct was "flagrant, ill intentioned," and the Supreme Court could not conclude with "any confidence" that it did not to have an effect on the outcome of the trial. The Court reversed Petitioner's convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann" on Justia Law

Parties David Koenig and Thurston County sought review of a decision by the Court of Appeals which held that a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) evaluation could be disclosed under the Public Records Act (PRA), but a victim impact statement could not. The Court of Appeals found that both the SSOSA evaluation and victim impact statement were investigative records. The court then determined the victim impact statement was exempt under the essential-to-effective-law enforcement prong of the investigative records exemption but concluded the SSOSA evaluation was not exempt. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that neither the SSOSA evaluation nor the victim impact statement are investigative records within the meaning of RCW 42.56.240. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Koenig v. Thurston County" on Justia Law

Kevin Coe challenged a Court of Appeals decision that affirmed his 2008 commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP). The trial court admitted evidence of several unadjudicated sexual offenses, and allowed an expert psychologist to rely on that evidence. In addition to these challenges, Coe claimed his trial counsel was ineffective, that his due process confrontation rights were violated, and that he was entitled to a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine. Finding no reversible error in any of Coe’s claims, the Supreme Court affirmed his commitment. View "In re Det. of Coe" on Justia Law

In 1997, Cecil Davis raped, robbed, and murdered 65-year-old Yoshiko Couch. A jury found him guilty of aggravated first degree murder and unanimously agreed that no mitigating factors warranted leniency, and was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence. The Court later granted Davis's personal restraint petition (PRP) and reversed his sentence because jurors had seen him in shackles. At the new penalty proceeding, the jury found no mitigating factors warranting leniency and Davis was again sentenced to death. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in Davis's second penalty proceeding, the Supreme Court again affirmed Davis's death sentence. View "Washington v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charles Weber filed an untimely PRP asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of the case and failed to explore the possibility that he had been misidentified as the perpetrator. Petitioner sought to avoid the procedural time bar by arguing that the actual innocence doctrine, recognized by this court in "In re Personal Restraint of Carter, (263 P.3d 1241 (2011)), be applied to allow review of his constitutional claim. Petitioner supported his innocence claim with new evidence in the form of declarations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner's new evidence was insufficient to show he was factually innocent. Accordingly, the Court dismissed his PRP. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Weber" on Justia Law

Richard J. Dyer was a convicted rapist who denied his guilt and was therefore ineligible for sex offender treatment. He was serving a maximum term of life in prison. Though Dyer had a history of good behavior while in prison, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) found Dyer unparolable for the sixth time and extended his minimum term another 60 months. In doing so, the ISRB considered Dyer's lack of sex offender treatment, along with additional evidence, and concluded he was not completely rehabilitated. Dyer filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) directly with this court, claiming the ISRB abused its discretion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the ISRB's decision. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Dyer" on Justia Law