Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A little after midnight in Yakima one summer night in 2009, someone in a car shot into a home, grazing Kyle Mullins' head. Petitioner Chad Duncan was charged with six counts of first degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Duncan moved to suppress the evidence and confessions that flowed from a traffic stop shortly after the incident on several grounds, including that the police had insufficient grounds to stop him and that their initial warrantless search of his car was improper. At the pretrial suppression hearing, held a year and a half after the events of that summer night, the judge found that the stop was justified and that the search was reasonable, and denied the motion. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges. This case presented two questions for review: (1) whether Duncan could challenge the legal financial obligations (LFOs) imposed by the trial court for the first time on appeal; and (2) whether the police properly searched his car for a gun after a drive-by shooting. The Supreme Court answered "yes" to both questions, affirmed Duncan's conviction, and remanded for resentencing with proper consideration of his ability to pay LFOs. View "Washington v. Duncan" on Justia Law

This case presented questions regarding a defendant's public trial right and right to be present as applied to the designation of alternate jurors by a random drawing performed after both sides have rested at trial. The random drawing was done by the trial court's judicial assistant at a brief recess during closing arguments. Defendant Martin Jones contended that this violated his constitutional rights to a public trial and to be present at all critical stages of trial proceedings. Based on the specific facts presented by the record before us, the Washington Supreme Court held that the random drawing by the judicial assistant did not implicate Jones' public trial right. The Court also held that Jones waived his right-to-presence claim by failing to raise an objection until after the jury reached its verdict. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals, and reinstated Jones' conviction. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

At issue was whether RCW 4.24.550, a community notification statute relating to registered sex offenders, constituted an "other statute" under the Public Records Act (PRA), that would exempt the blanket release of level I sex offender registration information from a PRA request. Appellant Donna Zink made several public records requests with the Washington State Patrol (WSP) and the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC) for documents pertaining to level I registered sex offenders. Both the WSP and WASPC intended to grant her request, but the WASPC notified several of the John Does that their records had been requested. The John Does in turn filed suit to enjoin production of the records. The trial court granted the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that RCW 4.24.550, and specifically RCW 4.24.550(3)(a), was not an "other statute" exemption under RCW 42.56.070(1) of the PRA. View "John Doe A v. Wash. State Patrol" on Justia Law

Prison inmate Steven Kozol sought to file a statutory petition for writ of review under chapter 7.16 RCW to challenge a prison disciplinary sanction imposed by the Department of Corrections. The Department of Corrections alleged that Kozol committed a serious infraction as defined under WAC 137-25-030 (Category D, 740: committing fraud or embezzlement, or obtaining goods, services, money, or anything else of value under false pretenses). A disciplinary hearing officer found Kozol guilty of the infraction and imposed a sanction of 10 days of cell confinement. There was no apparent loss of early release credit. Ordinarily, an inmate challenging a prison disciplinary sanction would file a personal restraint petition. But Kozol instead filed a pro se action for declaratory relief, alleging among other things that the department violated disciplinary hearing procedures set forth in chapter 137-28 WAC. He later amended his complaint to name individual defendants and assert additional causes of action, including a claim for damages. On Kozol' s appeal of the superior court's denial of his request to present a writ petition, the Court of Appeals held that Kozol could petition for such a writ in challenging a prison disciplinary decision. But because a personal restraint petition was an "adequate remedy at law" for challenging such a decision in this case, Kozol could not establish a basis for a statutory writ. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action but reversed denial of Kozol's motion to amend his complaint to seek a statutory writ of review, holding that Kozol could seek such a writ in challenging a prison disciplinary decision not involving loss of good conduct credits. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' judgment. After review, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Kozol v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Someone attempted to burglarize Lancer Lanes and Casino around 2:00a.m. on May 14, 2013. The burglar cut the surveillance feed. However, the burglar's activities awoke Eric Glasson, an individual who occasionally slept overnight at Lancer Lanes, and Glasson's presence apparently spooked the burglar into leaving without taking anything. On May 23, Petitioner Troy Wilcoxon, a card dealer at Lancer Lanes, invited Glasson, James Nollette, and two other casino employees to a "strip club" called the Candy Store. State's theory of the case was that the purpose of inviting Glasson and the other casino employees to the Candy Store was to get them out of Lancer Lanes so the burglary could occur without any interference. The group arrived around midnight, but Wilcoxon left by himself less than an hour later after talking privately with Nollette. Shortly after 2:00a.m., the Candy Store's surveillance footage showed Nollette talking on his cell phone with someone-the conversation lasted roughly 15 minutes. Cell phone records showed several calls between Nollette and Wilcoxon around 2:00a.m. Wilcoxon's phone's signal relied on a cell tower near Lancer Lanes. Soon after Nollette's conversation ended, Nollette, Glasson, and the two casino employees left the Candy Store. That same night, surveillance footage from Lancer Lanes showed the same garbage-bag-wearing burglar enter the building just before 2:00 a.m. The burglar again cut the surveillance feed, but this time, the cameras were backed up by batteries and recorded the burglary. Surveillance footage showed the burglar take $29,074 from Lancer Lanes's money drawer. The State charged Wilcoxon with second degree burglary, first degree theft, and second degree conspiracy to commit burglary. Wilcoxon's case was joined for trial with Nollette's case. Prior to trial, Wilcoxon moved to sever his trial from Nollette's, arguing that since Nollette would likely not testify, Wilcoxon would be unable to cross-examine him regarding certain statements Nollette made. The trial court denied Wilcoxon's motion. The jury convicted Wilcoxon of all three charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed Wilcoxon's convictions, finding no confrontation right violation or requirement to provide a limiting instruction sua sponte. After review, the Supreme Court found that Nolette's out of court statements made to another person were not testimonial, and as such, were not subject to the confrontation right. Wilcoxon's convictions were affirmed. View "Washington v. Wilcoxon" on Justia Law

