Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Howard Shale was an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation. He had family in the Quinault Indian Nation as well. In 1997, Shale was convicted under federal law of raping a child under 12. After Shale was released from prison, he moved to Seattle and registered as a sex offender with the King County sheriff. In 2012, a Jefferson County sheriffs detective began investigating whether Shale had moved to her county without reregistering as a sex offender. At least two officers assisted the detective in her investigation; a Jefferson County sheriffs deputy and a Quinault tribal police officer. Taken together, police reports suggested Shale was dividing his time between the two family homes. Based on the detective's report, the Jefferson County prosecutor charged Shale with failure to register with the county sheriff as a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Washington State had the power to prosecute an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation living on the Quinault Indian Nation's reservation for failing to register with the county sheriff as a sex offender. The Court found the State indeed had that power. View "Washington v. Shale" on Justia Law

Matthew Bruch was convicted of two counts of second degree child molestation and two counts of third degree rape of a child. The trial court imposed a standard range sentence of 116 months of confinement and ordered community custody for a period of "at least 4 months, plus all accrued earned early release time at the time of release." Bruch appealed his sentence, arguing that the court-imposed term of community custody was indeterminate and may exceed the statutory requirement of three years of community custody required under RCW 9.94A.701(1). The Court of Appeals rejected Bruch's challenge, as did the Supreme Court: (1) the total sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum, consistent with RCW 9.94A.701(9); . there was no need for the trial court to amend Bruch's sentence to limit community custody to a maximum of three years, "[t]he statutes must be read together to assure that the trial court's intended sentence-a total term of 120 months-is not undermined by giving effect to the DOC's authority to transfer earned early release into community custody." View "Washington v. Bruch" on Justia Law

Petitioners Nicholas Blazina and Mauricio Paige-Colter were ordered to pay discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). The trial court record in each petitioner's case did not reflect that the trial judges considered either party's ability to pay before imposing the LFOs. Neither petitioner objected at the time. For the first time on appeal, however, both argued that the judges in their respective cases should have made an inquiry into their ability to pay, and that failing to make this inquiry warranted resentencing. The Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue because both petitioners failed to object at sentencing, and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Petitioners appealed the Court of Appeals' and trial courts' rulings to the Supreme Court, and in each case, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals did not err in declining to reach the merits. However, exercising its own discretion, the Supreme Court reached the merits and held that the trial court had a statutory obligation to make an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future ability to pay before the imposition of LFOs. The cases were remanded for the trial courts to make these inquiries. View "Washington v. Blazina" on Justia Law

In 2008, teenager Philip Johnson called his close friend (and fellow Hilltop Crips gang member) defendant-respondent Marsele Henderson to say he was going to a party at a Boys and Girls Club. Henderson advised Johnson not to go because the club was too close to a rival gang's territory. Johnson went to the party, where he was shot. Henderson learned of the shooting and went to the hospital with his friends, including Koloneus D'Orman McClarron, to check on Johnson. Johnson died shortly thereafter at the hospital, although McClarron and Henderson testified that they did not learn of his death at the hospital. One of the disputed-facts in this case was how many people were in the area in front of the house prior to shots being fired, because whether a person shot into a crowd of people or whether they shot toward an area with very few people might have determined the nature of the crime. Witness testimony on this point varied significantly. Witnesses testified that either McClarron or Henderson pulled a gun and fired six shots toward the house from the street. McClarron testified that Henderson fired the shots, but Henderson testified that it was McClarron who did it. Neither could give an explanation as to why the other person fired the gun. Four people testified that the shooter yelled something related to the Hilltop Crips at the time of the shooting. Witnesses were divided about whether the shooter looked like Henderson or McClarron. prosecutors charged Henderson with first degree murder by extreme indifference. At trial, Henderson asked that the jury be instructed on the lesser included charge of first degree manslaughter. Initially, the State agreed, acknowledging that the definitions of first degree murder by extreme indifference and first degree manslaughter are "very close" and that there is "hardly a difference." The State later changed its position based on two Court of Appeals cases from 1998 and 1999: "Washington v. Pettus," (951 P.2d 284 (1998)), and "Washington v. Pastrana," (972 P.2d 557 (1999)). In both of those cases, the Court of Appeals held that the defendants were not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter because the defendants' actions were much more than merely reckless. The Supreme Court later narrowed the definition of reckless in the context of manslaughter in "Washington v. Gamble," (114 P.3d 646 (2005)), to specifically mean a disregard of a substantial risk of homicide. Defendant's trial counsel did not bring "Gamble" to the attention of the trial court, and as a result, the trial court agreed with the State that "Pettus" and "Pastrana" were controlling and refused to instruct on manslaughter. The jury convicted Henderson of first degree murder by extreme indifference. Henderson appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on first degree manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed Henderson's conviction, holding that he was entitled to the instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed Henderson's conviction. View "Washington v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In the late 1980s, Alan Meirhofer was charged with several counts of brutally raping children, along with charges of burglary and kidnapping. Meirhofer was implicated in several more child rapes. As Meirhofer finished serving his criminal sentence, the State brought SVP commitment proceedings against him under the sexually violent predator (SVP) act, chapter 71.09 RCW, in 2000. He sought a full evidentiary proceeding on whether he still met the statutory and constitutional criteria for SVP commitment. Before holding such a full evidentiary proceeding, the SVP act directs trial courts to hold an initial show cause hearing to determine whether the State has presented prima facie evidence that continued commitment is justified or the detainee has presented prima facie evidence that his or her condition has "so changed" as to warrant a new evidentiary proceeding. The trial court found the State had made its showing and Meirhofer had not. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer" on Justia Law

