Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Prison inmate Steven Kozol sought to file a statutory petition for writ of review under chapter 7.16 RCW to challenge a prison disciplinary sanction imposed by the Department of Corrections. The Department of Corrections alleged that Kozol committed a serious infraction as defined under WAC 137-25-030 (Category D, 740: committing fraud or embezzlement, or obtaining goods, services, money, or anything else of value under false pretenses). A disciplinary hearing officer found Kozol guilty of the infraction and imposed a sanction of 10 days of cell confinement. There was no apparent loss of early release credit. Ordinarily, an inmate challenging a prison disciplinary sanction would file a personal restraint petition. But Kozol instead filed a pro se action for declaratory relief, alleging among other things that the department violated disciplinary hearing procedures set forth in chapter 137-28 WAC. He later amended his complaint to name individual defendants and assert additional causes of action, including a claim for damages. On Kozol' s appeal of the superior court's denial of his request to present a writ petition, the Court of Appeals held that Kozol could petition for such a writ in challenging a prison disciplinary decision. But because a personal restraint petition was an "adequate remedy at law" for challenging such a decision in this case, Kozol could not establish a basis for a statutory writ. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action but reversed denial of Kozol's motion to amend his complaint to seek a statutory writ of review, holding that Kozol could seek such a writ in challenging a prison disciplinary decision not involving loss of good conduct credits. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' judgment. After review, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Kozol v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Someone attempted to burglarize Lancer Lanes and Casino around 2:00a.m. on May 14, 2013. The burglar cut the surveillance feed. However, the burglar's activities awoke Eric Glasson, an individual who occasionally slept overnight at Lancer Lanes, and Glasson's presence apparently spooked the burglar into leaving without taking anything. On May 23, Petitioner Troy Wilcoxon, a card dealer at Lancer Lanes, invited Glasson, James Nollette, and two other casino employees to a "strip club" called the Candy Store. State's theory of the case was that the purpose of inviting Glasson and the other casino employees to the Candy Store was to get them out of Lancer Lanes so the burglary could occur without any interference. The group arrived around midnight, but Wilcoxon left by himself less than an hour later after talking privately with Nollette. Shortly after 2:00a.m., the Candy Store's surveillance footage showed Nollette talking on his cell phone with someone-the conversation lasted roughly 15 minutes. Cell phone records showed several calls between Nollette and Wilcoxon around 2:00a.m. Wilcoxon's phone's signal relied on a cell tower near Lancer Lanes. Soon after Nollette's conversation ended, Nollette, Glasson, and the two casino employees left the Candy Store. That same night, surveillance footage from Lancer Lanes showed the same garbage-bag-wearing burglar enter the building just before 2:00 a.m. The burglar again cut the surveillance feed, but this time, the cameras were backed up by batteries and recorded the burglary. Surveillance footage showed the burglar take $29,074 from Lancer Lanes's money drawer. The State charged Wilcoxon with second degree burglary, first degree theft, and second degree conspiracy to commit burglary. Wilcoxon's case was joined for trial with Nollette's case. Prior to trial, Wilcoxon moved to sever his trial from Nollette's, arguing that since Nollette would likely not testify, Wilcoxon would be unable to cross-examine him regarding certain statements Nollette made. The trial court denied Wilcoxon's motion. The jury convicted Wilcoxon of all three charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed Wilcoxon's convictions, finding no confrontation right violation or requirement to provide a limiting instruction sua sponte. After review, the Supreme Court found that Nolette's out of court statements made to another person were not testimonial, and as such, were not subject to the confrontation right. Wilcoxon's convictions were affirmed. View "Washington v. Wilcoxon" on Justia Law

Bart Rowley Sr. was injured while driving a truck for work. He filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) denied Rowley's claim because it determined that Rowley was injured while committing a felony: possession of a controlled substance. The Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, barred payment of workers' compensation under that circumstance. Rowley filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board). After considering testimony from several witnesses, an industrial appeals judge (IAJ) found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Department's decision and ordered the Department to approve Rowley's claim. The Department challenged that order four times: in an appeal before a three-member board panel, at superior court, at the Court of Appeals, and finally to the Washington Supreme Court. Every lower court affirmed the IAJ's decision that Rowley was entitled to benefits. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding on the applicable evidentiary standard, the Supreme Court also agreed that Rowley was entitled to benefits. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Rowley" on Justia Law

Chad Chenoweth was convicted of six counts of third degree child rape of his daughter and six counts of first degree incest. The incest counts and the rape of a child counts were based on six incidents, each involving a single act. At sentencing, Chenoweth moved the court to find the incest counts were the same criminal conduct as the corresponding rape of a child count. The trial court disagreed and counted each conviction separately for the purposes of sentencing, concluding the offender score exceeded nine. Sentences for each conviction were ordered to be served concurrently. Chenoweth appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence. The Supreme Court granted review on the same criminal conduct issue, found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Washington v. Chenoweth" on Justia Law

