Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Kisha Fisher and Corey Trosclair were tried as codefendants for the felony murder of Leonard Masten. Prior to trial, Fisher made out-of-court statements that incriminated both herself and Trosclair. After denying both defendants' motions to sever, the State offered Fisher's statement at trial as evidence against her. Trosclair challenged the sufficiency of the redactions in protecting his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights under the federal constitution. Fisher challenged the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with her requested affirmative defense jury instruction. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the redaction of Trosclair's name to "first guy" in Fisher's confession was insufficient, as it obviously referred to Trosclair. The Court therefore held it was error to read Fisher's statement into evidence. However, in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence, the Court concluded this error was harmless and affirmed Trosclair's conviction. As to Fisher, the Court held she produced sufficient evidence at trial to warrant an affirmative defense jury instruction. Failure to do so constituted reversible error, and the Court reversed her conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The complaint in this case alleged negligence based on a failure to schedule a resentencing hearing for a criminal defendant after the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing. Consequently, the defendant served more prison time than he otherwise would have had he been promptly resentenced. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the "actual innocence" element of a criminal malpractice claim against the trial attorney, the appellate attorney and King County (through its agency, the Department of Public Defense), applied to the facts of this case to bar the complaint. The Supreme Court held that actual innocence was a necessary requirement to pursue the criminal malpractice claim and that no exception applied. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment of dismissal in favor of all respondents. View "Piris v. Kitching" on Justia Law

K.H.-H., a 17-year-old male, was charged with assault with sexual motivation after he forced himself on C.R., a female acquaintance who attended the same high school. The issue this case presented on appeal involved whether a juvenile disposition condition requiring K.H.-H. to write an apology letter to the victim violated his constitutional free speech rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that it did not. View "Washington v K. H.-H." on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Farnsworth, Jr. and James McFarland were suffering heroin withdrawals and had no money to purchase more. The pair made a plan to "rob" a bank. They were arrested and charged with first degree robbery. The jury was instructed on both first degree theft and first degree robbery; it unanimously convicted Farnsworth of first degree robbery and, per the jury instructions, it did not consider the lesser-included crime of first degree theft. The trial court found that the conviction was his third strike under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) and sentenced Farnsworth to life in prison without the possibility of release. The main question raised by Farnsworth's appeal of that sentence was whether certain conduct constituted a "threat of force," making the crime a robbery, not a theft. Specifically, the question centered on whether Farnsworth's handwritten note demanding money from a bank teller contained an implied threat of force. "Although the note did not convey an explicitly threatening message, we believe it was laden with inherent intimidation. … As Farnsworth's partner in crime explained, they were well aware that banks generally instructed their employees to react to such notes as if they contained an explicit threat; in fact, the pair relied on that knowledge and fear to commit this crime. In this context, we hold that there is sufficient evidence that the pair's conduct implied a threat of harm." Furthermore, the Court concluded no errors at trial court accumulated to deprive Farnsworth of a fair trial. The Court therefore affirmed Farnsworth's conviction for first degree robbery. View "Washington v. Farnsworth" on Justia Law

Officer Scott Campbell made a traffic stop of petitioner Mark Mecham, observing that Mecham might have been driving while intoxicated. Officer Campbell asked Mecham to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs), which would have involved Officer Campbell's observing Mecham's eye movements and ability to walk a straight line and stand on one leg. Mecham refused, and his refusal was used against him at trial. Mecham argued on appeal that his constitutional rights were violated when the State introduced evidence of his refusal to submit to the FSTs. After review, the Supreme Court held that Mecham's rights were not violated because an FST is not a search under the state and federal constitutions, and Mecham had no constitutional right to refuse to perform the FSTs. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. View "Washington v. Mecham" on Justia Law

The respondents' cases were unrelated, but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of recommitment under former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii). M.W. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he attacked another patient at Navos psychiatric hospital, stomping on his head three times. W.D. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he punched a stranger in the face with no warning or provocation. Both men's charges were dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. The State petitioned for civil commitment on three statutory grounds: those contained in RCW 71.05.280(2), (3) and (4). M.W. and W.D. each stipulated to commitment for a 180-day period and waived their right to a full evidentiary hearing. The trial court committed M.W. and W.D. to Western State Hospital for 180 days of involuntary treatment on multiple grounds, including RCW 71.05.280(3). Leading up to the expiration of the initial period of involuntary commitment, the State petitioned for an additional 180-day period of involuntary treatment. The State alleged two grounds for recommitment: RCW 71.05.280(4) (gravely disabled); and (3) (incompetent person charged with a violent felony who continues to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts). The latter ground triggered the provision at issue, former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii), which provided a special procedure for recommitting individuals subject to a judge's special finding under RCW 71.05.280(3)(b) that they committed a violent felony. The superior court commissioner declared former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) unconstitutional on multiple grounds: substantive and procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial. The court ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D. then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds. The Supreme Court concluded M.W. and W.D failed to meet their burden to prove that former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) violated substantive or procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, or the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court commissioner's ruling and upheld former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) as constitutional. View "In re Det. of M. W." on Justia Law

