Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Theodore Rhone asked the Washington Supreme Court to adopt a bright line rule establishing a prima facie case of discrimination when the State peremptorily strikes the last member of a racially cognizable group from a jury venire. “Without the benefit of the considerable knowledge we have gained regarding the impact of implicit bias in jury selection,” a “fractured” majority of the Supreme Court declined to adopt Rhone’s proposed rule in 2010. But seven years later, it did, in City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (2017). Although this case came to the Supreme Court as a personal restraint petition (PRP), the central issue was the Court’s 2010 decision in Rhone’s own case. The Supreme Court took the opportunity here to revisit and correct that decision. “Given the unique factual and procedural history of this case and in the interest of justice,” the Court recalled its prior mandate, reversed Rhone’s convictions, and remanded for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Rhone" on Justia Law

Petitioner Denver Lee Shoop kept a small herd of eight bison on his property. The State charged him with eight counts of animal cruelty in the first degree for his treatment of those eight bison. RCW 16.52.205(2) stated that one commits “animal cruelty in the first degree” when “he or she, with criminal negligence, starves, dehydrates, or suffocates an animal…” and causes considerably suffering or death. The State included “starves, dehydrates, or suffocates” in each of the eight counts. The jury convicted Shoop as charged, but without specifying which of those three means the State actually proved. Shoop appealed, arguing in part that RCW 16.52.205(2) constituted an “alternative means” crime, so either (1) the jury had to achieve unanimity about which means the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) the record had to show that sufficient evidence supported each of those multiple means. The Washington Supreme Court held RCW 16.52.205(2) described a single crime of animal cruelty in the first degree. “That statutory subsection’s list of ways of committing animal cruelty—negligently starving, dehydrating, or suffocating—constitute “minor nuances inhering in the same act [or omission],” not completely different acts, i.e., not “alternative means.” View "Washington v. Shoop" on Justia Law

A trial court granted Jeremy Dustin Hubbard’s motion to modify a court-imposed community custody condition approximately 15 years after sentencing based on a change in Hubbard’s factual circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Washington Supreme Court found the current statutory framework did not contain a provision authorizing Hubbard’s requested modification. "Outside a direct appeal or a timely collateral attack, a trial court cannot modify court-imposed community custody conditions after sentencing without express statutory authority to do so." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court to vacate its order. View "Washington v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

In 2018, Petitioner Zachery Meredith boarded a “Swift Blue Line” bus in Snohomish County. Swift buses used a “barrier-free payment-system[ ].” Snohomish County Sheriff’s Deputy Thomas Dalton and his partner were also on the Swift Blue Line that day, conducting fare enforcement pursuant to RCW 36.57A.235. In addition to the two deputies, a third officer was “in his patrol car, following [the bus] and acting as the back-up officer.” Meredith was already on the bus when Dalton and his partner boarded the bus; Dalton “never observed [Petitioner] getting on the bus without paying,” either in person or on video. In accordance with his “general practice,” Dalton requested “‘proof of payment or ORCA card’” from each passenger on the bus. On this particular day, Meredith was one of three individuals who “was not able to present proof of fare payment,” so “[u]pon reaching the next stop, Deputy Dalton detained [Meredith] outside at the bus platform.” Meredith “did not possess any identification documents,” but he gave the deputy a name and birth date, which turned out to be false. Rather than issuing a “civil infraction[ ]” for Meredith’s failure to provide proof of payment, the deputy “believed he had probable cause to arrest [Meredith] for theft in the third degree.” The officers ultimately learned he had two outstanding arrest warrants, for which Meredith was arrested and taken to jail. The State charged Meredith with a gross misdemeanor for making “a false or misleading material statement to a public servant.” Meredith unsuccessfully moved to suppress, contending the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion a crime had been committed. The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether Meredith was "disturbed in his private affairs" by the particular method of fare enforcement used here and, if so, whether this disturbance complied with article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Based on the totality of the circumstances presented, a majority of the Court held Meredith was unlawfully seized. Thus, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Meredith" on Justia Law

