Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Washington State Patrol Trooper Chris Stone saw a truck, driven by defendant Ryan Quaale speed by in a 25-mile per hour zone on a residential street. Trooper Stone activated the lights on his patrol car and attempted to pull the truck over. Quaale turned off his truck's headlights and accelerated. Trooper Stone pursued. Quaale lost control, overshot a corner, skidding into a homeowner's yard before he regained control and sped away for several more blocks. After Trooper Stone activated his siren, Quaale pulled the truck over and stopped. Quaale exited his truck but did not attempt to flee on foot. As a part of standard pursuit protocol, Trooper Stone ordered Quaale to the ground and handcuffed him. As he approached Quaale, Trooper Stone smelled a strong odor of "intoxicants" on Quaale's breath. Trooper Stone then performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test on Quaale. During the HGN test, Trooper Stone observed Quaale's eyes bounce and have difficulty tracking the stimulus. Trooper Stone placed Quaale under arrest for DUI, reckless driving, and attempting to elude. At the station, Trooper Stone informed Quaale of the implied consent warnings for a breath test. Quaale refused to take the test. Quaale was tried twice. Quaale was charged with attempting to elude a police vehicle and with felony DUI. At trial, Trooper Stone testified that he had "no doubt" that the defendant was impaired based solely on the HGN test. In closing, the State argued that the odor of intoxicants and Quaale's erratic driving supported its theory of driving while impaired by alcohol, but the State primarily relied on the HGN test. The State also remarked on Quaale's revoked license during closing in violation of the court's ruling. The jury found Quaale guilty of DUI. On appeal, Quaale argued that the trooper's testimony amounted to an improper opinion on guilt. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trooper's testimony was an improper opinion on guilt. View "Washington v. Quaale" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Speight filed a timely personal restraint petition, claiming for the first time on collateral review that his right to a public trial under article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, was violated when the trial court decided motions in limine and individually questioned potential jurors in chambers. Consistent with its holding in "In re Personal Restraint of Coggin," the Supreme Court held that a petitioner claiming a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and substantial prejudice. Speight could not show actual and substantial prejudice arising from the closure; therefore, his petition was denied. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Speight" on Justia Law

In this case and in "In re Personal Restraint of Speight,"prospective jurors were questioned in chambers without the trial court engaging in the analysis required by "Washington v. Bone-Club." After his convictions were affirmed on appeal, petitioner William Coggin brought this personal restraint petition, claiming the private questioning of jurors constituted a closure and raising the issue of whether actual and substantial prejudice must be shown from a public trial right violation in order to obtain relief by personal restraint petition. After review, the Supreme Court held that while Coggin's public trial rights were violated, a petitioner claiming a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and substantial prejudice. Coggin did not show actual and substantial prejudice arising from the closure; therefore, his petition was denied. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Coggin" on Justia Law

John Jones, III was convicted in 2008 for second degree assault. At his first sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence of several California convictions, including one count of murder with a firearm, two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, and one count of assault with a firearm. The trial court calculated Jones's offender score as 6 by including the murder and attempted murder convictions, and sentenced Jones to an exceptional sentence of 120 months. Jones appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated his sentence because the trial court had failed to perform a comparability analysis of his California convictions. On remand for resentencing, the State supplemented the record, over Jones's objection, with new evidence of Jones's murder and attempted murder convictions and an additional drug conviction. After performing a comparability analysis on these convictions, the trial court recalculated Jones's offender score as 7 (now with the additional drug conviction). The court again sentenced Jones to an exceptional sentence of 120 months. Jones appealed again. The Court of Appeals vacated his sentence, this time because the State failed to establish Jones's convictions by a preponderance of the evidence when it presented a copy of a probation report, which the State had represented to the court as being a plea colloquy. At the third sentencing hearing, at issue here, the State offered an uncertified copy of a California plea colloquy in order to establish Jones's prior convictions. It also moved for a short continuance to obtain a certified copy. The trial court, however, denied the motion, concluding that a trial court could not permit the State to supplement the record on resentencing. Without the California convictions, Jones's offender score was calculated as 1 and he was sentenced to an exceptional sentence of 60 months. A few days later, the State filed a certified copy of the plea transcript that allegedly established the comparability of the California convictions. The State appealed. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals adhered to the "no second chance" rule. The issue on appeal in this case centered whether a trial court must give effect to the provision in RCW 9.94A.530(2) that permits both parties to present additional relevant evidence of criminal history at resentencing following remand from appeal or collateral attack. The Supreme Court held that because the "no second chance" rule was based on judicial economy, not due process, the legislature was within its authority to alter the Court's rule and that the statutory remand provision controlled. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ignacio Cobos represented himself at his sentencing hearing and objected to the State's calculation of his offender score. The trial judge sentenced Cobos with the offender score asserted by the State without holding an evidentiary hearing because Cobos's former counsel had agreed to the score prior to being discharged. The Court of Appeals found the sentencing court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, remanded for resentencing, and concluded that both sides could introduce supplemental evidence of the proper score on remand. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Cobos argued the State was barred from offering new evidence on remand under the common law "no second chance" rule. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Cobos" on Justia Law

