Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Fabian Arredondo appealed his accomplice liability convictions of one count of second degree murder and three counts of first degree assault. A jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Arredondo, a gang member, drove a vehicle from which his cousin and fellow member, Rudy Madrigal, fired gunshots into a vehicle occupied by alleged rival gang members. One shot struck the driver, Ladislado Avila, in the head, and he later died at the hospital as a result of his gunshot wound. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues: (1) the trial court allowed the State to introduce ER 404(b) evidence linking Arredondo to an uncharged 2009 drive-by shooting; and (2) the trial court barred Arredondo from cross-examining the State's key witness, Maurice Simon, about Simon's past mental health diagnoses, as well as past alcohol and drug use. Simon would later testify that Arredondo admitted his role in the shooting to him while they shared a jail cell. In neither instance did the Supreme Court find the trial court committed reversible error. View "Washington v. Arredondo" on Justia Law

The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed precedent that a trial court must consider whether such joinder will result in undue prejudice to the defendant. If it will, joinder is not permissible. The State charged Charles Bluford with one count of first degree robbery and one count of indecent liberties. The State later charged Bluford in a separate information with five more first degree robberies involving five new victims. Before trial, the State moved to join the two robberies accompanied by sexual offenses to the other five robberies, while Bluford moved to sever the five robberies from each other. The Court of Appeals held: (1) the trial court properly allowed joinder; (2) Bluford did not invite the trial court to erroneously deny his request for a lesser-included offense instruction on the indecent liberties charge; and (3) the State had not proved Bluford's prior New Jersey conviction for second degree robbery was factually or legally comparable to a most serious offense in Washington, so Bluford's persistent offender sentence was erroneously imposed. The Washington Supreme Court overruled certain Court of Appeals opinions that have departed from precedent, reversed Bluford's convictions, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Bluford" on Justia Law

David Woodlyn cashed a series of blank checks written by Dora Kjellerson, an elderly woman suffering from dementia. The State charged Woodlyn with theft in the second degree, an alternative means crime. The jury's "to convict" instruction required the jury to unanimously agree on Woodlyn's guilt-but not on how he committed the crime. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. Woodlyn appealed, arguing the general verdict violated his right to jury unanimity under article I, section 21 of the Washington constitution insofar as the evidence was insufficient to support conviction under the "wrongfully obtained" alternative. The Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence of this means was insufficient, but nonetheless affirmed, holding that any error was harmless. The court reasoned that the absence of evidence of the theft by taking alternative reasonably showed that the jury's verdict rested on the theft by deception alternative. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals reasoning, finding the State failed to support one or more alternative means did not establish that the jury relied unanimously on another, supported alternative. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in result because it concluded the evidence before the jury was sufficient to support both alternative means of second degree theft. View "Washington v. Woodlyn" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, petitioners were each charged with four serious violent offenses-one count of conspiracy to commit assault (an anticipatory crime) and three substantive crimes of assault. A divided appellate panel held that the anticipatory crime did not have a seriousness level at all, and hence that anticipatory crime could not form the basis for consecutive sentencing calculations under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). Instead it directed the sentencing court to calculate the sentence using the seriousness level and standard range for one of petitioners' substantive crimes-an approach that resulted in longer sentences. The majority's approach in “Washington v. Weatherwax” conflicted with another appellate court panel. In “Washington v. Breaux,” the appellate court held that RCW 9.94A.589(1 )(b) was ambiguous in cases where multiple serious violent offenses had the same seriousness level but produced different length sentences; it therefore held that the rule of lenity required courts facing that situation to start their sentencing calculations using the serious violent offense that yields the shorter overall sentence. The Supreme Court accepted review to resolve this conflict. The Court held that for purposes of RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b), anticipatory offenses carry the same seriousness level as their completed offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that when an anticipatory offense and a completed offense carrying the same seriousness level might both form the basis for calculating consecutive sentences under RCW 9.94A.589(1 )(b), the sentencing court must start its calculations with the offense that produces the lower overall sentence. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for resentencing using the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in “Breaux.” View "Washington v. Weatherwax" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case, Zyion Houston-Sconiers and Treson Roberts, were children. On Halloween night in 2012, they were 17 and 16 years old, respectively. They robbed mainly other groups of children, and they netted mainly candy. They were charged with crimes that brought them automatically into adult (rather than juvenile) court, without any opportunity for a judge to exercise discretion about the appropriateness of such transfers. They had lengthy adult sentencing ranges calculated under adult Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) rules. And they received lengthy adult firearm sentence enhancements, with their mandatory, consecutive, flat-time consequences, without any opportunity for a judge to exercise discretion about the appropriateness of that sentence increase, either. Both defendants appealed their sentences. Because "children are different" under the Eighth Amendment and hence "criminal procedure laws" must take the defendants' youthfulness into account, sentencing courts must have absolute discretion to depart as far as they want below otherwise applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing enhancements when sentencing juveniles in adult court, regardless of how the juvenile got there. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but remanded both cases for resentencing. View "Washington v. Houston-Sconiers" on Justia Law

