Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue central to this appeal centered on the filing of a type of report about a juvenile offender: whether a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) evaluation should be filed in the official juvenile court file and therefore be open to the public. The legislature has explicitly defined the contents of the official juvenile court file as "the petition or information, motions, memorandums, briefs, findings of the court, and court orders." Since the SSODA evaluation does not fit within any of these categories, the Supreme Court held that it was not a part of the official juvenile court file. Consequently, it was subject to the general rule that all juvenile records not in the official juvenile court file must be kept confidential. View "Washington v. A.G.S." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a potential obstacle to public access constituted a courtroom closure: a sign that listed the courthouse hours. After a jury trial in Yakima County Superior Court, defendant Joey Andy was convicted of first degree burglary and second degree assault. He appealed, arguing that his right to a public trial right was violated when proceedings on some days continued after 4:00 p.m., despite a new 4:00 p.m. closing time for the courthouse. Pursuant to RAP 9.11, Andy moved to remand the case to the superior court to take "additional evidence to determine whether the courthouse doors were locked at 4 p.m. on the dates of the trial ... and if so, whether that closure barred entry to the ongoing courtroom proceedings." After review of the evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that at all times during Andy's trial proceedings, the door to the courthouse was unlocked and no member of the public was deterred from attending the proceedings by the sign. Therefore, the Court concluded that the sign did not constitute a courtroom closure and Andy's public trial right was not violated. View "Washington v. Andy" on Justia Law

In 2009, Maurice Clemmons shot and killed four Lakewood police officers. Clemmons contacted petitioners Eddie Davis and Letrecia Nelson shortly after the shootings. Based on their actions following that contact, petitioners were convicted of rendering criminal assistance and possessing a firearm. A divided Washington Supreme Court would have held that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Davis' and Nelson's convictions for possession of a stolen firearm, and Davis' conviction for second degree unlawful possession of that firearm, but this was not the decision of the Court. The Court did hold that the aggravating factor found in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(r) could not justify an exceptional sentence for rendering criminal assistance as a matter of law. The result of three opinions of the Court for this case was to reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dante McWilliams received the exceptional sentence of 120 months of confinement and 18 months of community custody, which, in the aggregate, exceeded the statutory maximum for his offense. McWilliams pled guilty to a 2009 second degree assault. At sentencing, he had an offender score of7, which resulted in a standard sentencing range of 43 to 57 months of confinement. The statutory maximum sentence of confinement for second degree assault is 120 months. The plea agreement entered into by the parties recommended an exceptional sentence of confinement of 120 months-the statutory maximum-along with 18 months of community custody .. The trial court imposed this sentence as stipulated in the agreement. At that time, McWilliams did not appeal. More than one year passed after entry of judgment. McWilliams then filed this personal restraint petition directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that his judgment and sentence was facially invalid under RCW 9.94A.701(9). The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the appropriate remedy was a notation in the judgment and sentence that explicitly states that the total term of confinement and community custody actually served may not exceed the statutory maximum. View "In re Pers. Restraint of McWilliams" on Justia Law

In two separate King County Superior Court cases, petitioner Adonijah Sykes was charged with three violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. Sykes successfully petitioned to participate in the King County adult drug diversion court and entered drug diversion court waivers and agreements with the State. Sykes participated in the drug diversion court program for over a year but had difficulties complying with its requirements. The State eventually moved to terminate her from the program. Sykes then moved to rescind the drug diversion court waivers and agreements and to vacate the orders granting her petitions to participate, arguing that King County's practice of holding closed "staffings" prior to holding open review hearings violated article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. Sykes argued the closed staffings tainted all procedures that followed, so she should have been allowed to restore her full trial rights to the underlying charges, and defend her cases as though she had never participated in drug diversion court. The State agreed that closed staffings violated article I, section 10 and chose not to assert invited error in order to have the underlying issue resolved on its merits. The drug diversion court denied Sykes' motions, holding that presumptively closed adult drug court staffings did not violate article I, section 10. The court did not reach the merits of the State's motion to terminate. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded Article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution did not require adult drug court staffings to be presumptively open. The case was therefore remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Sykes" on Justia Law

