Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State charged defendant with second and third degree assault, as well as first degree unlawful possession of a firearm based on multiple juvenile convictions for robbery that rendered him ineligible to possess a firearm. On the first day of trial, the parties informed the court that they had agreed to stipulate that defendant had been convicted of a "serious offense." Defense counsel indicated he did not want the jury to hear about the underlying convictions but informed the court that defendant disagreed with the stipulation. Both the defense attorney and the trial judge discussed the matter and agreed that stipulating to an element was a tactical decision that did not require the defendant's consent. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an attorney can stipulate to an element of a charged crime over his client's express objection and whether, in this case, any error was waived by defendant. An ancillary issues was whether defense counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals, in a two to one opinion, affirmed the defendant's convictions for assault in the second degree with a firearm enhancement and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed as to the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction and affirmed as to the assault conviction. View "Washington v. Humphries" on Justia Law

While petitioner Mario Medina was awaiting retrial on charges of second degree murder, he was ordered to participate in two King County Community Center for Alternative Programs (CCAP): "CCAP Enhanced" and "CCAP Basic." Petitioner participated in these programs for approximately five years before his second trial resulted in a conviction. He argued that he was entitled, as a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, to credit for time served in the alternative programs. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Medina" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Ronald Mendes was "compelled" to waive his constitutional right not to testify as a witness in his own criminal case after the trial court refused to rule on whether the evidence presented during the State's case in chief entitled Mendes to a self-defense instruction. Mendes challenged his conviction for felony murder based on allegations that he shot and killed Danny Saylor after an altercation at Saylor's home. At trial, Mendes's theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense after Saylor came at him with a baseball bat. After the State rested, Mendes's counsel asked the court to make a preliminary ruling on whether enough evidence had been presented through the State's witnesses to warrant a self-defense instruction. The State objected, and the trial court declined to rule on Mendes's request. Mendes then testified on his own behalf. Mendes was convicted of felony murder. On appeal, Mendes argued that the trial court improperly compelled him to testify when it declined to rule on whether the State's evidence alone entitled him to a self-defense instruction. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held that Mendes was not entitled to an advisory ruling on jury instructions before the close of all the evidence and that Mendes's decision to testify was voluntary and tactical. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Washington v. Mendes" on Justia Law

Robert Kinnaman pleaded guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. He also agreed to a special finding that supported a sentence enhancement. At sentencing Kinnaman moved to withdraw his agreement to the sentencing enhancement only. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Kinnaman. The Court of Appeals found the plea involuntary and indivisible and reversed, remanding the matter to the trial court for vacation of the entire plea. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's holding that the entire plea should be vacated; neither party sought that result. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order denying Kinnaman's motion to withdraw his agreement to the special finding. View "Washington v. Kinnaman" on Justia Law

William Smith claimed that the trial court violated his public trial right when courtroom limitations led to holding "sidebar" conferences in a hallway outside the courtroom on the record with counsel present. Smith argued that these sidebars were courtroom closured, and because the trial court did not perform a "Washington v. Bone-Club," (906 P.2d 325 (1995)) analysis, he asked the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction and grant a new trial. "Sidebars are not subject to the public trial right under the experience and logic test because they have not historically been open to the public and because allowing public access would play no positive role in the proceeding. Although the practice of holding sidebars in a hallway outside the courtroom is unusual, the form of these hallway conferences was consistent with the role traditionally filled by sidebars and so they do not implicate the public trial right." View "Washington v. Smith" on Justia Law

Kenneth Slert was tried and convicted three times for the murder of John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed. In his third trial, prospective jurors were given a questionnaire designed to determine if any of them had heard about the two prior trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether a pre-voir-dire in-chambers discussion of their answers and the dismissal of four prospective jurors for outside knowledge of the case violated the open public trials provisions of the Washington State Constitution. The Court found no reversible error. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law

In the unrelated trials of Henry Grisby III and Gregory Shearer, the trial judges questioned a juror in private without making a finding that specific circumstances warranted closing the questioning to the public. This was a violation of both Grisby's and Shearer's right to a public trial. The State asks the Washington Supreme Court to overrule two key holdings from two 2012 cases on public trial rights. First, the State asked that we overrule the holding that a defendant's failure to object to a closure at trial does not constitute a waiver of his or her public trial rights. Second, the State asked the Court to overrule the holding that public trial rights violations are structural error and thus prejudice is presumed when a public trial rights violation is shown. The Court overruled its precedent only when it has been shown to be incorrect and harmful, and in this case, the State did not make such a showing. Therefore, the Court applied the holdings from those 2012 cases here and found that the public trial rights of both Shearer and Grisby were violated when a portion of juror questioning was closed to the public without a finding that specific circumstances warranted the closure. View "Washington v. Shearer" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the portion of jury selection in which the court excuses jurors for hardship is a proceeding to which the public trial right attaches. The Court of Appeals concluded that it is, and that Joseph Njonge's public trial right was violated when the trial court purportedly excluded observers during hardship excusals. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial without reaching Njonge's other assignments of error, including claims that the trial court improperly excluded a family member of the victim (who was also a witness) and members of the press from portions of voir dire. Based on its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not close proceedings in violation of Njonge's public trial right. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for review of Njonge's additional assignments of error. View "Washington v. Njonge" on Justia Law

Anthony Koss was convicted of first degree burglary. Before jury deliberations, the judge and counsel met in chambers. Immediately afterwards, the judge stated in open court that she had given counsel the jury instructions and had made a requested change in one instruction. Koss therefore inferred, and the State agreed that it was an in-chambers instructions conference. Koss challenged that procedure for the first time on appeal. Recent controlling precedent of the Supreme Court held that he could raise this constitutional claim for the first time on appeal and that the trial court must address several factors on the record before closing a proceeding to which the constitutional right to a public trial attaches. But recent precedent also held that the constitutional right to a public trial did not extend to a preliminary instructions conference. In addition to the jury instruction conference, Koss argued that the trial judge received and answered two questions, in writing, during deliberations, in another closed court proceeding. But the transcript, clerk's papers, and docket did not reveal any such proceeding, open or closed. Recent controlling precedent reaffirmed a long-standing rule that the appellant bore the burden of providing a record showing that the supposedly unconstitutional event occurred. The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed that recent controlling precedent. View "Washington v. Koss" on Justia Law

In consolidated criminal cases, the issue common to both was whether a defendant could waive his right to a public trial under article I, section 22 and/or article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. In "State v. Frawley" the Court of Appeals reversed Brian Frawley's conviction for first degree felony murder because the trial court closed the courtroom without performing a "Bone-Club" analysis. In "State v. Applegate," the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's determination of aggravating factors supporting Ronald Applegate's exceptional sentence for his 2005 conviction for rape of a child because the defendant waived his public trial right. In both cases, because the State did not establish waiver, the Supreme Court affirmed Frawley and reversed Applegate. View "Washington v. Frawley" on Justia Law