The State charged Larry Hayes with one count of leading organized crime and one count of identity theft in the first degree, among several other charges. The State alleged that Hayes was involved in a complex identity theft scheme that used stolen credit card information, including information stolen from a hair salon's customer receipts, to manufacture false identification devices and credit cards. These in turn would be used to make purchases and rent vehicles, usually from out of state, with those rental vehicles sold for cash. The State also alleged that each count (except for a drug charge) was subject to the sentence aggravators for being a major economic offense. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether a trial court may impose an exceptional sentence on a defendant under the major economic offense sentence aggravators found in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(d)(i) and (iii) when that defendant's conviction was based on accomplice liability. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals's decision that the trial court improperly applied the sentence aggravators to Hayes. View "Washington v. Hayes" on Justia Law

Odies Walker was convicted as an accomplice to first degree murder, first degree assault, first degree robbery, solicitation, and conspiracy. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether those convictions should have been reversed in light of a Power Point presentation the prosecuting attorney used during closing argument. That presentation repeatedly expressed the prosecutor's personal opinion on guilt (over 100 of its approximately 250 slides were headed with the words "DEFENDANT WALKER GUILTY OF PREMEDITATED MURDER," and one slide showed Walker's booking photograph altered with the words "GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT," which were superimposed over his face in bold red letters). The prosecutor also appealed to passion and prejudice by juxtaposing photographs of the victim with photographs of Walker and his family, some altered with the addition of inflammatory captions and superimposed text. While the prosecutor was entitled to draw the jury's attention to admitted evidence, those slides, as presented, served no legitimate purpose. "Their prejudicial effect could not have been cured by a timely objection, and we cannot conclude with any confidence that Walker's convictions were the result of a fair trial." The Court reversed Walker's convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Walker" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal consisted of two criminal cases. In each case, the jury convicted the defendant and found that aggravating circumstances were present. At sentencing, the trial courts deviated from the standard sentencing range and imposed exceptional sentences. While both trial courts explained on the record their reasons for deviating from the standard range, neither court entered written findings as required by statute. Both sentences were affirmed by the Court of Appeals in unpublished opinions. The issue these cases presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an on-the-record oral ruling could substitute for written findings when a trial court imposes an exceptional sentence. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that oral findings do not satisfy the requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. The cases were remanded for entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Washington v. Friedlund" on Justia Law

In 2009, Maurice Clemmons shot and killed four Lakewood police officers. Petitioner Darcus Allen drove Clemmons to and from the crime scene and was charged as an accomplice. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the prosecuting attorney committed prejudicial misconduct by misstating the standard upon which the jury could convict an accomplice. In a divided decision, the Court of Appeals recognized that the statements were improper but ultimately held that they did not amount to prejudicial misconduct. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Court of Appeals. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Allen" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Joel Condon guilty of several offenses including aggravated first degree (premeditated) murder and first degree felony murder, stemming from his involvement in a home invasion robbery attempt. He argued on appeal that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, and that there were errors by the trial court in instructing the jury. The Court of Appeals found there was sufficient evidence of premeditation, but that it was error to deny Condon's request for an instruction on the lesser included crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Washington v. Condon" on Justia Law