Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Jerry Lain was sentenced to life under Washington's former indeterminate sentencing scheme. In 2010, the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board found petitioner parolable, approved a release plan, and ordered parole with supervision. The governor revoked petitioner's parole. As a result, the Review Board tacked on 36 months to petitioner's minimum term of confinement. Petitioner challenged the revocation and additional term as-applied and facially, arguing that RCW 9.95.160 violated due process because it did not outline procedures for the governor to provide petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard before the governor acted. The Supreme Court concluded the statute was constitutional on both its face and as applied to petitioner. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Lain" on Justia Law

In November 2006, Petitioner Bao Dinh Dang walked up to a gas pump in Seattle, lit newspaper on fire, and attempted to pump gas in order to ignite the gas. A station employee successfully knocked the flaming newspaper out of petitioner's hand with a window-washing squeegee while a customer phoned police. Petitioner was arrested, and the State charged him with attempted arson in the first degree. Petitioner moved for acquittal on the grounds of insanity. The court granted the motion, finding that petitioner was suffering from a mental disease but that he was "not a substantial danger to other persons and [did] not [. . .] present a substantial likelihood of committing felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or security, but . . . is in need of further control by the court or other persons or institutions." The court ordered petitioner conditionally released subject to various conditions. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether trial courts are required to enter a finding of dangerousness before revoking the conditional release of a person acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity. Furthermore, the Court decided whether trial courts must also decide the appropriate standard of proof governing the revocation determination. The Court's conclusion was that Washington law requires trial courts to find conditionally released insanity acquittees dangerous before committing them to mental institutions against their will. The Court also concluded that a preponderance of the evidence sufficiently protects an insanity acquittee's rights in the context of revoking conditional release. Because the trial court in this case specifically determined that Bao Dinh Dang was dangerous, the trial court held that it properly revoked his conditional release. However, the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements at Dang's revocation hearing without finding good cause for doing so but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Washington v. Dang" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Ollivier was convicted for possession of child pornography. On appeal, he contended his rights to a speedy trial under the United States and Washington State Constitution were violated by delay in bringing him to trial. He also contended that evidence obtained in a search of his apartment should have been suppressed because of misrepresentations and other defects in the affidavit in support of probable cause to issue the warrant, and he was not presented with a copy of the search warrant prior to commencement of the search. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the delay in bringing petitioner to trial did not violate speedy trial rights when defendant's own counsel requested the continuances causing the delay and no claim of ineffective counsel was made related to those continuances, that probable cause for the search warrant was sufficiently established by qualifying information in the affidavit, and no violation of CrR 2.3(d) occurred because a copy of the search warrant was posted upon seizure of property pursuant to the warrant. View "Washington v. Ollivier" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Wooten was convicted of first degree malicious mischief for damaging a home he was purchasing on a real estate contract. Petitioner claimed he did not damage "property of another" because he had exclusive possessory and proprietary interests in the property. He also argued the trial court abused its discretion by excluding closing argument about financing issues relating to the home. The Supreme Court concluded after review of the trial court record that Petitioner was not the exclusive owner of the property for the purposes of malicious mischief, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Petitioner's attorney's closing argument. View "Washington v. Wooten" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the search of Lisa Byrd's purse was a search of her person. Because the purse was in her lap when she was arrested, it was an article of her person under the long-standing "time of arrest" rule. If the arrest was lawful, the arresting officer was entitled to search Byrd's person and articles closely associated with her person without showing the search was motivated by particularized concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case for further trial court proceedings. View "Washington v. Byrd" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a trial court may allow a witness to be accompanied by a comfort animal, here a dog, when testifying during trial. Generally, wide discretion is given to the trial court to control proceedings, including the manner in which testimony will be presented. Here, the trial court acted within its broad discretion when it determined that the facility dog provided by the prosecutor's office to the victim was needed in light of the victim's severe developmental disabilities in order for the victim to testify adequately. View "Washington v. Dye" on Justia Law

Dayva Cross pled guilty to killing his wife and two of her three daughters in 2001 for which he was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence after direct review. In his first personal restraint petition challenging the judgment and sentence, Cross contended, among other things, that an "Alford" plea was insufficient to support capital punishment and asked the Supreme Court to vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court with direction that the Alford plea be set aside. After review, the Court held that a capital sentence could be predicated on an Alford plea and denied that portion of Cross' personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Cross" on Justia Law

Benjamin Brockie was convicted of 2 counts of first degree robbery, 15 counts of first degree kidnapping, and 2 counts of making bomb threats. Brockie asked the Supreme Court to vacate those convictions because the jury was instructed on a means of committing first degree robbery that was not included in the charging information. Since Brockie failed to show actual and substantial prejudice resulting from the erroneous instruction, the court denied his request for relief. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Brockie" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant Jeffrey Lynch with indecent liberties and second-degree rape. At trial, defendant's argued the State failed to prove forcible compulsion because the alleged victim, T.S., consented to the sexual intercourse. Over defendant's objection, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant had the burden to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of the crimes charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's second-degree rape conviction but reversed the indecent liberties conviction. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to control his defense by instructing the jury on the affirmative defense over his objection and that such error was not harmless. View "Washington v. Lynch" on Justia Law

William Kurtz challenged the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm his conviction for possession and manufacturing of marijuana. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his request to raise a common law medical necessity defense. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that medical necessity remained an available defense to marijuana prosecution and that the Washington State Medical Use of Marijuana Act did not abrogate the common law. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Kurtz" on Justia Law