Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Brian Brush was convicted of first degree murder for killing his ex-fiancee. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence based on the jury's finding that the murder was an aggravated domestic violence offense. Brush appealed the domestic violence finding on two grounds: (1) a jury instruction defining "prolonged period of time" in the context of the domestic violence aggravating factor violated the constitutional rule against judges commenting on the evidence; and (2) the admission of certain heresay statements made by the victim's daughter during the sentencing phase of trial. With regard to respondent's first contention, the Supreme Court agreed that the instruction defining "prolonged period of time" essentially resolved a factual question for the jury and thereby constituted an improper comment on the evidence. With regard to respondent's second contention, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the victim's daughter to testify because her testimony related to an incident where Brush stalked her and her mother. The Court reversed Brush's exceptional sentence and remanded to the trial court with instructions that, if requested, it could impanel a jury to consider evidence of a prolonged pattern of abuse. View "Washington v. Brush" on Justia Law

This case began as a call for police assistance to E.J.J. 's house to help with his intoxicated, out-of-control sister, R.J. (a juvenile at the time). The police responded and began their intervention by escorting R.J. out of the house 10 to 15 feet away from the front door, where the officers attempted to calm her down. E.J.J. grew concerned when he saw an officer reach for what he perceived to be a nightstick. E.J.J. exited the house and stood on the porch, telling the officers that R.J. was his sister and that they should not use the nightstick. The officers advised him that they were in the middle of their investigation and instructed him multiple times to leave the scene and return to the house. Initially, E.J.J. did not comply. When he did return to the home, he stood in an open doorway and continued his verbal interaction with the officers. The officers directed E.J.J. multiple times to close the solid wood door and to withdraw further into the home, but E.J.J. refused, stating that he wanted to make sure that R.J. was not harmed. E.J.J. continued to stand behind a closed wrought iron door. Multiple times, an officer reached into the home to close the solid door. E.J.J. would immediately reopen it. At this point, E.J.J. was irate, yelling profanities and calling the officers abusive names. An officer warned E.J.J. that he could be arrested for obstruction. After E.J.J. continued to reopen the solid door, an officer put him under arrest for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. E.J.J. challenged the obstruction statute as unconstitutional as applied to his behavior. "While E.J.J. 's words may have been disrespectful, discourteous, and annoying, they are nonetheless constitutionally protected." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case. View "Washington v. E.J.J." on Justia Law

Leroy Jones was convicted of second degree assault for his role in a street fight involving five people. In a motion for a new trial made shortly after the verdict and before appeal, he asserted that his trial lawyer failed to interview and call certain eyewitnesses who were clearly identified in discovery that the State provided. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was clear that defense trial counsel's failure to interview three previously identified and easily accessible eyewitnesses before trial constituted deficient performance. "This deficiency also caused prejudice: it deprived Jones of the opportunity to develop a theory of the case that Jones was the victim rather than the aggressor, and it deprived him of neutral bystander eyewitness testimony in support of that theory." On this ground, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court. With regard to arguments made about the sentence he received, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in calculating defendant's sentence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Frederick Hardtke was charged with two counts of second degree rape, one count of second degree assault, two counts of fourth degree assault, and malicious mischief. All were alleged to be acts of domestic violence that took place while Hardtke claimed he was blacked out from alcohol abuse. At his arraignment, the trial court imposed conditions of release, including that Hardtke not consume alcohol, pay a performance bond, and wear an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet while awaiting trial. Hardtke objected multiple times to paying for the cost of the bracelet, but he wore the bracelet as a condition of his release. Hardtke eventually pleaded guilty to amended charges, and as part of his sentence he was ordered to reimburse the county for the cost of the alcohol monitoring. He appealed, challenging only the imposition of this cost. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, the costs for an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet fit under the statutory meaning of "pretrial supervision." Because the trial court imposed nearly $4,000 in monitoring costs, the reversed and remanded for imposition of costs consistent with the statute. View "Washington v. Hardtke" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Barry appealed his conviction on two counts of child molestation, claiming that the trial court's instruction in response to a jury question violated his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The jury asked the court whether it may consider "observations of the defendant's actions-demeanor during the court case" as "evidence." In response, the trial court instructed the jury that "[e]vidence includes what you witness in the courtroom." All parties agreed that the record contains no references whatsoever to Barry's in-court demeanor and so the Supreme Court had no way of determining what aspects of Barry's "demeanor" drew the jury's attention and whether the jury's observations were favorable or unfavorable to Barry. Therefore, after review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's instruction did not amount to constitutional error. The Court instead applied the nonconstitutional error standard and affirmed. View "Washington v. Barry" on Justia Law

