Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether, under either the state or federal constitutions, the information provided by multiple 911 callers was reliable and sufficient to justify an investigatory Terry stop of the car in which defendant was a passenger. Defendant Z.U.E. moved to suppress evidence of marijuana found on him following the stop, arguing that the officers lacked a reasonable basis to detain the car and its occupants. The trial court denied Z.U.E.'s motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed. In determining whether the information provided by a series of 911 calls provided the officers sufficient reliable information to justify stopping Z.U.E.'s car, the Supreme Court declined to strictly apply the two-pronged "Aguilar/Spinelli" analysis, but it recognized the two factors' relevance and usefulness to the reliability analysis. In this case case before us, the State did not establish that the series of 911 calls provided the officers with any articulable reason to suspect any of the passengers in this particular car were engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, the officers' subsequent seizure of Z.U.E. was therefore unlawful, and any evidence obtained as a result of that seizure should have been suppressed at trial. View "Washington v. Z. U. E." on Justia Law

At the conclusion of voir dire questioning, counsel exercised for cause challenges orally at the bench and subsequently exercised peremptory challenges silently by exchanging a list of jurors and alternatively striking names from it. All of voir dire, including the juror challenges, occurred in open court, on the record, and in full view of any observer in the courtroom. This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether that method of challenging jurors after voir dire (a method commonly employed in trial courts around the state) violated the constitutional right to a public trial. After review, the Court held that the juror challenges in this case were exercised in a manner consistent with the minimum safeguards of the public trial right. View "Washington v. Love" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Robert Yates Jr. of two counts of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced him to death. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2007. Yates filed this personal restraint petition, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. The Court found that personal restraint petitions must be filed within one year of a judgment and sentence becoming final (with certain exceptions). Yates filed his personal restraint petition seven years after his judgment and sentence became final. Since his petition did not meet any of the statutory exceptions to the one-year filing requirement, the Supreme Court dismissed it as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law

Petitioner Chadwick Kalebaugh appealed his first degree child molestation conviction and claimed reversible error based on the trial judge's misstatements regarding the meaning of "reasonable doubt" in his preliminary remarks to the jury venire. Petitioner did not object, and raised the issue for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court, in its review of the matter, reached the unpreserved error because it was a manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3). However, the Court affirmed because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Washington v. Kalebaugh" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Cates was convicted by jury on two counts of first degree rape of a child, and two counts of first degree child molestation. He was given a standard-range sentence for each conviction, all to run concurrently, resulting in 25 years of total confinement. He was further sentenced to three years of community custody upon his release and prohibited from contacting the victim. The prosecutor proposed a community custody condition that would have prohibited Cates from possessing or maintaining access to a computer without explicit authorization from his community corrections officer (CCO). Instead of the prosecutor's recommended condition, the trial court entered a modified condition providing, "You must consent to [Department of Corrections] home visits to monitor your compliance with supervision. Home visits include access for the purposes of visual inspection of all areas of the residence in which you live or have exclusive/joint control/access, to also include computers which you have access to." The Court of Appeals affirmed Cates' convictions and sentence in an unpublished opinion. Cates petitioned for the Supreme Court's review only as to the validity of the community custody provision requiring him to consent to home visits. Cates argued this condition violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. After careful consideration of the trial court record and petitioner's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that petitioner's challenge was not yet ripe for review. View "Washington v. Cates" on Justia Law

Respondent Brian Brush was convicted of first degree murder for killing his ex-fiancee. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence based on the jury's finding that the murder was an aggravated domestic violence offense. Brush appealed the domestic violence finding on two grounds: (1) a jury instruction defining "prolonged period of time" in the context of the domestic violence aggravating factor violated the constitutional rule against judges commenting on the evidence; and (2) the admission of certain heresay statements made by the victim's daughter during the sentencing phase of trial. With regard to respondent's first contention, the Supreme Court agreed that the instruction defining "prolonged period of time" essentially resolved a factual question for the jury and thereby constituted an improper comment on the evidence. With regard to respondent's second contention, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the victim's daughter to testify because her testimony related to an incident where Brush stalked her and her mother. The Court reversed Brush's exceptional sentence and remanded to the trial court with instructions that, if requested, it could impanel a jury to consider evidence of a prolonged pattern of abuse. View "Washington v. Brush" on Justia Law

