Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Lorraine Netherton was convicted of second degree murder. Upon review of her appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erroneously imposed a sentence enhancement based on the jury's "deadly weapon" finding. Because petitioner's appellate counsel misapprehended who represented Petitioner at a critical stage of her appeal, Petitioner lost an opportunity to get the enhancement reversed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Netherton" on Justia Law

Petitioner Josh Sanchez was adjudicated a juvenile sex offender. He petitioned against the superior court's release of his offender information to the King County Sheriff's Office when he was released back into the community. Washington law mandated that the local authorities notify the community of the offender's release and potential risk that the offender posed. The Supreme Court held that the juvenile court could release the evaluation of petitioner that resulted in his receiving offender status, and that it was not a violation of his rights to do so. View "Washington v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Smith was apprehended by police on the doorstep of his motel room and charged with rape, assault, harassment, kidnapping and child rape. Prior to trial, the Supreme Court invalidated the practice of random motel registry searches. At Petitioner's suppression hearing, he argued that the evidence gathered against him was the fruit of an unlawful registry search, and therefore should have been suppressed. The trial court allowed the evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The appellate court upheld Petitioner's convictions, concluding that the evidence was admissible under the attenuation and independent source doctrines. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction, holding the evidence was admissible because the warrantless search that led to its discovery was justifiable under the warrant exception for when lives were in danger. View "Washington v. Smith" on Justia Law

An officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation. When it turned out that the driver and his passenger both had suspended drivers' licenses and alternate arrangements could not be made, the officer arranged for a tow truck to move the car. In order to turn the vehicle over to the towing company, the officer conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered methamphetamine during the search. The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine and driving while his license was suspended. He appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence on the ground the search was pretextual. He also argued that because he did not consent to the search, it was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed, finding that under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, law enforcement officers do not have to obtain consent in order to conduct an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle. View "Washington v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2009, Petitioner Lowell Finstad faced at least seven felony charges. After he was convicted by jury on two, he and the State negotiated a global plea agreement on the remaining charges. The agreement resulted in less prison time, and in exchange, Petitioner agreed to dismiss his appeal of the jury convictions. Under the terms of the agreement, the sentences would run concurrently. However, the State indicated that it would ask the judge to run a sentence for delivery of a controlled substance conviction consecutive to the others. From the record, it appeared that neither the State nor Petitioner nor the trial court realized that the last consecutive sentence would constitute an exceptional sentence that required special findings. The judge accepted the pleas without making any special findings. Petitioner did not appeal. Three years later, he filed a personal restraint petition contending he received an exceptional sentence that did not comply with Washington law. The State argued in response to the petition that under the facts of this case, Petitioner was not entitled to relief because he could not show he was prejudiced by the error. The Supreme Court agreed with the State and dismissed Petitioner's petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court violated petitioner Brandon Coristine's constitutional rights by offering an affirmative defense instruction over his objection. Petitioner argued that offering the instruction to the jury violated his right to control his defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where a defendant chooses not to argue or invoke an affirmative defense, offering an instruction on the defense over the defendant's objection violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Washington v. Coristine" on Justia Law

In 2010, Mike Siegel moved to intervene and to unseal the court file in the criminal case of "Washington v. Richardson,"(King County Superior Court No. 93-1-02331-2). The court file was originally sealed in 2002. The trial court authorized intervention but denied the motion to unseal. Siegel petitioned the Supreme Court for direct review of the trial court's order denying his motion to unseal. The deputy clerk denied appeal as a matter of right and redesignated the matter as a motion for discretionary review. The Court granted direct discretionary review. Siegel argued that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to unseal because it failed to perform an "Ishikawa" analysis and failed to comply with GR 15; (2) the denial of his motion to unseal is appealable as of right; and (3) he should have been entitled to attorney fees under RAP 18 .1. Because the trial court failed to apply Ishikawa and GR 15( e )(2); and failed to articulate its reasons for continued sealing on the record, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if the records should remain sealed under Ishikawa and GR 15(e)(2). View "Washington v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved an exceptional sentence, imposed for a second degree assault conviction, where the jury found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense. Defendant Richard Duncalf was tried on charges of first degree assault and, as an alternative, second degree assault. The jury acquitted on the first degree assault but found defendant guilty of second degree assault. The jury also was instructed on an aggravating factor and found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy second degree assault to support the exceptional sentence imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging whether, under the statute defining second degree assault, a victim's injuries can legally exceed those contemplated by the statutory definition absent a jury finding of "great bodily harm." Defendant also challenged the exceptional circumstances inquiry as being unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed and after its review, finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Duncalf" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Fuller was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with one count of obstructing a law enforcement officer under RCW 9A.76.020 and one count of assault under SMC 12A. 16.010. Following a jury trial, petitioner was acquitted of assault but convicted of obstructing a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to 365 days in jail with 358 suspended, a $5,000 fine with $5,000 suspended, and he was ordered to pay restitution. Petitioner appealed to the King County Superior Court, arguing that the municipal court lacked the authority to order restitution and that restitution may only be imposed in lieu of a fine under RCW 9A.20.030. The superior court rejected this argument, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution and that it had the authority to order both restitution and a fine under the reasoning of "Washington v. Barnett, ( 675 P.2d 626 (1984)). Petitioner filed a motion for discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which held that RCW 35.20.010(1) gave the municipal court authority to impose both a fine and restitution. Considering the amendments to these statutes in light of the legislature's intent and the surrounding statutes and case law, the Supreme Court held that the amendments did not alter the authority of municipal courts to impose restitution and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "City of Seattle v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Robert Evans stole a business check from the small business where he worked, made the check to himself for $500, then forged a signature on the check and cashed it. Evans was charged with identity theft and convicted after a bench trial. He challenged his conviction on the ground that RCW 9.35.020 (the identity theft statute) criminalized theft of a natural person's identity but did not criminalize theft of a corporate identity-or in the alternative, that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Evans's arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals. "The plain language and legislative history of the identity theft statute demonstrate that theft of a corporate identity is a crime. The identity theft statute provided fair warning to Evans and other persons and contains sufficiently objective standards for purposes of enforcement. We thus affirm Evans's conviction." View "Washington v. Evans" on Justia Law