This case concerned an untimely personal restraint petition that petitioner Jonathan Pitchlynn alleged was exempt from the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100(5) because the judgment and sentence was imposed in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court ordered a reference hearing to resolve a material factual dispute. Based on the factual findings, the Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, the Court dismissed petitioner’s personal restraint petition as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Hinton was 17 when he was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He received a 37-year standard range adult sentence. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Hinton argued he was less culpable than an adult when he committed those crimes, so his standard range adult sentence was a disproportionate punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hinton sought collateral relief in the form of a resentencing hearing so he could prove that his lesser culpability entitled him to a lesser sentence. The State argued RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP under RAP 16.4(d). To this, the Washington Supreme Court agreed: RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP because it eliminated the constitutional error that Hinton identified in his original sentence. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton" on Justia Law

This case concerned the adequacy of the Washington early release statute, RCW 9.94A.730, as a remedy to petitioner Erik Carrasco’s alleged unconstitutional sentence for a crime he committed as a juvenile. Carrasco was serving a 93-year sentence imposed without any consideration of his youth. Carrasco was 17 years old and a member of “La Raza,” a Norteño gang in Yakima; he was ultimately convicted of second degree murder, four counts of first degree assault, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He would be eligible to petition for early release under RCW 9.94A.730 after serving 20 years of his sentence. Because Washington v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) was controlling, the Washington Supreme Court concluded Carrasco had an adequate remedy under the statute. The judgment dismissing his personal restraint petition was affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrasco" on Justia Law

When J.W.M. was 17½ years old, he pointed what he thought was an unloaded gun at his friend W.B. and pulled the trigger. The gun was loaded, it discharged, W.B. died two days later. The State charged J.W.M. with first degree manslaughter while being armed with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm (UPFA). Because first degree manslaughter was a serious violent offense subject to the Washington “auto-decline” statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A), J.W.M. was tried in adult court, and a jury found him guilty of second-degree manslaughter, a lesser included offense. The trial court found him guilty of UPFA in a bifurcated bench trial. With neither offense being an auto-decline offense, J.W.M. was not sentenced in adult court but instead proceeded to a juvenile disposition hearing. More than two weeks before the disposition hearing, for the first time the State recommended a manifest injustice disposition. The juvenile court imposed the maximum possible manifest injustice upward disposition: confinement until age 25. J.W.M. challenged his disposition on several grounds, including that the juvenile court’s primary reason for imposing the disposition was J.W.M.’s need for treatment and services was an invalid basis under our decision in State v. B.O.J., 449 P.3d 1006 (2019). The Washington Supreme Court agreed a new disposition hearing was required, as a manifest injustice disposition was not justified by a juvenile offender’s need for services. View "Washington v. J.W.M." on Justia Law

"became overwhelmed" and punched himself in the face. After several jurors expressed concern, the trial court questioned juror 9 and two other jurors before dismissing juror 9 for cause. The reconstituted jury found Norman guilty of one of two counts. The Court of Appeals reversed Norman’s conviction, holding juror 9’s dismissal was improper under the heightened evidentiary standard set forth in Washington v. Elmore, 123 P.3d 72 (2005). The Washington Supreme Court found the Elmore standard applied only where a juror was accused of nullification, refusing to follow the law, or refusing to deliberate. As there was no such accusation here, and the trial court found juror 9’s conduct likely affected the jury’s process of deliberating freely, it did not abuse its discretion in dismissing juror 9. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed Norman’s conviction. View "Washington v. Norman" on Justia Law

Petitioners Robert Ayerst and Justin Lewis were represented at their criminal trials by Robert Van Idour. Though a licensed attorney in Idaho, Van Idour was never admitted to practice in Washington. Accordingly, Van Idour was not authorized to practice law when he represented the petitioners, along with 100 other indigent defendants in Asotin County. Th Washington Supreme Court found Van Idour’s failure to gain admittance to the Washington bar was not just shockingly unprofessional, it was "unethical and indefensible." The issue presented here was whether a lawyer who is licensed in Idaho but not in Washington was nevertheless a lawyer for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ayerst and Lewis contended this failure resulted in a complete denial of counsel, which constituted structural error and demanded reversal of their convictions. While the Washington Supreme Court agreed Van Idour’s actions violated state licensure rules, it disagreed that they amounted to a constitutional denial of counsel. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ denial of Ayerst’s and Lewis’s personal restraint petitions. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Lewis" on Justia Law