Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a trial court may allow a witness to be accompanied by a comfort animal, here a dog, when testifying during trial. Generally, wide discretion is given to the trial court to control proceedings, including the manner in which testimony will be presented. Here, the trial court acted within its broad discretion when it determined that the facility dog provided by the prosecutor's office to the victim was needed in light of the victim's severe developmental disabilities in order for the victim to testify adequately. View "Washington v. Dye" on Justia Law

Dayva Cross pled guilty to killing his wife and two of her three daughters in 2001 for which he was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence after direct review. In his first personal restraint petition challenging the judgment and sentence, Cross contended, among other things, that an "Alford" plea was insufficient to support capital punishment and asked the Supreme Court to vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court with direction that the Alford plea be set aside. After review, the Court held that a capital sentence could be predicated on an Alford plea and denied that portion of Cross' personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Cross" on Justia Law

Benjamin Brockie was convicted of 2 counts of first degree robbery, 15 counts of first degree kidnapping, and 2 counts of making bomb threats. Brockie asked the Supreme Court to vacate those convictions because the jury was instructed on a means of committing first degree robbery that was not included in the charging information. Since Brockie failed to show actual and substantial prejudice resulting from the erroneous instruction, the court denied his request for relief. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Brockie" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant Jeffrey Lynch with indecent liberties and second-degree rape. At trial, defendant's argued the State failed to prove forcible compulsion because the alleged victim, T.S., consented to the sexual intercourse. Over defendant's objection, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant had the burden to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of the crimes charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's second-degree rape conviction but reversed the indecent liberties conviction. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to control his defense by instructing the jury on the affirmative defense over his objection and that such error was not harmless. View "Washington v. Lynch" on Justia Law

William Kurtz challenged the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm his conviction for possession and manufacturing of marijuana. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his request to raise a common law medical necessity defense. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that medical necessity remained an available defense to marijuana prosecution and that the Washington State Medical Use of Marijuana Act did not abrogate the common law. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the Court's holding in "Washington v. Winterstein," (220 P.3d 1226 (2009)) and whether the inevitable discovery doctrine (which was found inconsistent with the Washington constitution) applied retroactively to judgments that were made final when decided. A jury convicted defendant Nadder Haghighi on theft and unlawful issuance of checks or drafts. The underlying issue in this personal restraint petition involved the admissibility of evidence obtained through a warrant issued in Washington, but faxed to the bank's offices in Illinois. A representative at the bank provided records requested by Washington police which did not comply with Illinois' law on domestication of out-of-state warrants. Defendant moved to suppress the records police obtained from Illinois, and appealed the trial court's denial of that motion. He also claimed on appeal he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Upon review of the present case, the Court determined: (1) "Winterstein" did not apply retroactively; and, (2) defendant's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was time barred. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved a claim under RCW 10.73.090. Petitioner successfully argued that a 2000 judgment against him and subsequent sentence were based on an incorrectly-calculated offender score. Petitioner claims in this appeal that because he successfully challenged the score in a 2009 collateral challenge and received a new sentence, he should have been able to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel relating back to that challenge. The Court of Appeals dismissed the claim as untimely and because it was successive. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that petitioner's petition was time barred. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Adams" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the conflict between the statutory requirement that limits disclosure of competency evaluations prepared under RCW 10.77 and the constitutional requirement that "justice in all cases shall be administered openly." Once the evaluation is filed, the trial court uses it to determine defendant's competency to stand trial. The trial court in this case denied defendant's motion to seal the evaluation, and defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that once a competency evaluation becomes court record, it becomes subject to the constitutional presumption of openness, which could be rebutted only when the trial court makes a specific finding that "Ishikawa" factors weigh in favor of sealing. View "Washington v. Chen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's dismissal of notice of special death penalty sentencing proceedings. The King County prosecuting attorney appealed to the Supreme Court to decide whether he violated Washington's capital punishment statutes by considering the strength of the evidence against respondents Joseph McEnroe and Michele Anderson when he determined he would seek the death penalty. Respondents were accused of shooting and killing six people. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the prosecutor did not violate Washington law, reversed the trial court and remanded the case with instructions so that the cases against respondents could proceed. View "Washington v. McEnroe" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jennifer Mau was convicted of making false insurance claims. She challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against her at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State failed to prove the existence of any "contract of insurance" underlying Petitioner's claim. Therefore the Court reversed her conviction. View "Washington v. Mau" on Justia Law