Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John George Cooper was arrested in Washington State in 2009 for attempting to obtain pain-killers with a fake prescription. In October while his case was pending, Cooper jumped bail. According to Cooper, he was summoned to Texas by his father to assist in his grandfather's funeral. While in Texas in 2010, Cooper committed another theft for which he was arrested and convicted. Cooper was sentenced at the same time for two thefts he had previously committed in Texas in 2008. The Texas court deferred those sentences in March 2010. Cooper returned to Washington a few months later and pled guilty to the pain-killer incident as well as bail jumping. The two deferred sentences he had received in Texas were counted as part of his offender score in Washington. Cooper's sole argument on appeal to the Supreme Court was that the Texas deferred sentences were not adjudications of guilt and so should not have counted as convictions for the purpose of calculating his Washington offender score. The trial court and Court of Appeals rejected his argument. The Supreme Court also rejected his argument and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Petitioner James John Chambers Jr. was charged with several crimes arising from three incidents that occurred in 1999. Before committing the November crimes, Petitioner plead guilty to charges resulting from the February and May incidents. Prior to sentencing on these charges, Petitioner entered into an agreement that provided that he would plead guilty to the November crimes and stipulate to a 240 month sentence to run consecutively to the sentences for the February and May crimes. Petitioner was sentenced for the February and May crimes and pled guilty to the November crimes on the same date. He was sentenced for the November crimes at a subsequent hearing. Several years later, Petitioner filed personal restraint petitions (PRPs), seeking to withdraw his plea to the February charges and argued that his sentence on the November charges was incorrectly calculated. The trial court granted his motion to withdraw his February plea but denied his request for resentencing on the November charges. The Court of Appeals consolidated the PRPs and reversed, holding that the pleas were indivisible and declining to consider the validity of the sentence arising from the November crimes. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner entered into a global plea agreement that was indivisible and that he failed to demonstrate that his 240 month sentence was calculated in error. View "Washington v. Chambers" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the conflicting authority on which the standard of review applies to a sentencing court's determination of "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Defendant Julio Cesar Aldano Graciano was charged by amended information with four counts of first degree rape of a child and two counts of first degree child molestation relating to E.R. The jury was instructed that a guilty verdict required unanimous agreement on which act was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was further instructed that the acts constituting each count must be separate and distinct from one another. The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Furthermore, the jury found Defendant not guilty of the molestation charge relating to a second child, J.R. At sentencing, defense counsel argued the crimes should have been considered the "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) for purposes of calculating Defendant's offender score. Both Defendant and the State sought review of the trial court's sentence. The Court of Appeals (Division Two) reviewed the trial court's determination de novo, adopting the reasoning of Division Three in "Washington v. Torngren," (196 P.3d 742 (2008)). The Torngren Court acknowledged a long line of precedent stating the proper standard is abuse of discretion but held that a de novo standard “seem[s] more appropriate." The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reaffirmed that determinations of same criminal conduct are reviewed for abuse of discretion or misapplication of law, and concluded that the sentencing judge acted within her discretion in declining to find that Defendant's crimes constituted the same criminal conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's sentence. View "Washington v. Aldana Graciano" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sealing of juror questionnaires amounted to a trial closure, implicating a defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to a public trial. Questionnaires were given to and completed by prospective jurors to assist counsel in jury selection and to possibly identify who would be individually questioned outside the presence of the entire venire but in open court. Several days after the jury was selected, the trial court sealed the questionnaires. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the right to a public trial had not been violated. However, the court held that the trial court’s failure to conduct a "Bone-Club" analysis before sealing the questionnaires was inconsistent with the public’s right of open access to court records and remanded the case for reconsideration of the sealing order. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Washington v. Beskurt" on Justia Law

Defendant Jon Strine was charged with and tried for vehicular homicide and vehicular assault after he crashed his vehicle into a motorcycle carrying a married couple. After a two-day deliberation, the jury returned verdict forms finding Defendant “not guilty” on both charges. The trial judge polled the jury on the mistaken belief that polling was required. Six jurors dissented from the original verdict and the presiding juror stated that the jury would be unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial judge declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Defendant then moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds but the trial court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, finding that double jeopardy clause does not prevent the State from reprosecuting Defendant because his original jeopardy never terminated. View "Washington v. Strine" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bryan Allen challenged his felony harassment conviction, raising three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the potential fallibility of cross-racial eyewitness identification; (2) whether the “true threat” requirement is an essential element of a harassment statute that must be pleaded in the information and included in the "to-convict" instruction; and (3) alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Court of Appeals rejected the arguments raised. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Allen" on Justia Law

Under chapter 10.05 RCW, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor in a Washington court of limited jurisdiction may petition the court for deferred prosecution if the crime was the result of substance dependency or mental illness. After the defendant fulfills the statutory requirements, the judge may dismiss the charges. RCW 10.05.130 requires the appropriation of public funds "to provide investigation, examination, report and treatment plan for any indigent person who is unable to pay the cost of any program of treatment" within a deferred prosecution. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the statutory interpretation of the term "treatment plan" in RCW 10.05.130. The Court held that according to the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 10.05.130, the legislature did not intend to commit public funds for the full course of treatment programs for indigent defendants in deferred prosecutions. View "Washington v. Velasquez" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a traffic stop motivated by an uncorroborated tip (but also independently motivated by a reasonable, articulable suspicion) was unconstitutionally pretextual under the Washington Constitution. Upon review, the Court concluded that a "mixed motive" traffic stop is not pretextual "so long as the desire to address a suspected traffic infraction (or criminal activity) for which the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion is an actual, conscious and independent cause" of the stop. View "Washington v. Arreola" on Justia Law

Larry Stout was severely injured while being apprehended by a subcontractor of CJ Johnson Bail Bonds. He sued the contractor, the subcontractor, and the owners of CJ Johnson under two theories of vicarious liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CJ Johnson, holding that vicarious liability did not apply in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, assuming that vicarious liability applies to the activity but holding that such liability is available only to "innocent[] nonparticipant[s]," not those voluntarily engaging in the dangerous activity with knowledge of the danger. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that fugitive apprehension was an activity that posed a peculiar risk of physical harm, and that defendant could assert a cause of action against CJ Johnson based on the theory of vicarious liability because the narrow exception for employees of independent contractors (in this case, the subcontractor) did not apply. View "Stout v. Warren" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nicholas Pappas challenged an appellate court decision that affirmed an exceptional sentence for vehicular assault based on the severity of the victim's injuries. The case arose from a 2008 motorcycle accident in which Petitioner's passenger was thrown from the vehicle and suffered multiple injuries, including permanent brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Washington case law and the language of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y) authorized an exceptional sentence when the jury finds the victim's injuries substantially exceed "substantial bodily harm." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Pappas" on Justia Law