Petitioner Nalda Otton sought reversal of his convictions for second degree assault and felony harassment. Otton and the victim had a romantic relationship and lived in the same household. The victim was disabled due to a history of multiple brain surgeries and sometimes had difficulties with memory and speaking. Late one night in December 2012, Otton and the victim had a confrontation. After Otton left the house, the victim called 911. When the police arrived, the victim gave a written statement, signed under penalty of perjury, alleging that Otton held her on the bed and against the wall by her neck so that she could not breathe and told her he was going to kill her. The victim testified at Otton's trial, and because her testimony was inconsistent with her prior sworn statement to police about the incident, the trial court admitted the victim's prior statement as substantive evidence. Otton acknowledged that the trial court's decision and the Court of Appeals opinion affirming that decision were proper in accordance with long-standing precedent. But in this appeal, Otton asked the Supreme Court to reject that precedent. The victim's statement was not hearsay, and admissible as substantive evidence. A question arose on whether the victim's police interview was an "other proceeding" contemplated by ER 801(d)(1)(i). When confronted with the same question in 1982, the Supreme Court declined to issue a categorical ruling that a police interview was either always or never considered an "other proceeding." The Court had not reexamined that 1982 case since it was issued. Based on that precedential case, the Court of Appeals formulated a four-factor test for determining whether an out-of-court statement by a nonparty witness was admissible. Otton did not challenge the trial court's discretionary determinations with regard to the four-part test; instead he argued the Supreme Court should reject the 1982 case. Finding that Otton has not shown that the 1982 case was incorrect, or any other reversible reason, the Supreme Court declined Otton's invitation and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Otton" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether police officers had to give resident-respondent Michael Budd "Ferrier" warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the resident's home in order to seize an item containing suspected contraband. In 2009, the Washington State Patrol received an anonymous cybertip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children alleging that respondent possessed child pornography on his computer, used Internet messaging services to communicate with minors, and bragged about molesting his nine-and-a-half-year-old daughter. After review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Ferrier warnings were required under such circumstances. Here, the trial court found that the officers did not give respondent the warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the home to seize his computer. Based on this finding, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent's consent was invalid. View "Washington v. Budd" on Justia Law

Defendants were tried together as codefendants, each charged with three counts of first degree assault while armed with a firearm with intent to benefit a criminal street gang. All three defendants appealed, raising a number of issues. The Court of Appeals largely rejected their claims, but found that the trial court had erred in two ways: (1) some of the generalized gang evidence that the trial judge allowed was irrelevant, "had little or no probative value," and was not appropriately limited (however, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the additional generalized gang evidence was unlikely to have materially affected the outcome of the trial, and upheld all three convictions); and (2) the trial court erred when it ruled that the defendants' statements on jail intake forms regarding gang affiliation were voluntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals explained that "the State's own trial evidence demonstrated that there was a real and ongoing danger of violence and retaliation between rival gangs that presented these defendants with a credible threat of harm if housed with rival gang members in the Sunnyside jail." As a result, the statements were made by the defendants to avoid a very real risk of danger, and thus were not made voluntarily. However, the Court of Appeals found that the latter error was harmless as to two of the defendants (Anthony DeLeon and Robledo) because of other admissible evidence of their gang affiliation, and upheld their gang aggravators. Because of the scant evidence of Ricardo DeLeon's gang involvement, the Court of Appeals reversed his gang aggravator and remanded for a new trial on the aggravator and resentencing. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial for all three defendants, finding that they were forced to choose between making incriminating statements and facing physical violence, and that those incriminating statements were then used against the defendants at trial. "Under these circumstances, we do not see how the statements could possibly be considered voluntary and admissible. One should not have to risk physical violence to assert a constitutional right." View "Washington v. Juarez" on Justia Law

Curtis Stump was convicted of possession of heroin following a bench trial. He filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed a lawyer to represent Stump on the appeal at public expense. That lawyer, however, did not file a brief in support of Stump's appeal. Instead, Stump's appointed lawyer moved to withdraw and filed an "Anders" brief, arguing not that the appeal was meritorious but that it was wholly frivolous. The commissioner of the Court of Appeals granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw, agreed with defense counsel's assessment that the appeal was wholly frivolous, dismissed the appeal, and affirmed Stump's conviction. The State then filed a cost bill, and the commissioner imposed appellate costs against Stump under RAP 14.2. At least one other Division of the Court of Appeals has declined to order costs in this situation. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the issue of the propriety of imposing costs against an indigent criminal defendant whose appointed lawyer files an Anders brief and motion to withdraw. "In order to serve the ends of justice," the Supreme Court held that RAP 14.2 did not apply to this unique situation. The appellate court's award of costs was reversed, and no costs were awarded to either party for review by the Supreme Court. View "Washington v. Stump" on Justia Law