Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Baron Ashley Jr. appealed his conviction for unlawful imprisonment with domestic violence. At trial, the State introduced evidence of Ashley's prior acts of domestic violence against the victim pursuant to ER 404(b). The Washington Supreme Court held that the evidence was properly admitted for the purpose of establishing an element of the charged crime but that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence for the purpose of bolstering the witness's credibility. However, because the Supreme Court held that the error was harmless, it affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Ashley" on Justia Law

The State challenged a Court of Appeals decision reversing Clifford Porter's conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Pursuant to a search warrant, police discovered portions of a stolen vehicle on Porter's property. At the close of trial, the jury convicted Porter as charged. On appeal, Porter argued for the first time that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document was constitutionally deficient for failing to allege that Porter withheld or appropriated the vehicle from the true owner. Specifically, Porter argued that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document omitted an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle: RCW 9A.56.140(1 )'s provision stating that possession means to "'withhold or appropriate [stolen property] to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto."' The State contended the information need not include the "withhold or appropriate" language because it merely defined the essential element of possession and was not itself an essential element. The Supreme Court concluded the State had the better argument, and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. View "Washington v. Porter" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kisha Fisher and Corey Trosclair were tried as codefendants for the felony murder of Leonard Masten. Prior to trial, Fisher made out-of-court statements that incriminated both herself and Trosclair. After denying both defendants' motions to sever, the State offered Fisher's statement at trial as evidence against her. Trosclair challenged the sufficiency of the redactions in protecting his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights under the federal constitution. Fisher challenged the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with her requested affirmative defense jury instruction. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the redaction of Trosclair's name to "first guy" in Fisher's confession was insufficient, as it obviously referred to Trosclair. The Court therefore held it was error to read Fisher's statement into evidence. However, in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence, the Court concluded this error was harmless and affirmed Trosclair's conviction. As to Fisher, the Court held she produced sufficient evidence at trial to warrant an affirmative defense jury instruction. Failure to do so constituted reversible error, and the Court reversed her conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The complaint in this case alleged negligence based on a failure to schedule a resentencing hearing for a criminal defendant after the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing. Consequently, the defendant served more prison time than he otherwise would have had he been promptly resentenced. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the "actual innocence" element of a criminal malpractice claim against the trial attorney, the appellate attorney and King County (through its agency, the Department of Public Defense), applied to the facts of this case to bar the complaint. The Supreme Court held that actual innocence was a necessary requirement to pursue the criminal malpractice claim and that no exception applied. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment of dismissal in favor of all respondents. View "Piris v. Kitching" on Justia Law

K.H.-H., a 17-year-old male, was charged with assault with sexual motivation after he forced himself on C.R., a female acquaintance who attended the same high school. The issue this case presented on appeal involved whether a juvenile disposition condition requiring K.H.-H. to write an apology letter to the victim violated his constitutional free speech rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that it did not. View "Washington v K. H.-H." on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Farnsworth, Jr. and James McFarland were suffering heroin withdrawals and had no money to purchase more. The pair made a plan to "rob" a bank. They were arrested and charged with first degree robbery. The jury was instructed on both first degree theft and first degree robbery; it unanimously convicted Farnsworth of first degree robbery and, per the jury instructions, it did not consider the lesser-included crime of first degree theft. The trial court found that the conviction was his third strike under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) and sentenced Farnsworth to life in prison without the possibility of release. The main question raised by Farnsworth's appeal of that sentence was whether certain conduct constituted a "threat of force," making the crime a robbery, not a theft. Specifically, the question centered on whether Farnsworth's handwritten note demanding money from a bank teller contained an implied threat of force. "Although the note did not convey an explicitly threatening message, we believe it was laden with inherent intimidation. … As Farnsworth's partner in crime explained, they were well aware that banks generally instructed their employees to react to such notes as if they contained an explicit threat; in fact, the pair relied on that knowledge and fear to commit this crime. In this context, we hold that there is sufficient evidence that the pair's conduct implied a threat of harm." Furthermore, the Court concluded no errors at trial court accumulated to deprive Farnsworth of a fair trial. The Court therefore affirmed Farnsworth's conviction for first degree robbery. View "Washington v. Farnsworth" on Justia Law

