Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State charged Daniel Gunderson with felony domestic violence after violating a September 2010 court order relating back to an altercation between himself and Christina Moore, his ex-girlfriend. At trial, Moore testified that no assault occurred. Although she had not made any prior statement about the incident, nor an inconsistent statement, the State sought to introduce evidence of Gunderson's prior domestic violence against her to impeach her. The trial judge admitted this evidence over Gunderson's ER 404(b) objection. Gunderson argued on appeal that the trial court should have excluded evidence of his prior bad acts under ER 404(b). The Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "Washington v. Gunderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sonia Graciano was injured after she was hit by a car driven by Saul Ayala. Ayala was insured by defendant California Automobile Insurance Company (CAIC). Three weeks after Graciano's attorney first contacted CAIC regarding the accident, Graciano misidentified both the driver and the applicable insurance policy. CAIC investigated the accident, identified the applicable policy and the correct driver, and offered to settle Graciano's claim with a "full policy limits offer." Graciano did not accept CAIC's full policy limits offer and, in this suit, alleged CAIC and its parent and affiliated companies acted in bad faith, based on an alleged "wrongful failure to settle." Graciano argued CAIC could have and should have earlier discovered the facts, and should have made the full policy limits offer more quickly. The jury found in favor of Graciano and this appeal followed. CAIC argued that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence to support the verdict that CAIC acted in bad faith by unreasonably failing to settle Graciano's claim against Saul. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the judgment. View "Washington v. Graham" on Justia Law

On methamphetamine, petitioner Jason Graham went on a shooting spree. He used an AK-47 to fire at six different police officers during a foot chase through downtown Spokane. He was eventually convicted by jury of 10 offenses, including "6 serious violent offenses" for sentencing purposes. He received an aggregate sentence of 1,225 months. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, but the Supreme Court granted review to reconsider the firearm enhancements under the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in light of "Washington v. Williams-Walker," (225 P.3d 913 (2010)). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a sentencing court could impose an exceptional sentence downward if the judge found the multiple offense policy resulted in a presumptive sentence that was clearly excessive. Reading the plain language of the SRA, the Supreme Court concluded the sentencing court has such discretion. View "Washington v. Berg" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether it violates due process to assign a defendant the burden of proving consent as a defense to a charge of rape by forcible compulsion. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court found W.R. committed rape in the second degree. The event in question was a sexual encounter between W.R. and J.P. that occurred while J.P. was visiting her aunt, who resided with W.R. and his sister. Both W.R. and J.P. were minors at the time. Throughout the police investigation, W.R. consistently denied ever having sexual intercourse with J.P. Shortly before trial, he admitted that they had engaged in sexual intercourse, but defended it as consensual. The court did not find W.R.'s and his sister's testimony to be credible, noting W.R.'s evasive responses to questions and inconsistent story, and his sister's uncorroborated story and "cavalier demeanor" at trial. The court found J.F.'s testimony to be credible, and concluded W.R. committed rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion. The court explained that the State had proved rape in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt and that W.R. had failed to prove the defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence. W.R. appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in allocating to him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was consensual. The Washington Supreme Court held in "Washington v. Camara," (and reaffirmed in Washington v. Gregory," that notwithstanding the "conceptual overlap" between consent and forcible compulsion, the defendant may be tasked with proving consent by a preponderance of the evidence. More recently than Camara and Gregory, the Court was asked to consider this issue again, but declined to reach it, instead resolving the case on Sixth Amendment grounds. Three justices would have reached the issue and overruled Camara and Gregory. With this case, the Supreme Court embraced that approach and rejected the due process precedent set in Camara and Gregory as both incorrect and harmful. The Court reversed W .R.'s conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. W.R." on Justia Law

In 2010, Christian Williams stole several items from the home of his childhood friend and former housemate, Bo Larsen. When Larsen confronted Williams about the stolen items, Williams admitted his involvement and returned most items, though some had already been used as collateral for a pawn shop loan. A jury convicted Williams of residential burglary and trafficking in stolen property in the first degree. At issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether sentencing courts have discretion to count prior convictions separately under the burglary antimerger statute notwithstanding a finding that they encompass the same criminal conduct under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). The Court of Appeals held they do not. Agreeing with the appellate court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Williams" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant with second and third degree assault, as well as first degree unlawful possession of a firearm based on multiple juvenile convictions for robbery that rendered him ineligible to possess a firearm. On the first day of trial, the parties informed the court that they had agreed to stipulate that defendant had been convicted of a "serious offense." Defense counsel indicated he did not want the jury to hear about the underlying convictions but informed the court that defendant disagreed with the stipulation. Both the defense attorney and the trial judge discussed the matter and agreed that stipulating to an element was a tactical decision that did not require the defendant's consent. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an attorney can stipulate to an element of a charged crime over his client's express objection and whether, in this case, any error was waived by defendant. An ancillary issues was whether defense counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals, in a two to one opinion, affirmed the defendant's convictions for assault in the second degree with a firearm enhancement and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed as to the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction and affirmed as to the assault conviction. View "Washington v. Humphries" on Justia Law

While petitioner Mario Medina was awaiting retrial on charges of second degree murder, he was ordered to participate in two King County Community Center for Alternative Programs (CCAP): "CCAP Enhanced" and "CCAP Basic." Petitioner participated in these programs for approximately five years before his second trial resulted in a conviction. He argued that he was entitled, as a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, to credit for time served in the alternative programs. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Medina" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Ronald Mendes was "compelled" to waive his constitutional right not to testify as a witness in his own criminal case after the trial court refused to rule on whether the evidence presented during the State's case in chief entitled Mendes to a self-defense instruction. Mendes challenged his conviction for felony murder based on allegations that he shot and killed Danny Saylor after an altercation at Saylor's home. At trial, Mendes's theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense after Saylor came at him with a baseball bat. After the State rested, Mendes's counsel asked the court to make a preliminary ruling on whether enough evidence had been presented through the State's witnesses to warrant a self-defense instruction. The State objected, and the trial court declined to rule on Mendes's request. Mendes then testified on his own behalf. Mendes was convicted of felony murder. On appeal, Mendes argued that the trial court improperly compelled him to testify when it declined to rule on whether the State's evidence alone entitled him to a self-defense instruction. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held that Mendes was not entitled to an advisory ruling on jury instructions before the close of all the evidence and that Mendes's decision to testify was voluntary and tactical. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Washington v. Mendes" on Justia Law

Robert Kinnaman pleaded guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. He also agreed to a special finding that supported a sentence enhancement. At sentencing Kinnaman moved to withdraw his agreement to the sentencing enhancement only. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Kinnaman. The Court of Appeals found the plea involuntary and indivisible and reversed, remanding the matter to the trial court for vacation of the entire plea. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's holding that the entire plea should be vacated; neither party sought that result. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order denying Kinnaman's motion to withdraw his agreement to the special finding. View "Washington v. Kinnaman" on Justia Law

William Smith claimed that the trial court violated his public trial right when courtroom limitations led to holding "sidebar" conferences in a hallway outside the courtroom on the record with counsel present. Smith argued that these sidebars were courtroom closured, and because the trial court did not perform a "Washington v. Bone-Club," (906 P.2d 325 (1995)) analysis, he asked the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction and grant a new trial. "Sidebars are not subject to the public trial right under the experience and logic test because they have not historically been open to the public and because allowing public access would play no positive role in the proceeding. Although the practice of holding sidebars in a hallway outside the courtroom is unusual, the form of these hallway conferences was consistent with the role traditionally filled by sidebars and so they do not implicate the public trial right." View "Washington v. Smith" on Justia Law