Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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This case concerned an untimely personal restraint petition that petitioner Jonathan Pitchlynn alleged was exempt from the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100(5) because the judgment and sentence was imposed in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court ordered a reference hearing to resolve a material factual dispute. Based on the factual findings, the Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, the Court dismissed petitioner’s personal restraint petition as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn" on Justia Law

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Petitioner James Hinton was 17 when he was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He received a 37-year standard range adult sentence. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Hinton argued he was less culpable than an adult when he committed those crimes, so his standard range adult sentence was a disproportionate punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hinton sought collateral relief in the form of a resentencing hearing so he could prove that his lesser culpability entitled him to a lesser sentence. The State argued RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP under RAP 16.4(d). To this, the Washington Supreme Court agreed: RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP because it eliminated the constitutional error that Hinton identified in his original sentence. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton" on Justia Law

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This case concerned the adequacy of the Washington early release statute, RCW 9.94A.730, as a remedy to petitioner Erik Carrasco’s alleged unconstitutional sentence for a crime he committed as a juvenile. Carrasco was serving a 93-year sentence imposed without any consideration of his youth. Carrasco was 17 years old and a member of “La Raza,” a Norteño gang in Yakima; he was ultimately convicted of second degree murder, four counts of first degree assault, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He would be eligible to petition for early release under RCW 9.94A.730 after serving 20 years of his sentence. Because Washington v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) was controlling, the Washington Supreme Court concluded Carrasco had an adequate remedy under the statute. The judgment dismissing his personal restraint petition was affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrasco" on Justia Law

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When J.W.M. was 17½ years old, he pointed what he thought was an unloaded gun at his friend W.B. and pulled the trigger. The gun was loaded, it discharged, W.B. died two days later. The State charged J.W.M. with first degree manslaughter while being armed with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm (UPFA). Because first degree manslaughter was a serious violent offense subject to the Washington “auto-decline” statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A), J.W.M. was tried in adult court, and a jury found him guilty of second-degree manslaughter, a lesser included offense. The trial court found him guilty of UPFA in a bifurcated bench trial. With neither offense being an auto-decline offense, J.W.M. was not sentenced in adult court but instead proceeded to a juvenile disposition hearing. More than two weeks before the disposition hearing, for the first time the State recommended a manifest injustice disposition. The juvenile court imposed the maximum possible manifest injustice upward disposition: confinement until age 25. J.W.M. challenged his disposition on several grounds, including that the juvenile court’s primary reason for imposing the disposition was J.W.M.’s need for treatment and services was an invalid basis under our decision in State v. B.O.J., 449 P.3d 1006 (2019). The Washington Supreme Court agreed a new disposition hearing was required, as a manifest injustice disposition was not justified by a juvenile offender’s need for services. View "Washington v. J.W.M." on Justia Law

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"became overwhelmed" and punched himself in the face. After several jurors expressed concern, the trial court questioned juror 9 and two other jurors before dismissing juror 9 for cause. The reconstituted jury found Norman guilty of one of two counts. The Court of Appeals reversed Norman’s conviction, holding juror 9’s dismissal was improper under the heightened evidentiary standard set forth in Washington v. Elmore, 123 P.3d 72 (2005). The Washington Supreme Court found the Elmore standard applied only where a juror was accused of nullification, refusing to follow the law, or refusing to deliberate. As there was no such accusation here, and the trial court found juror 9’s conduct likely affected the jury’s process of deliberating freely, it did not abuse its discretion in dismissing juror 9. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed Norman’s conviction. View "Washington v. Norman" on Justia Law

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Petitioners Robert Ayerst and Justin Lewis were represented at their criminal trials by Robert Van Idour. Though a licensed attorney in Idaho, Van Idour was never admitted to practice in Washington. Accordingly, Van Idour was not authorized to practice law when he represented the petitioners, along with 100 other indigent defendants in Asotin County. Th Washington Supreme Court found Van Idour’s failure to gain admittance to the Washington bar was not just shockingly unprofessional, it was "unethical and indefensible." The issue presented here was whether a lawyer who is licensed in Idaho but not in Washington was nevertheless a lawyer for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ayerst and Lewis contended this failure resulted in a complete denial of counsel, which constituted structural error and demanded reversal of their convictions. While the Washington Supreme Court agreed Van Idour’s actions violated state licensure rules, it disagreed that they amounted to a constitutional denial of counsel. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ denial of Ayerst’s and Lewis’s personal restraint petitions. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Lewis" on Justia Law