Bart Rowley Sr. was injured while driving a truck for work. He filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) denied Rowley's claim because it determined that Rowley was injured while committing a felony: possession of a controlled substance. The Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, barred payment of workers' compensation under that circumstance. Rowley filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board). After considering testimony from several witnesses, an industrial appeals judge (IAJ) found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Department's decision and ordered the Department to approve Rowley's claim. The Department challenged that order four times: in an appeal before a three-member board panel, at superior court, at the Court of Appeals, and finally to the Washington Supreme Court. Every lower court affirmed the IAJ's decision that Rowley was entitled to benefits. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding on the applicable evidentiary standard, the Supreme Court also agreed that Rowley was entitled to benefits. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Rowley" on Justia Law

Chad Chenoweth was convicted of six counts of third degree child rape of his daughter and six counts of first degree incest. The incest counts and the rape of a child counts were based on six incidents, each involving a single act. At sentencing, Chenoweth moved the court to find the incest counts were the same criminal conduct as the corresponding rape of a child count. The trial court disagreed and counted each conviction separately for the purposes of sentencing, concluding the offender score exceeded nine. Sentences for each conviction were ordered to be served concurrently. Chenoweth appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence. The Supreme Court granted review on the same criminal conduct issue, found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Washington v. Chenoweth" on Justia Law

Cory Sundberg was charged with and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). The statute under which Sundberg was convicted set forth a strict liability crime in that knowledge of the possession was not an element of the offense that the State had to prove. To reduce the harshness of this offense, courts have created an "unwitting possession" defense and placed the burden on the defendant to establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. At trial, the thrust of Sundberg's argument was to assert an unwitting possession defense, assuming this burden of proof. He was convicted, and the issue his appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a prosecutor commits error when, during closing rebuttal argument, he comments that the defendant failed to call a witness to corroborate his affirmative defense of unwitting possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court held that in a criminal prosecution where the defendant has the burden to establish an affirmative defense, no error occurs where the prosecutor comments on the defendant's failure to present evidence or testimony in support of the defense. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Sundberg" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Spencer Miller of two counts of attempted first degree murder in 2002. The trial court imposed a 200-month sentence on each count, to run consecutively. In an untimely collateral attack, Miller argued that "In re Personal Restraint of Mulholland," (166 P.3d 677 (2007)), constituted a significant change in the law retroactively applicable to his sentence. The trial court agreed and ordered resentencing. The Supreme Court rejected Miller's argument and vacated the trial court order. View "Washington v. Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Johnny Fuller was charged with two counts of assault in the second degree, each count presenting an alternative means of committing the offense. The jury acquitted Fuller of one count and deadlocked on the other. The trial court declared a mistrial on that count, and the State sought to retry Fuller. Fuller moved to dismiss, arguing that retrial would subject him to re-prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, in violation of double jeopardy. The superior court denied Fuller's motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Washington Supreme Court held that jeopardy never terminated as to the count the State sought to retry, and that the jury's acquittal on the other count was of no consequence. Because retrial did not implicate double jeopardy, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Fuller" on Justia Law