The State charged Christopher Maynard in juvenile court with six counts of malicious mischief. Less than one month later, he turned 18 years old. Maynard's counsel did not move for an order to extend the court's statutory jurisdiction before Maynard turned 18. As a result, the juvenile court ruled that it had lost jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The State then filed the case in superior court. Maynard moved to dismiss, arguing that preaccusatorial delay and ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of the benefits of juvenile court jurisdiction, including the opportunity to accept a plea offer from the State. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ineffective assistance of counsel, not preaccusatorial delay, caused the loss of jurisdiction. The court, however, determined that remand to adult trial court for a new trial was the proper remedy. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Maynard received ineffective assistance of counsel which then deprived him the benefit of the opportunity to accept a plea deal. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' order with regard to remanding of the case to the adult trial court and instead, directed the State to reoffer the plea proposal of deferred disposition consistent with the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW. View "Washington v. Maynard" on Justia Law

The issue common to these consolidated cases centered on whether the totality of circumstances in each case provided law enforcement with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a Terry stop. Both cases involved the stop of a defendant after the defendant entered a high-crime apartment complex and visited an apartment occupied by a suspected drug dealer. However, other circumstances distinguished the cases and lead to different results. Because the circumstances included a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the Supreme Court affirmed in "Washington v. Fuentes." Finding that there were insufficient facts to give rise to an individualized suspicion, the Court reversed in "Washington v. Sandoz." View "Washington v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Glasmann asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the holdings of "Washington v. Daniels," (156 P.3d 905 (2007) (Daniels I), adhered to on recons., 200 P .3d 711 (2009) (Daniels II)). The Daniels case law established that if (1) the State charges a person with greater and lesser offenses and the jury is unable to agree regarding the greater offense but finds the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and (2) the defendant's conviction for the lesser offense is reversed on appeal, then the State may retry the defendant for the greater offense without violating double jeopardy. Glasmann asked the Washington Court to reconsider the Daniels decision in light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' approach to the subject. "We will overturn our precedent only when someone shows that it is incorrect and harmful. Since Glasmann has not made that showing regarding the Daniels decisions, we see no reason to overturn them." View "Washington v. Glasmann" on Justia Law

Ryan Peeler was serving a prison sentence on a Snohomish County charge at the Washington Corrections Center (WCC) when he requested a final disposition of an untried charge in Skagit County. By the time that the Skagit County prosecutor received Peeler's final disposition request, however, the Department of Corrections (DOC) had transported him to the King County jail to await trial on unrelated charges. Peeler was not returned to WCC until well after the Skagit County prosecutor received his request. The State failed to bring Peeler to trial in Skagit County within 120 days of receiving his final disposition request. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that even though Peeler was physically located in King County when the State received his final disposition request, his request was valid and the State failed to meet the 120-day deadline to bring him to trial in Skagit County. View "Washington v. Peeler" on Justia Law

As applied to Washington, the holding in "Padilla v. Kentucky," (559 U.S. 356 (2010) was an affirmation of the duty to provide effective assistance of counsel, which included the duty to reasonably research and apply relevant statutes. However, language in certain Washington appellate cases made it appear that this rule did not apply to RCW 10.40.200. "Padilla" superseded those cases, significantly changing state law. Muhammadou Jagana raised a claim that would have been rejected before "Padilla" based on those superseded appellate cases. The Washington Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Jagana's personal restraint petition (PRP) and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. However, Yung-Cheng Tsai's claim was available before "Padilla," and Tsai did in fact raise his claim with the assistance of an attorney in 2008. That motion was denied based on an issue of law not affected by Padilla, and Tsai did not appeal. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Tsai's PRP. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai" on Justia Law