Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shacon Barbee was a pimp that made money from prostitutes working under his supervision. The State charged Barbee with two counts of promoting sexual abuse of a minor (SE), one count of first degree promoting prostitution (BK), one count of second degree promoting prostitution (CW), one count of leading organized crime, two counts of first degree theft from the Social Security Administration, and one count of second degree theft from the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The jury found Barbee guilty on all counts, except that they found him guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree promoting prostitution of BK. The jury made a special finding that promoting commercial sexual abuse of SE was part of a pattern of abuse over a "prolonged period of time," and the court imposed exceptional sentences of 420 months for the first two promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor (PCSAM) convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed all of Barbee's convictions. At issue for the Supreme Court’s review was whether a pimp could be convicted on multiple counts of promoting prostitution when multiple prostitutes were involved. The Court had not previously considered the unit of prosecution for second degree promoting prostitution. In light of the statute's plain language and its prior decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the legislature expressed its clear intent to authorize multiple convictions when one pimp exploits multiple individuals. View "Washington v. Barbee" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether the State could offer a driver's refusal to take a breath test under Washington's implied consent statute, RCW 46.20.308, as evidence of guilt at a criminal trial after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in “Missouri v. McNeely,” (133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)). In the two cases here, an officer asked each defendant to submit to a breath test. Dominic Baird agreed to the test; Collette Adams refused it. Baird's test results showed a BAC above the legal limit. Pretrial, both defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the breath test was a request to consent to a warrantless search and they had a constitutional right to refuse consent. Consequently, the State could not use their refusal as evidence of guilt. Baird further argued that because the officer told him that his refusal could be used as evidence, the officer coerced his consent through an unlawful threat, thereby invalidating his consent. The State took the position that the defendants had no constitutional right to refuse because the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied in all DUI cases. Due to the body's natural elimination of alcohol from the bloodstream as time passes, the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is impractical since the delay will cause the destruction of DUI evidence. The Washington Supreme Court found that the district courts correctly rejected the State's argument that alcohol dissipation constituted exigency per se. The Court held that the implied consent statute did not authorize a warrantless search, and a driver has no constitutional right to refuse a breath test because such a search falls under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Further, although the implied consent statute gives a driver a statutory right to refuse the test, by exercising the privilege to drive, a driver consents to admitting that refusal to take the breath test into evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that a driver's refusal was admissible as evidence of guilt under Washington's implied consent law. View "Washington v. Baird" on Justia Law

Mark Black challenged his commitment as a sexually violent predator under chapter 71.09 RCW. He contended that his commitment had to be vacated because he was not present when some potential jurors were questioned individually in open court about their prior experiences with sexual abuse. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded Black waived his right to be present while jurors were individually questioned about these sensitive subjects. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "In re Det. of Black" on Justia Law

Noel Caldellis shot into a crowd of people outside a party, killing one. He was charged with first degree murder "[u]nder circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." The jury was given a "to-convict" instruction modeled on the relevant pattern jury instruction, which itself was modeled on subsection RCW 9A.32.030(l)(b). After Caldellis' trial, the pattern jury committee amended the relevant pattern instruction to require an additional "element" that "the defendant knew of and disregarded the grave risk of death." Among other things, Caldellis argued his conviction should have been set aside because the jury was not required to find this new "element" in his case. The Supreme Court held the instruction given in Caldellis' trial included the required elements of the crime and was sufficient. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Caldellis" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Earl Flippo of four counts of child molestation in 2008. Flippo timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the verdict and sentence in 2010. The Court of Appeals dismissed Flippo's first personal restraint petition (PRP) in 2011. In 2015, Flippo filed his second PRP, arguing for the first time that the sentencing court imposed discretionary legal financial obligations without having performed an individualized inquiry into his ability to pay. The Court of Appeals dismissed Flippo's PRP on the basis that it was untimely, and Flippo appealed that decision. The Washington Supreme Court granted discretionary review, found no reversible error in the dismissal of Flippo's case, and affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Flippo" on Justia Law

