Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A police officer positioned on a second floor observed Defendant Gregorio Ortega commit acts that gave the officer probable cause to believe Defendant was engaged in drug traffic loitering, a gross misdemeanor. The officer radioed fellow officers, described what he was witnessing, and instructed them to arrest Defendant. One of the arresting officers searched Defendant and found crack cocaine and cash. Defendant unsuccessfully moved the trial court to suppress evidence of the drugs and cash, and he was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether an officer has lawful authority to arrest a gross misdemeanor suspect based solely on whether the officer who directs the arrest from a remote location is an "arresting officer." After review, the Supreme Court concluded that unless a statutory exception applies, an officer may arrest a misdemeanor suspect without a warrant only if the officer was present when the misdemeanor was committed. Here, the officer who arrested Defendant was not present when the misdemeanor occurred, and the record did not support a finding that the officer who observed the offense was an "arresting officer." View "Washington v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Flaherty attempted to file a motion to vacate his 2005 conviction for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance with the Spokane Superior Court. In 2009, Petitioner was considered a "career offender" and subject to an increased sentence for a federal conviction. Petitioner tried to file his motion on the grounds that his attorney failed to advise him that pleading guilty would contribute to the "career offender" determination. The court refused the file the motion as untimely. Petitioner appealed, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed: "it is plainly not part of the clerk's ministerial function to determine whether a collateral challenge is timely." View "Washington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Yates, Jr. filed a personal restraint petition following the Supreme Court's decision to affirm his death sentence. Petitioner was sentenced in 2000 to 408 years in prison for thirteen counts of aggravated first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. In 2002, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of aggravated first degree murder, for which he received the death penalty. Petitioner raised 25 grounds for relief covering a host of legal issues, including procedural errors at trial, ineffective assistance of counsel, juror bias and public trial rights. The Court found that no merit to any of Petitioner's claims, and dismissed Petitioner's restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a domestic violence protection order that included a child visitation provision qualified as a "court-ordered parenting plan" under Washington's first degree custodial interference statute, RCW 9A.40.060(2). Upon review, the Court concluded that it did not, because the legislature specifically created the phrase "court-ordered parenting plan" as a term of art to refer to a document created under chapter 26.09 RCW. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for dismissal of Petitioner Jose Veliz, Jr.'s custodial interference conviction for insufficient evidence. View "Washington v. Veliz" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Toledo-Sotelo filed an untimely personal restraint petition but argued that his judgment and sentence recited an incorrect offender score and offense seriousness level. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court used the sentencing range that resulted from the correct offender score and seriousness level. Thus the sentencing court did not exceed its statutory authority and the judgment and sentence was valid on its face. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and dismissed Toledo-Sotelo’s untimely petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Toledo-Sotelo" on Justia Law

John George Cooper was arrested in Washington State in 2009 for attempting to obtain pain-killers with a fake prescription. In October while his case was pending, Cooper jumped bail. According to Cooper, he was summoned to Texas by his father to assist in his grandfather's funeral. While in Texas in 2010, Cooper committed another theft for which he was arrested and convicted. Cooper was sentenced at the same time for two thefts he had previously committed in Texas in 2008. The Texas court deferred those sentences in March 2010. Cooper returned to Washington a few months later and pled guilty to the pain-killer incident as well as bail jumping. The two deferred sentences he had received in Texas were counted as part of his offender score in Washington. Cooper's sole argument on appeal to the Supreme Court was that the Texas deferred sentences were not adjudications of guilt and so should not have counted as convictions for the purpose of calculating his Washington offender score. The trial court and Court of Appeals rejected his argument. The Supreme Court also rejected his argument and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Petitioner James John Chambers Jr. was charged with several crimes arising from three incidents that occurred in 1999. Before committing the November crimes, Petitioner plead guilty to charges resulting from the February and May incidents. Prior to sentencing on these charges, Petitioner entered into an agreement that provided that he would plead guilty to the November crimes and stipulate to a 240 month sentence to run consecutively to the sentences for the February and May crimes. Petitioner was sentenced for the February and May crimes and pled guilty to the November crimes on the same date. He was sentenced for the November crimes at a subsequent hearing. Several years later, Petitioner filed personal restraint petitions (PRPs), seeking to withdraw his plea to the February charges and argued that his sentence on the November charges was incorrectly calculated. The trial court granted his motion to withdraw his February plea but denied his request for resentencing on the November charges. The Court of Appeals consolidated the PRPs and reversed, holding that the pleas were indivisible and declining to consider the validity of the sentence arising from the November crimes. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner entered into a global plea agreement that was indivisible and that he failed to demonstrate that his 240 month sentence was calculated in error. View "Washington v. Chambers" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the conflicting authority on which the standard of review applies to a sentencing court's determination of "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Defendant Julio Cesar Aldano Graciano was charged by amended information with four counts of first degree rape of a child and two counts of first degree child molestation relating to E.R. The jury was instructed that a guilty verdict required unanimous agreement on which act was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was further instructed that the acts constituting each count must be separate and distinct from one another. The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Furthermore, the jury found Defendant not guilty of the molestation charge relating to a second child, J.R. At sentencing, defense counsel argued the crimes should have been considered the "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) for purposes of calculating Defendant's offender score. Both Defendant and the State sought review of the trial court's sentence. The Court of Appeals (Division Two) reviewed the trial court's determination de novo, adopting the reasoning of Division Three in "Washington v. Torngren," (196 P.3d 742 (2008)). The Torngren Court acknowledged a long line of precedent stating the proper standard is abuse of discretion but held that a de novo standard “seem[s] more appropriate." The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reaffirmed that determinations of same criminal conduct are reviewed for abuse of discretion or misapplication of law, and concluded that the sentencing judge acted within her discretion in declining to find that Defendant's crimes constituted the same criminal conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's sentence. View "Washington v. Aldana Graciano" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sealing of juror questionnaires amounted to a trial closure, implicating a defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to a public trial. Questionnaires were given to and completed by prospective jurors to assist counsel in jury selection and to possibly identify who would be individually questioned outside the presence of the entire venire but in open court. Several days after the jury was selected, the trial court sealed the questionnaires. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the right to a public trial had not been violated. However, the court held that the trial court’s failure to conduct a "Bone-Club" analysis before sealing the questionnaires was inconsistent with the public’s right of open access to court records and remanded the case for reconsideration of the sealing order. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Washington v. Beskurt" on Justia Law

Defendant Jon Strine was charged with and tried for vehicular homicide and vehicular assault after he crashed his vehicle into a motorcycle carrying a married couple. After a two-day deliberation, the jury returned verdict forms finding Defendant “not guilty” on both charges. The trial judge polled the jury on the mistaken belief that polling was required. Six jurors dissented from the original verdict and the presiding juror stated that the jury would be unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial judge declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Defendant then moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds but the trial court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, finding that double jeopardy clause does not prevent the State from reprosecuting Defendant because his original jeopardy never terminated. View "Washington v. Strine" on Justia Law