Officer Scott Campbell made a traffic stop of petitioner Mark Mecham, observing that Mecham might have been driving while intoxicated. Officer Campbell asked Mecham to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs), which would have involved Officer Campbell's observing Mecham's eye movements and ability to walk a straight line and stand on one leg. Mecham refused, and his refusal was used against him at trial. Mecham argued on appeal that his constitutional rights were violated when the State introduced evidence of his refusal to submit to the FSTs. After review, the Supreme Court held that Mecham's rights were not violated because an FST is not a search under the state and federal constitutions, and Mecham had no constitutional right to refuse to perform the FSTs. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. View "Washington v. Mecham" on Justia Law

The respondents' cases were unrelated, but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of recommitment under former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii). M.W. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he attacked another patient at Navos psychiatric hospital, stomping on his head three times. W.D. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he punched a stranger in the face with no warning or provocation. Both men's charges were dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. The State petitioned for civil commitment on three statutory grounds: those contained in RCW 71.05.280(2), (3) and (4). M.W. and W.D. each stipulated to commitment for a 180-day period and waived their right to a full evidentiary hearing. The trial court committed M.W. and W.D. to Western State Hospital for 180 days of involuntary treatment on multiple grounds, including RCW 71.05.280(3). Leading up to the expiration of the initial period of involuntary commitment, the State petitioned for an additional 180-day period of involuntary treatment. The State alleged two grounds for recommitment: RCW 71.05.280(4) (gravely disabled); and (3) (incompetent person charged with a violent felony who continues to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts). The latter ground triggered the provision at issue, former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii), which provided a special procedure for recommitting individuals subject to a judge's special finding under RCW 71.05.280(3)(b) that they committed a violent felony. The superior court commissioner declared former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) unconstitutional on multiple grounds: substantive and procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial. The court ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D. then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds. The Supreme Court concluded M.W. and W.D failed to meet their burden to prove that former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) violated substantive or procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, or the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court commissioner's ruling and upheld former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) as constitutional. View "In re Det. of M. W." on Justia Law

Petitioner Nalda Otton sought reversal of his convictions for second degree assault and felony harassment. Otton and the victim had a romantic relationship and lived in the same household. The victim was disabled due to a history of multiple brain surgeries and sometimes had difficulties with memory and speaking. Late one night in December 2012, Otton and the victim had a confrontation. After Otton left the house, the victim called 911. When the police arrived, the victim gave a written statement, signed under penalty of perjury, alleging that Otton held her on the bed and against the wall by her neck so that she could not breathe and told her he was going to kill her. The victim testified at Otton's trial, and because her testimony was inconsistent with her prior sworn statement to police about the incident, the trial court admitted the victim's prior statement as substantive evidence. Otton acknowledged that the trial court's decision and the Court of Appeals opinion affirming that decision were proper in accordance with long-standing precedent. But in this appeal, Otton asked the Supreme Court to reject that precedent. The victim's statement was not hearsay, and admissible as substantive evidence. A question arose on whether the victim's police interview was an "other proceeding" contemplated by ER 801(d)(1)(i). When confronted with the same question in 1982, the Supreme Court declined to issue a categorical ruling that a police interview was either always or never considered an "other proceeding." The Court had not reexamined that 1982 case since it was issued. Based on that precedential case, the Court of Appeals formulated a four-factor test for determining whether an out-of-court statement by a nonparty witness was admissible. Otton did not challenge the trial court's discretionary determinations with regard to the four-part test; instead he argued the Supreme Court should reject the 1982 case. Finding that Otton has not shown that the 1982 case was incorrect, or any other reversible reason, the Supreme Court declined Otton's invitation and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Otton" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether police officers had to give resident-respondent Michael Budd "Ferrier" warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the resident's home in order to seize an item containing suspected contraband. In 2009, the Washington State Patrol received an anonymous cybertip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children alleging that respondent possessed child pornography on his computer, used Internet messaging services to communicate with minors, and bragged about molesting his nine-and-a-half-year-old daughter. After review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Ferrier warnings were required under such circumstances. Here, the trial court found that the officers did not give respondent the warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the home to seize his computer. Based on this finding, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent's consent was invalid. View "Washington v. Budd" on Justia Law