The State charged Daniel Gunderson with felony domestic violence after violating a September 2010 court order relating back to an altercation between himself and Christina Moore, his ex-girlfriend. At trial, Moore testified that no assault occurred. Although she had not made any prior statement about the incident, nor an inconsistent statement, the State sought to introduce evidence of Gunderson's prior domestic violence against her to impeach her. The trial judge admitted this evidence over Gunderson's ER 404(b) objection. Gunderson argued on appeal that the trial court should have excluded evidence of his prior bad acts under ER 404(b). The Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "Washington v. Gunderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sonia Graciano was injured after she was hit by a car driven by Saul Ayala. Ayala was insured by defendant California Automobile Insurance Company (CAIC). Three weeks after Graciano's attorney first contacted CAIC regarding the accident, Graciano misidentified both the driver and the applicable insurance policy. CAIC investigated the accident, identified the applicable policy and the correct driver, and offered to settle Graciano's claim with a "full policy limits offer." Graciano did not accept CAIC's full policy limits offer and, in this suit, alleged CAIC and its parent and affiliated companies acted in bad faith, based on an alleged "wrongful failure to settle." Graciano argued CAIC could have and should have earlier discovered the facts, and should have made the full policy limits offer more quickly. The jury found in favor of Graciano and this appeal followed. CAIC argued that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence to support the verdict that CAIC acted in bad faith by unreasonably failing to settle Graciano's claim against Saul. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the judgment. View "Washington v. Graham" on Justia Law

On methamphetamine, petitioner Jason Graham went on a shooting spree. He used an AK-47 to fire at six different police officers during a foot chase through downtown Spokane. He was eventually convicted by jury of 10 offenses, including "6 serious violent offenses" for sentencing purposes. He received an aggregate sentence of 1,225 months. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, but the Supreme Court granted review to reconsider the firearm enhancements under the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in light of "Washington v. Williams-Walker," (225 P.3d 913 (2010)). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a sentencing court could impose an exceptional sentence downward if the judge found the multiple offense policy resulted in a presumptive sentence that was clearly excessive. Reading the plain language of the SRA, the Supreme Court concluded the sentencing court has such discretion. View "Washington v. Berg" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether it violates due process to assign a defendant the burden of proving consent as a defense to a charge of rape by forcible compulsion. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court found W.R. committed rape in the second degree. The event in question was a sexual encounter between W.R. and J.P. that occurred while J.P. was visiting her aunt, who resided with W.R. and his sister. Both W.R. and J.P. were minors at the time. Throughout the police investigation, W.R. consistently denied ever having sexual intercourse with J.P. Shortly before trial, he admitted that they had engaged in sexual intercourse, but defended it as consensual. The court did not find W.R.'s and his sister's testimony to be credible, noting W.R.'s evasive responses to questions and inconsistent story, and his sister's uncorroborated story and "cavalier demeanor" at trial. The court found J.F.'s testimony to be credible, and concluded W.R. committed rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion. The court explained that the State had proved rape in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt and that W.R. had failed to prove the defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence. W.R. appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in allocating to him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was consensual. The Washington Supreme Court held in "Washington v. Camara," (and reaffirmed in Washington v. Gregory," that notwithstanding the "conceptual overlap" between consent and forcible compulsion, the defendant may be tasked with proving consent by a preponderance of the evidence. More recently than Camara and Gregory, the Court was asked to consider this issue again, but declined to reach it, instead resolving the case on Sixth Amendment grounds. Three justices would have reached the issue and overruled Camara and Gregory. With this case, the Supreme Court embraced that approach and rejected the due process precedent set in Camara and Gregory as both incorrect and harmful. The Court reversed W .R.'s conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. W.R." on Justia Law

In 2010, Christian Williams stole several items from the home of his childhood friend and former housemate, Bo Larsen. When Larsen confronted Williams about the stolen items, Williams admitted his involvement and returned most items, though some had already been used as collateral for a pawn shop loan. A jury convicted Williams of residential burglary and trafficking in stolen property in the first degree. At issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether sentencing courts have discretion to count prior convictions separately under the burglary antimerger statute notwithstanding a finding that they encompass the same criminal conduct under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). The Court of Appeals held they do not. Agreeing with the appellate court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Williams" on Justia Law