In decriminalizing recreational use of cannabis, a Washington State initiative set the legal concentration limit for the psychoactive compound in cannabis, tetracannabinol (or THC), in the bloodstream. The initiative also amended the implied consent statute to direct police officers to warn drivers of the legal consequences of a breath test that revealed that THC concentration. No breath test available at the time measured THC concentrations in the blood. The Washington legislature has since amended the implied consent statute so that it no longer requires officers give the warning that suggested the then-current breath test measured something it could not. Before that amendment, Judith Murray and Darren Robison were given implied consent warnings that conformed to the ability of the breath test but not to the specific language of the statute. The issue these cases presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the breath test results should have been suppressed because the THC warnings were not given. The Court found that for the breath tests given, the warnings did not omit any relevant part of the statute, accurately expressed the relevant parts of the statute, and were not misleading. Accordingly, the warnings substantially complied with the implied consent statute and the test results were properly admitted. View "Washington v. Murray" on Justia Law

Kevin Case was convicted of felony violation of a domestic violence no-contact order. Violating a no-contact order became a felony when an offender had at least two prior convictions for violating a no-contact order or similar order issued under qualifying provisions listed in RCW 26.50.110(5). Case stipulated that he had been convicted of violating no-contact orders before. However, his stipulation did not explicitly state that the previously violated orders had been issued under qualifying provisions listed in the statute. For the first time on appeal, Case argued the State failed to prove its case because his stipulation was inadequate. After review, the Supreme Court found that whether the prior convictions were issued under qualifying provisions listed in RCW 26.50.11 0(5) was a threshold legal matter to be decided by the judge and that Case's stipulation, in context, was sufficient. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Case's conviction. View "Washington v. Case" on Justia Law

A jury found Miguel Albarran guilty of several crimes, including second degree rape of a child and second degree rape, based on a single act. At sentencing, the parties and the trial court all agreed that the rape and child rape convictions violated double jeopardy protections. The remedy for a double jeopardy violation was vacation of the conviction for the lesser offense. Here, the trial court concluded that the lesser offense was second degree child rape and vacated that conviction Albarran appealed because the enhanced second degree rape carried a mandatory sentence of 25 years, while the vacated conviction did not. Albarran argued that a different and more important violation occurred in this case: a violation of the so-called "general-specific rule." The remedy for a violation of the "general-specific" rule was vacation of the conviction for the "general" offense. Albarran argued that the more general offense in this case was second degree rape. The Court of Appeals agreed with Albarran, vacated the conviction for second degree rape, reinstated the conviction for second degree rape of a child, and remanded for resentencing. The Washington Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in reaching its conclusion, and reversed the Court of Appeals. The original judgment and sentence were reinstated. View "Washington v. Albarran" on Justia Law

Juvenile defendant Trey M. challenged his three convictions for felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020. The Court of Appeals certified the issue to the Washington Supreme Court of whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Elonis v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)) had any impact on the Washington Court's "reasonable person standard" for what constituted a "true threat" under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Washington Supreme Court held that because "Elonis" expressly avoided any First Amendment analysis, it provided no basis for the Court to abandon its established First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Trey M." on Justia Law

Kenneth Slert was convicted three times of killing John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed on appeal. Potential jurors in his third trial were given an initial written questionnaire in an attempt to determine whether any knew of Slert's prior convictions. Based on the written answers and after a discussion in chambers and out of Slert's presence, four jurors were dismissed. For the first time on appeal, Slert challenged his conviction on the grounds that the discussion in chambers violated his right to be present at a critical stage of his own trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Slert waived his right to raise his exclusion from the in chambers discussion by not raising it at trial. The Court also concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as it was clear the dismissed jurors had disqualifying knowledge of Slert's prior convictions or held disqualifying opinions about his guilt. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law