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Tyler Bagby was convicted of residential burglary, fourth degree assault, and harassment. At his trial, the prosecutor repeatedly asked witnesses to identify Bagby by his “nationality.” All the witnesses responded by identifying Bagby as either Black or African-American. Bagby was born in the United States; he was an American citizen; and his race, ethnicity, and identity were not at issue in this case. The Washington Supreme Court granted review to address whether the prosecutor’s repeated use of the word “nationality,” among other statements, to distinguish a defendant from other witnesses evoked racial bias in a manner that constituted prosecutorial misconduct and prejudiced the trial. The Court held that it did. "Because the race-based misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that a timely objection and jury instruction could not have cured resulting prejudice, the errors are per se prejudicial, warranting reversal." View "Washington v. Bagby" on Justia Law

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The trial court denied Respondent William Talbott II’s motion to excuse a prospective juror (juror 40) for cause. Talbott could have removed juror 40 with a peremptory challenge, but he did not, nor did he exhaust his peremptory challenges on other prospective jurors. Instead, Talbott affirmatively accepted the jury panel, including juror 40, with at least two peremptory challenges still available to him. After he was convicted, Talbott appealed the denial of his for-cause challenge to juror 40. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Talbott's claim was foreclosed by a long line of precedent holding that a party who accepts the jury panel without exhausting their peremptory challenges cannot appeal “based on the jury’s composition.” View "Washington v. Talbott" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Chaz Butler, a Black man, was convicted of assaulting two security officers in separate incidents at two Seattle light rail stations. One of the victims, who appeared to be white, identified Butler as his assailant at trial. The victim had not made an out-of-court identification. Butler asked the trial court to instruct the jury according to the pattern jury instruction on eyewitness identifications, which included optional bracketed language that the jury may consider “[t]he witness’s familiarity or lack of familiarity with people of the [perceived] race or ethnicity of the perpetrator of the act.” The trial court agreed to give the pattern jury instruction, but—finding no evidence in the record regarding either the fallibility of cross-racial identification in general or the witness’s familiarity or lack of familiarity with people of Butler’s race in particular—declined to include that optional language. Butler did not challenge the admissibility of the witness’s identification testimony. On appeal, Butler argued that the trial court denied his right to present a defense by failing to give the cross-racial identification portion of the pattern instruction. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because there was insufficient evidence supporting the instruction, and it upheld Butler’s conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Butler" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Li’Anthony Williams was 17 years old in 2001 when he pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree with sexual motivation and was sentenced under the indeterminate sentencing scheme for sex offenders. The trial court imposed the statutory maximum term of life with a minimum term at the bottom of the three to nine month standard range. Williams was transferred to the Department of Corrections (DOC) with the understanding that his release date would be determined by the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB or Board). The ISRB found Williams was not releasable. Williams in turn filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) on grounds that his maximum term of life sentence was unconstitutional and that he was sentenced to a nonexistent crime. Williams also argued his petition was not barred by the one-year time limit for two reasons: (1) his claim was based on Washington v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), which was a significant, material change of law that should be retroactively applied; and (2) his conviction was invalid on its face. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed with both claims: Williams’ petition failed to meet the time bar exception under RCW 10.73.100(6) because his sentence did not violate the substantive rule of Houston-Sconiers; therefore, Houston-Sconiers was not material to Williams’ claim. Furthermore, Williams’ petition did not meet the exception under RCW 10.73.090 because the State’s failure to specify the intended felony underlying the conviction on the judgment and sentence (J&S) did not render the J&S invalid on its face. The Court therefore dismissed Williams’ petition as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Williams" on Justia Law