Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court violated petitioner Brandon Coristine's constitutional rights by offering an affirmative defense instruction over his objection. Petitioner argued that offering the instruction to the jury violated his right to control his defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where a defendant chooses not to argue or invoke an affirmative defense, offering an instruction on the defense over the defendant's objection violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Washington v. Coristine" on Justia Law

In 2010, Mike Siegel moved to intervene and to unseal the court file in the criminal case of "Washington v. Richardson,"(King County Superior Court No. 93-1-02331-2). The court file was originally sealed in 2002. The trial court authorized intervention but denied the motion to unseal. Siegel petitioned the Supreme Court for direct review of the trial court's order denying his motion to unseal. The deputy clerk denied appeal as a matter of right and redesignated the matter as a motion for discretionary review. The Court granted direct discretionary review. Siegel argued that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to unseal because it failed to perform an "Ishikawa" analysis and failed to comply with GR 15; (2) the denial of his motion to unseal is appealable as of right; and (3) he should have been entitled to attorney fees under RAP 18 .1. Because the trial court failed to apply Ishikawa and GR 15( e )(2); and failed to articulate its reasons for continued sealing on the record, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if the records should remain sealed under Ishikawa and GR 15(e)(2). View "Washington v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved an exceptional sentence, imposed for a second degree assault conviction, where the jury found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense. Defendant Richard Duncalf was tried on charges of first degree assault and, as an alternative, second degree assault. The jury acquitted on the first degree assault but found defendant guilty of second degree assault. The jury also was instructed on an aggravating factor and found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy second degree assault to support the exceptional sentence imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging whether, under the statute defining second degree assault, a victim's injuries can legally exceed those contemplated by the statutory definition absent a jury finding of "great bodily harm." Defendant also challenged the exceptional circumstances inquiry as being unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed and after its review, finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Duncalf" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Fuller was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with one count of obstructing a law enforcement officer under RCW 9A.76.020 and one count of assault under SMC 12A. 16.010. Following a jury trial, petitioner was acquitted of assault but convicted of obstructing a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to 365 days in jail with 358 suspended, a $5,000 fine with $5,000 suspended, and he was ordered to pay restitution. Petitioner appealed to the King County Superior Court, arguing that the municipal court lacked the authority to order restitution and that restitution may only be imposed in lieu of a fine under RCW 9A.20.030. The superior court rejected this argument, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution and that it had the authority to order both restitution and a fine under the reasoning of "Washington v. Barnett, ( 675 P.2d 626 (1984)). Petitioner filed a motion for discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which held that RCW 35.20.010(1) gave the municipal court authority to impose both a fine and restitution. Considering the amendments to these statutes in light of the legislature's intent and the surrounding statutes and case law, the Supreme Court held that the amendments did not alter the authority of municipal courts to impose restitution and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "City of Seattle v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Robert Evans stole a business check from the small business where he worked, made the check to himself for $500, then forged a signature on the check and cashed it. Evans was charged with identity theft and convicted after a bench trial. He challenged his conviction on the ground that RCW 9.35.020 (the identity theft statute) criminalized theft of a natural person's identity but did not criminalize theft of a corporate identity-or in the alternative, that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Evans's arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals. "The plain language and legislative history of the identity theft statute demonstrate that theft of a corporate identity is a crime. The identity theft statute provided fair warning to Evans and other persons and contains sufficiently objective standards for purposes of enforcement. We thus affirm Evans's conviction." View "Washington v. Evans" on Justia Law

A police officer positioned on a second floor observed Defendant Gregorio Ortega commit acts that gave the officer probable cause to believe Defendant was engaged in drug traffic loitering, a gross misdemeanor. The officer radioed fellow officers, described what he was witnessing, and instructed them to arrest Defendant. One of the arresting officers searched Defendant and found crack cocaine and cash. Defendant unsuccessfully moved the trial court to suppress evidence of the drugs and cash, and he was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether an officer has lawful authority to arrest a gross misdemeanor suspect based solely on whether the officer who directs the arrest from a remote location is an "arresting officer." After review, the Supreme Court concluded that unless a statutory exception applies, an officer may arrest a misdemeanor suspect without a warrant only if the officer was present when the misdemeanor was committed. Here, the officer who arrested Defendant was not present when the misdemeanor occurred, and the record did not support a finding that the officer who observed the offense was an "arresting officer." View "Washington v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Flaherty attempted to file a motion to vacate his 2005 conviction for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance with the Spokane Superior Court. In 2009, Petitioner was considered a "career offender" and subject to an increased sentence for a federal conviction. Petitioner tried to file his motion on the grounds that his attorney failed to advise him that pleading guilty would contribute to the "career offender" determination. The court refused the file the motion as untimely. Petitioner appealed, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed: "it is plainly not part of the clerk's ministerial function to determine whether a collateral challenge is timely." View "Washington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Yates, Jr. filed a personal restraint petition following the Supreme Court's decision to affirm his death sentence. Petitioner was sentenced in 2000 to 408 years in prison for thirteen counts of aggravated first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. In 2002, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of aggravated first degree murder, for which he received the death penalty. Petitioner raised 25 grounds for relief covering a host of legal issues, including procedural errors at trial, ineffective assistance of counsel, juror bias and public trial rights. The Court found that no merit to any of Petitioner's claims, and dismissed Petitioner's restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a domestic violence protection order that included a child visitation provision qualified as a "court-ordered parenting plan" under Washington's first degree custodial interference statute, RCW 9A.40.060(2). Upon review, the Court concluded that it did not, because the legislature specifically created the phrase "court-ordered parenting plan" as a term of art to refer to a document created under chapter 26.09 RCW. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for dismissal of Petitioner Jose Veliz, Jr.'s custodial interference conviction for insufficient evidence. View "Washington v. Veliz" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Toledo-Sotelo filed an untimely personal restraint petition but argued that his judgment and sentence recited an incorrect offender score and offense seriousness level. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court used the sentencing range that resulted from the correct offender score and seriousness level. Thus the sentencing court did not exceed its statutory authority and the judgment and sentence was valid on its face. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and dismissed Toledo-Sotelo’s untimely petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Toledo-Sotelo" on Justia Law