At his trial for premeditated first degree murder, petitioner Anthony Clark sought to introduce expert testimony regarding his intellectual deficits. Clark asserted this testimony would be relevant to contesting the State's mens rea evidence and to helping the jury understand Clark's affect while testifying. The trial court excluded Clark's proffered expert testimony, but it did allow relevant observation testimony about Clark's education history, Social Security disability benefits, affect, and actions on the day of the murder. The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in making its evidentiary rulings. The court did allow relevant observation testimony from lay witnesses to rebut the State's mens rea evidence, and Clark did not challenge the scope of this testimony on review. However, because Clark purposefully did not assert or plead diminished capacity and the proposed expert testimony was not relevant to any other purpose, the expert testimony was properly excluded. Clark also could not establish ineffective assistance of counsel or cumulative error, so the Court affirmed his convictions. View "Washington v. Clark" on Justia Law

Reginald Bell was convicted in 2009 of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and bail jumping. His judgment and sentence became final on direct appeal in 2012. In October 2015, Bell filed a personal restraint petition; the acting chief judge dismissed it as improperly successive. Bell then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court. The Court's commissioner denied review, and Bell moved to modify the commissioner's ruling. He argued that, procedurally, his personal restraint petition should have been transferred to the Supreme Court rather than dismissed because his successive petition did not assert an issue that was raised and determined on the merits in a previous personal restraint petition. The Supreme Court agreed: a successive personal restraint petition that does not seek relief on the same grounds as those adjudicated in a previous petition must generally be transferred to the Supreme Court rather than be dismissed. However, there is an exception: if the Court of Appeals determines that the successive petition was time barred, then the Court of Appeals should dismiss it. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals made no such determination. Hence, it erred in dismissing Bell's petition rather than transferring it to the Supreme Court. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Bell" on Justia Law

A jury found Alexander Ortiz-Abrego guilty on charges of child rape. The trial court held a contested competency hearing. The court determined that Ortiz-Abrego was incompetent during his trial, though various accommodations suggested by an expert who evaluated him midtrial could have helped him follow the proceedings. The court ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court departed from the established competency standard by analyzing whether Ortiz-Abrego actually understood his trial and by injecting concepts from disability accommodations law. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse the wide discretion appropriate to competency determinations. "This case is unusual in that the competency hearing took place after the trial concluded. Viewing the record in that context, the trial court's consideration of the defendant's observed behavior during trial, and its discussion of whether accommodations could have been made, do not reflect a departure from the established competency standard." Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's ruling. View "Washington v. Ortiz-Abrego" on Justia Law

As a juvenile homicide offender facing a de facto life-without-parole sentence, petitioner Joel Rodriguez Ramos was entitled to a "Miller" hearing, just as a juvenile homicide offender facing a literal life-without-parole sentence would be. Based on the record presented, the Supreme Court found that that Ramos received a constitutionally adequate Miller hearing and he did not show that his aggregated 85-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. View "Washington v. Rodriguez Ramos" on Justia Law

Guadalupe Solis-Diaz Jr. seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision vacating his sentence a second time and remanding for resentencing but declining to disqualify the sentencing judge. In 2007, 16-year-old Solis-Diaz was tried as an adult in connection with a drive-by shooting in Centralia and was convicted of six counts of first degree assault, each with a firearm enhancement; one count of drive-by shooting; and one count of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Judge Nelson Hunt imposed a standard range sentence of 1,111 months (92.6 years) of imprisonment. After his judgment and sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, Solis-Diaz filed a personal restraint petition challenging his sentence. The Court of Appeals ordered resentencing on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a sentencing report and properly inform the trial court that SolisDiaz's case had been automatically declined to adult court as a result of his age and the nature of the charges. At resentencing, again before Judge Hunt, the State noted recent changes in the law that allowed the judge to consider an offender's youth in deciding whether to impose an exceptional downward sentence, and it asked Judge Hunt to conduct an individualized determination of the propriety of an exceptional downward sentence for Solis-Diaz. Judge Hunt again imposed a prison sentence of 1,111 months, but in doing so, he commented on the Court of Appeals' holding that defense counsel had been ineffective in connection with the original sentencing. He found it "insulting" for the court to postulate that he would be "so ignorant, lazy, or stupid as to not know or inquire" why a teenage offender was in adult court, and that it was particularly insulting that the court presupposed that he did not "review the file or was so behind in the law not to know ... about the automatic adult jurisdiction" in Washington, and was even "ludicrous" given the judge's years practicing as a prosecutor and defense attorney and his work on juvenile justice issues. Solis-Diaz's request to disqualify Judge Hunt from presiding over resentencing was still declined. "Judge Hunt will be asked to exercise discretion on remand regarding the propriety of a sentence he has twice imposed, and the record reflects that he not only has strong opinions on sentencing generally and juvenile sentencing in particular, but also suggests he has already reached a firm conclusion about the propriety of a mitigated sentence in this case and may not be amenable to considering mitigating evidence with an open mind." As such, the Supreme Court reversed with respect to resentencing only, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Solis-Diaz" on Justia Law