This case began as a call for police assistance to E.J.J. 's house to help with his intoxicated, out-of-control sister, R.J. (a juvenile at the time). The police responded and began their intervention by escorting R.J. out of the house 10 to 15 feet away from the front door, where the officers attempted to calm her down. E.J.J. grew concerned when he saw an officer reach for what he perceived to be a nightstick. E.J.J. exited the house and stood on the porch, telling the officers that R.J. was his sister and that they should not use the nightstick. The officers advised him that they were in the middle of their investigation and instructed him multiple times to leave the scene and return to the house. Initially, E.J.J. did not comply. When he did return to the home, he stood in an open doorway and continued his verbal interaction with the officers. The officers directed E.J.J. multiple times to close the solid wood door and to withdraw further into the home, but E.J.J. refused, stating that he wanted to make sure that R.J. was not harmed. E.J.J. continued to stand behind a closed wrought iron door. Multiple times, an officer reached into the home to close the solid door. E.J.J. would immediately reopen it. At this point, E.J.J. was irate, yelling profanities and calling the officers abusive names. An officer warned E.J.J. that he could be arrested for obstruction. After E.J.J. continued to reopen the solid door, an officer put him under arrest for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. E.J.J. challenged the obstruction statute as unconstitutional as applied to his behavior. "While E.J.J. 's words may have been disrespectful, discourteous, and annoying, they are nonetheless constitutionally protected." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case. View "Washington v. E.J.J." on Justia Law

Leroy Jones was convicted of second degree assault for his role in a street fight involving five people. In a motion for a new trial made shortly after the verdict and before appeal, he asserted that his trial lawyer failed to interview and call certain eyewitnesses who were clearly identified in discovery that the State provided. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was clear that defense trial counsel's failure to interview three previously identified and easily accessible eyewitnesses before trial constituted deficient performance. "This deficiency also caused prejudice: it deprived Jones of the opportunity to develop a theory of the case that Jones was the victim rather than the aggressor, and it deprived him of neutral bystander eyewitness testimony in support of that theory." On this ground, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court. With regard to arguments made about the sentence he received, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in calculating defendant's sentence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Frederick Hardtke was charged with two counts of second degree rape, one count of second degree assault, two counts of fourth degree assault, and malicious mischief. All were alleged to be acts of domestic violence that took place while Hardtke claimed he was blacked out from alcohol abuse. At his arraignment, the trial court imposed conditions of release, including that Hardtke not consume alcohol, pay a performance bond, and wear an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet while awaiting trial. Hardtke objected multiple times to paying for the cost of the bracelet, but he wore the bracelet as a condition of his release. Hardtke eventually pleaded guilty to amended charges, and as part of his sentence he was ordered to reimburse the county for the cost of the alcohol monitoring. He appealed, challenging only the imposition of this cost. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, the costs for an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet fit under the statutory meaning of "pretrial supervision." Because the trial court imposed nearly $4,000 in monitoring costs, the reversed and remanded for imposition of costs consistent with the statute. View "Washington v. Hardtke" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Barry appealed his conviction on two counts of child molestation, claiming that the trial court's instruction in response to a jury question violated his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The jury asked the court whether it may consider "observations of the defendant's actions-demeanor during the court case" as "evidence." In response, the trial court instructed the jury that "[e]vidence includes what you witness in the courtroom." All parties agreed that the record contains no references whatsoever to Barry's in-court demeanor and so the Supreme Court had no way of determining what aspects of Barry's "demeanor" drew the jury's attention and whether the jury's observations were favorable or unfavorable to Barry. Therefore, after review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's instruction did not amount to constitutional error. The Court instead applied the nonconstitutional error standard and affirmed. View "Washington v. Barry" on Justia Law