Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Slert was tried and convicted three times for the murder of John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed. In his third trial, prospective jurors were given a questionnaire designed to determine if any of them had heard about the two prior trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether a pre-voir-dire in-chambers discussion of their answers and the dismissal of four prospective jurors for outside knowledge of the case violated the open public trials provisions of the Washington State Constitution. The Court found no reversible error. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law

In the unrelated trials of Henry Grisby III and Gregory Shearer, the trial judges questioned a juror in private without making a finding that specific circumstances warranted closing the questioning to the public. This was a violation of both Grisby's and Shearer's right to a public trial. The State asks the Washington Supreme Court to overrule two key holdings from two 2012 cases on public trial rights. First, the State asked that we overrule the holding that a defendant's failure to object to a closure at trial does not constitute a waiver of his or her public trial rights. Second, the State asked the Court to overrule the holding that public trial rights violations are structural error and thus prejudice is presumed when a public trial rights violation is shown. The Court overruled its precedent only when it has been shown to be incorrect and harmful, and in this case, the State did not make such a showing. Therefore, the Court applied the holdings from those 2012 cases here and found that the public trial rights of both Shearer and Grisby were violated when a portion of juror questioning was closed to the public without a finding that specific circumstances warranted the closure. View "Washington v. Shearer" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the portion of jury selection in which the court excuses jurors for hardship is a proceeding to which the public trial right attaches. The Court of Appeals concluded that it is, and that Joseph Njonge's public trial right was violated when the trial court purportedly excluded observers during hardship excusals. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial without reaching Njonge's other assignments of error, including claims that the trial court improperly excluded a family member of the victim (who was also a witness) and members of the press from portions of voir dire. Based on its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not close proceedings in violation of Njonge's public trial right. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for review of Njonge's additional assignments of error. View "Washington v. Njonge" on Justia Law

Anthony Koss was convicted of first degree burglary. Before jury deliberations, the judge and counsel met in chambers. Immediately afterwards, the judge stated in open court that she had given counsel the jury instructions and had made a requested change in one instruction. Koss therefore inferred, and the State agreed that it was an in-chambers instructions conference. Koss challenged that procedure for the first time on appeal. Recent controlling precedent of the Supreme Court held that he could raise this constitutional claim for the first time on appeal and that the trial court must address several factors on the record before closing a proceeding to which the constitutional right to a public trial attaches. But recent precedent also held that the constitutional right to a public trial did not extend to a preliminary instructions conference. In addition to the jury instruction conference, Koss argued that the trial judge received and answered two questions, in writing, during deliberations, in another closed court proceeding. But the transcript, clerk's papers, and docket did not reveal any such proceeding, open or closed. Recent controlling precedent reaffirmed a long-standing rule that the appellant bore the burden of providing a record showing that the supposedly unconstitutional event occurred. The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed that recent controlling precedent. View "Washington v. Koss" on Justia Law

In consolidated criminal cases, the issue common to both was whether a defendant could waive his right to a public trial under article I, section 22 and/or article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. In "State v. Frawley" the Court of Appeals reversed Brian Frawley's conviction for first degree felony murder because the trial court closed the courtroom without performing a "Bone-Club" analysis. In "State v. Applegate," the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's determination of aggravating factors supporting Ronald Applegate's exceptional sentence for his 2005 conviction for rape of a child because the defendant waived his public trial right. In both cases, because the State did not establish waiver, the Supreme Court affirmed Frawley and reversed Applegate. View "Washington v. Frawley" on Justia Law

Richard Sweat received an exceptional sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i) as part of a domestic violence conviction. He believed the trial court erred and argued that the catchall definition of "victim" in RCW 9.94A.030 must be used in interpreting RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i), precluding the application of the aggravating factor when the pattern of abuse was not perpetrated against the victim or victims of the currently charged offense. The Supreme Court disagreed with that reasoning and affirmed. View "Washington v. Sweat" on Justia Law

About 25 years ago, petitioners Russell McNeil and Herbert Rice Jr. were tried as adults and convicted of aggravated first degree murder for crimes committed while the petitioners were both a little over 17 years old. They were each given the mandatory minimum sentence for that crime-life in prison without the possibility of early release. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. (2012)). Relying on "Miller," petitioners sought relief from their sentences on collateral review through personal restraint petitions (PRPs). While the PRPs were pending before the Washington Supreme Court, the legislature passed and the governor signed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5064, "the Miller fix." The State filed a motion to dismiss the PRPs, arguing the Miller fix made it impossible for petitioners to meet their threshold burden of showing they had suffered actual and substantial prejudice based on a constitutional error. The Washington Court denied the State's motion and deny the PRPs. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of McNeil" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pamela Deskins challenged the sentence she received after a jury found her guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the cruelty to animals statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited her from owning or living with animals as a condition of probation; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to forfeit any remaining animals to the Stevens County Sheriffs Office after giving her seven days to find them new homes; and (3) the trial court violated her due process rights by proceeding to sentencing 22 minutes after the verdict and imposing restitution to reimburse the county for animal care. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture challenge was moot, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all other issues.View "Washington v. Deskins" on Justia Law

Respondent Jeramie Owens and a friend visited a car dealership in Mount Vernon after seeing a 1967 Volkswagen (VW) Beetle with a high performance engine, roof rack and surfboard on top. They took the car on a test ride but left without purchasing the car or leaving their names. The next day, a salesman opened the dealership and discovered that the same 1967 VW Beetle that respondent test drove the day before had been stolen, and one of the dealer's keys was missing. The next business day, respondent registered a 1971 VW Beetle, the registration for which had expired in 1993. In response to a listing on Craig's List, Craig Sauvageau purchased the 1971 Beetle from respondent. Claiming that he had lost the title respondent provided Sauvageau an affidavit in lieu of title. Savageau took the car to his mechanic to have it inspected, and the mechanic discovered that the VIN registered by respondent a few days prior appeared to be brand new with reinstalled rivets. Savageau called police to report the car as potentially stolen. Police discovered the confidential VIN matched that of the stolen 1967 VW from the dealership. Respondent would later be charged with first degree taking a motor vehicle without permission, first degree trafficking in stolen property, possession of a stolen vehicle and bail jumping. A jury convicted respondent on all charges but taking a motor vehicle without permission. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review involved whether whether RCW 9A.82.050(1) described alternative means of committing first degree trafficking in stolen property, and if so, whether substantial evidence supported each of the alternative means in this case. The Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.82.050 described eight alternative means of committing the crime, and because there was insufficient evidence to support at least one of those eight means, the court reversed respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the conviction, and held that RCW 9A.82.050 described only two alternative means, and in this case, each was supported by sufficient evidence.View "Washington v. Owens" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Yates Jr. agreed to plead guilty to thirteen counts of aggravated first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder in exchange for a 408-year prison sentence. Yates sought to withdraw those guilty pleas, claiming that he should technically have been sentenced to 408 years with a possible extension to life in prison rather than a determinate 408-year sentence. Because he did not show that he was prejudiced by this difference, the Supreme Court dismissed his personal restraint petition.View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law