Cory Sundberg was charged with and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). The statute under which Sundberg was convicted set forth a strict liability crime in that knowledge of the possession was not an element of the offense that the State had to prove. To reduce the harshness of this offense, courts have created an "unwitting possession" defense and placed the burden on the defendant to establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. At trial, the thrust of Sundberg's argument was to assert an unwitting possession defense, assuming this burden of proof. He was convicted, and the issue his appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a prosecutor commits error when, during closing rebuttal argument, he comments that the defendant failed to call a witness to corroborate his affirmative defense of unwitting possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court held that in a criminal prosecution where the defendant has the burden to establish an affirmative defense, no error occurs where the prosecutor comments on the defendant's failure to present evidence or testimony in support of the defense. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Sundberg" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Spencer Miller of two counts of attempted first degree murder in 2002. The trial court imposed a 200-month sentence on each count, to run consecutively. In an untimely collateral attack, Miller argued that "In re Personal Restraint of Mulholland," (166 P.3d 677 (2007)), constituted a significant change in the law retroactively applicable to his sentence. The trial court agreed and ordered resentencing. The Supreme Court rejected Miller's argument and vacated the trial court order. View "Washington v. Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Johnny Fuller was charged with two counts of assault in the second degree, each count presenting an alternative means of committing the offense. The jury acquitted Fuller of one count and deadlocked on the other. The trial court declared a mistrial on that count, and the State sought to retry Fuller. Fuller moved to dismiss, arguing that retrial would subject him to re-prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, in violation of double jeopardy. The superior court denied Fuller's motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Washington Supreme Court held that jeopardy never terminated as to the count the State sought to retry, and that the jury's acquittal on the other count was of no consequence. Because retrial did not implicate double jeopardy, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Fuller" on Justia Law

In 1988, when petitioner John Anderson was 17 years old, he pled guilty in juvenile court to statutory rape in the first degree. The victim was two and a half years old. Anderson was sentenced to 100 weeks in a juvenile rehabilitation facility. When Anderson's juvenile sentence was about to expire in 1990, the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed and he was transferred to Western State Hospital (WSH) for an evaluation. Before the evaluation period ended, Anderson voluntarily sought civil commitment. In February 2000, Anderson announced his intention to end his voluntary commitment and the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW. Anderson was transferred to the Special Commitment Center (SCC) during the pendency of the State's petition in March 2001. In 2004, after a bench trial, the trial court found Anderson was an SVP. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appoint Anderson's requested expert witness. The Supreme Court agreed. On remand, Anderson moved to dismiss, contending that his juvenile adjudication was not a conviction, and thus he could not be subject to an SVP petition under RCW 71.09.030(1)(e). He also contended that his sexual contacts with other patients at WSH were not recent overt acts as a matter of law. The trial court denied Anderson's motion to dismiss, and Anderson was retried by a jury. The jury concluded that Anderson was an SVP, and the trial court entered an order committing him to the SCC. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. Anderson petitioned the Supreme Court to ask that his civil commitment under chapter 71.09 RCW be reversed. Specifically, he asked whether juvenile adjudication for a sexually violent offense was a predicate "convict[ion]" under RCW 71.09.030(1)(e). The Supreme Court held that it was, and affirmed his civil commitment. View "In re Det. of Anderson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Andrea Rich of driving under the influence (DUI) and reckless endangerment. The evidence showed that Rich was speeding in traffic while highly intoxicated and with a young child in the front passenger seat. But the officer who arrested Rich followed her car because he believed that the car was stolen. Rich's manner of driving posed no observable danger. The Court of Appeals reversed the reckless endangerment conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Rich's driving created an actual, substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person. The Court of Appeals ruled, on an issue of first impression, that proof of a DUI does not necessarily establish proof of reckless endangerment. The Supreme Court agreed that proof of DUI alone did not necessarily establish proof of reckless endangerment. However, the Court found that a reasonable juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Rich created a substantial risk of death or injury to her passenger, knew of that risk and disregarded it. The Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed on the reckless endangerment conviction. View "Washington v. Rich" on Justia Law

Seattle Police Officer Michael Conners stopped a vehicle driven by Wayne Evans for speeding in the Central District of Seattle. As Conners approached Evans's vehicle, he observed furtive movements from Evans and his passenger, and smelled marijuana. Conners directed Evans to exit the vehicle and asked him whether he had any weapons. Evans responded that there was a knife in his pocket. Conners instructed Evans not to reach for the knife; Conners then reached into Evans's front right pocket, retrieved a fixed-blade knife with a black handle, and placed Evans under arrest for possession of a fixed-blade knife. The city of Seattle charged Evans with the unlawful use of weapons. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and Evans's conviction was affirmed by the superior court and the Court of Appeals. On appeal of that conviction, Evans argued that Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 12A.14.0801 violated his right to bear arms under article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution because the ordinance does not permit him to carry a small, fixed-blade "paring" knife for the purpose of self-defense. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on different grounds: the Court held that Evans' paring knife was not an arm entitled to constitutional protection, and that Evans therefore could not establish that SMC 12A.14.080 was unconstitutionally applied to him. View "City of Seattle v. Evans" on Justia Law