Washington State Patrol Trooper Chris Stone saw a truck, driven by defendant Ryan Quaale speed by in a 25-mile per hour zone on a residential street. Trooper Stone activated the lights on his patrol car and attempted to pull the truck over. Quaale turned off his truck's headlights and accelerated. Trooper Stone pursued. Quaale lost control, overshot a corner, skidding into a homeowner's yard before he regained control and sped away for several more blocks. After Trooper Stone activated his siren, Quaale pulled the truck over and stopped. Quaale exited his truck but did not attempt to flee on foot. As a part of standard pursuit protocol, Trooper Stone ordered Quaale to the ground and handcuffed him. As he approached Quaale, Trooper Stone smelled a strong odor of "intoxicants" on Quaale's breath. Trooper Stone then performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test on Quaale. During the HGN test, Trooper Stone observed Quaale's eyes bounce and have difficulty tracking the stimulus. Trooper Stone placed Quaale under arrest for DUI, reckless driving, and attempting to elude. At the station, Trooper Stone informed Quaale of the implied consent warnings for a breath test. Quaale refused to take the test. Quaale was tried twice. Quaale was charged with attempting to elude a police vehicle and with felony DUI. At trial, Trooper Stone testified that he had "no doubt" that the defendant was impaired based solely on the HGN test. In closing, the State argued that the odor of intoxicants and Quaale's erratic driving supported its theory of driving while impaired by alcohol, but the State primarily relied on the HGN test. The State also remarked on Quaale's revoked license during closing in violation of the court's ruling. The jury found Quaale guilty of DUI. On appeal, Quaale argued that the trooper's testimony amounted to an improper opinion on guilt. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trooper's testimony was an improper opinion on guilt. View "Washington v. Quaale" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Speight filed a timely personal restraint petition, claiming for the first time on collateral review that his right to a public trial under article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, was violated when the trial court decided motions in limine and individually questioned potential jurors in chambers. Consistent with its holding in "In re Personal Restraint of Coggin," the Supreme Court held that a petitioner claiming a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and substantial prejudice. Speight could not show actual and substantial prejudice arising from the closure; therefore, his petition was denied. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Speight" on Justia Law

In this case and in "In re Personal Restraint of Speight,"prospective jurors were questioned in chambers without the trial court engaging in the analysis required by "Washington v. Bone-Club." After his convictions were affirmed on appeal, petitioner William Coggin brought this personal restraint petition, claiming the private questioning of jurors constituted a closure and raising the issue of whether actual and substantial prejudice must be shown from a public trial right violation in order to obtain relief by personal restraint petition. After review, the Supreme Court held that while Coggin's public trial rights were violated, a petitioner claiming a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and substantial prejudice. Coggin did not show actual and substantial prejudice arising from the closure; therefore, his petition was denied. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Coggin" on Justia Law

John Jones, III was convicted in 2008 for second degree assault. At his first sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence of several California convictions, including one count of murder with a firearm, two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, and one count of assault with a firearm. The trial court calculated Jones's offender score as 6 by including the murder and attempted murder convictions, and sentenced Jones to an exceptional sentence of 120 months. Jones appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated his sentence because the trial court had failed to perform a comparability analysis of his California convictions. On remand for resentencing, the State supplemented the record, over Jones's objection, with new evidence of Jones's murder and attempted murder convictions and an additional drug conviction. After performing a comparability analysis on these convictions, the trial court recalculated Jones's offender score as 7 (now with the additional drug conviction). The court again sentenced Jones to an exceptional sentence of 120 months. Jones appealed again. The Court of Appeals vacated his sentence, this time because the State failed to establish Jones's convictions by a preponderance of the evidence when it presented a copy of a probation report, which the State had represented to the court as being a plea colloquy. At the third sentencing hearing, at issue here, the State offered an uncertified copy of a California plea colloquy in order to establish Jones's prior convictions. It also moved for a short continuance to obtain a certified copy. The trial court, however, denied the motion, concluding that a trial court could not permit the State to supplement the record on resentencing. Without the California convictions, Jones's offender score was calculated as 1 and he was sentenced to an exceptional sentence of 60 months. A few days later, the State filed a certified copy of the plea transcript that allegedly established the comparability of the California convictions. The State appealed. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals adhered to the "no second chance" rule. The issue on appeal in this case centered whether a trial court must give effect to the provision in RCW 9.94A.530(2) that permits both parties to present additional relevant evidence of criminal history at resentencing following remand from appeal or collateral attack. The Supreme Court held that because the "no second chance" rule was based on judicial economy, not due process, the legislature was within its authority to alter the Court's rule and that the statutory remand provision controlled. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ignacio Cobos represented himself at his sentencing hearing and objected to the State's calculation of his offender score. The trial judge sentenced Cobos with the offender score asserted by the State without holding an evidentiary hearing because Cobos's former counsel had agreed to the score prior to being discharged. The Court of Appeals found the sentencing court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, remanded for resentencing, and concluded that both sides could introduce supplemental evidence of the proper score on remand. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Cobos argued the State was barred from offering new evidence on remand under the common law "no second chance" rule. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Cobos" on Justia Law