Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charles Fletcher was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault and related crimes in 2013. The judge ordered him committed. Fletcher initiated the process for obtaining release in 2015 by mailing a motion for release directly to the superior court judge. The court directed Fletcher to file with Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) instead, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s consideration centered on the self-petition process. If a criminal defendant was acquitted due to insanity, the judge must then decide what to do with him or her. An acquitted person who constitutes a substantial danger to others, or who presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control of the court, other persons, or institutions, "shall" be committed under Washington’s involuntary commitment statute, RCW 10.77.110(1). If those safety concerns disappear, the insanity acquittee must be released. Either DSHS or the insanity acquittee may initiate the process for obtaining such release. The Court held that the insanity acquittee may petition the court directly for conditional release. Furthermore, he or she is entitled to legal counsel once a petition for conditional release is filed with the court or an application for release is submitted to DSHS. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Charles Fletcher was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault and related crimes in 2013. The judge ordered him committed. Fletcher initiated the process for obtaining release in 2015 by mailing a motion for release directly to the superior court judge. The court directed Fletcher to file with Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) instead, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s consideration centered on the self-petition process. If a criminal defendant was acquitted due to insanity, the judge must then decide what to do with him or her. An acquitted person who constitutes a substantial danger to others, or who presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control of the court, other persons, or institutions, "shall" be committed under Washington’s involuntary commitment statute, RCW 10.77.110(1). If those safety concerns disappear, the insanity acquittee must be released. Either DSHS or the insanity acquittee may initiate the process for obtaining such release. The Court held that the insanity acquittee may petition the court directly for conditional release. Furthermore, he or she is entitled to legal counsel once a petition for conditional release is filed with the court or an application for release is submitted to DSHS. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Herrick was an alleged sexually violent predator (SVP) awaiting trial after stipulating to probable cause and agreeing to be evaluated by the State's expert. At the request of the State's expert and pursuant to ROW 71.09.050(1), the trial court ordered Herrick to submit to penile plethysmograph (PPG) and polygraph tests. Herrick refused to comply with the court order, which resulted in a finding of contempt. Herrick brought a facial and as-applied challenge to the statute, and he also challenged the lawfulness of the contempt order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Washington Supreme Court found that compelled PPG testing pursuant to court order in accordance with RCW 71.09.050(l)(c) complied with substantive due process, including in Herrick's case. Therefore, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Det. of Herrick" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Herrick was an alleged sexually violent predator (SVP) awaiting trial after stipulating to probable cause and agreeing to be evaluated by the State's expert. At the request of the State's expert and pursuant to ROW 71.09.050(1), the trial court ordered Herrick to submit to penile plethysmograph (PPG) and polygraph tests. Herrick refused to comply with the court order, which resulted in a finding of contempt. Herrick brought a facial and as-applied challenge to the statute, and he also challenged the lawfulness of the contempt order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Washington Supreme Court found that compelled PPG testing pursuant to court order in accordance with RCW 71.09.050(l)(c) complied with substantive due process, including in Herrick's case. Therefore, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Det. of Herrick" on Justia Law

Pro se petitioner Donna Zink and the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) sought reversal of a published Court of Appeals decision, which affirmed the trial court's summary judgment ruling in favor of respondents, John Does G, I, and J (John Does). This case presented two issues: (1) whether special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) evaluations were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 ROW, because they contained "health care information;" and (2) whether pseudonymous litigation was proper in this action. In July 2014, Zink sent a PRA request to the DOC for all SSOSA evaluations "held, maintained, in the possession of or owned" by the DOC since 1990. The DOC responded to Zink, intending to release the SSOSA evaluations on an installment basis. The DOC explained that it would review the SSOSA evaluations and make appropriate redactions as required under the PRA before disclosure. The John Does obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO), which prevented the DOC from releasing any SSOSA evaluations of level I sex offenders. Upon the TRO's expiration, the trial court granted the John Does a preliminary injunction. The Washington Supreme Court held the SSOSA evaluations did not contain "health care information" because they were forensic examinations done for the purpose of aiding a court in sentencing a sex offender. The Court also held that pseudonymous litigation was improper in this action because the trial court did not adhere to the requirements of article 1, section 10 of the Washington Constitution and General Rule (OR) 15. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "John Doe G v. Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Washington Supreme Court centered on whether a prosecutor's closing argument asserting a victim was "groomed" by the defendant, where testimony of grooming was disallowed during trial, constituted flagrant and illintentioned misconduct requiring reversal. The Court of Appeals granted Todd Phelps's personal restraint petition (PRP) and reversed his convictions for third degree rape and sexual misconduct with a minor. The Court of Appeals held that expert testimony was required if the State intended to rely on grooming to argue and prove its case. Thus, because the prosecutor did not provide expert testimony, the Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence during his closing argument. The Supreme Court reversed on both issues and held that under the facts and charges involved in this case, expert testimony on grooming was not required and the use of the term "grooming" during closing argument did not amount to arguing facts not in evidence. The prosecutor also did not commit flagrant and illintentioned misconduct, nor did Phelps show that if misconduct occurred it caused him actual and substantial prejudice. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Phelps" on Justia Law

The trial court found that Oscar Lopez's lawyer was "fairly obvious[ly]" "severely handicapped" by depression during the pretrial and trial phases of Lopez's case. That finding was supported by the trial court's own observations. Based on that evidence, the trial court concluded that Lopez was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and granted Lopez's motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding amongst other things, defendants had no right to counsel free from mental illness. Lopez petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review, which agreed with the trial court that Lopez was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, and reversed the Court of Appeal which reversed the trial court. View "Washington v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Eddie Arnold challenged his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of ROW 9A.44.130. He argued he was not required to register because his 1988 conviction of statutory rape in violation of a statute amended in 1979, was not a "sex offense" within the meaning of the current sex offender registration statute. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed: the prior sex offense of which Arnold was convicted met the two critical prerequisites to a countable "sex offense" listed in former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(b) (2012): (1) that prior conviction was based on a statute that was 'in effect . . . prior to July 1, 1976" and (2) that prior conviction was based on a statute that is "comparable" to a current "sex offense" as defined in former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a) (2012). The Court of Appeals felt bound by prior decisions of the two other divisions of the Court of Appeals, labeling this deference to a prior out-of-division decision a rule of "horizontal stare decisis." The Supreme Court rejected this rule, finding it conflicted with the statutes establishing the powers and duties of the Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court itself: “it conflicts with court rules on those topics, it conflicts with prior decisions, and it would tend to diminish the robust, adversarial development of the law that is the gem of our current approach. We therefore reverse.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Arnold" on Justia Law

Erik Petterson has been serving a term of community custody under a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) for over 15 years. After Petterson successfully completed treatment, the court removed most of his community custody conditions. The Washington State Department of Corrections (Department) sought to ensure that while Petterson was on community custody, he was required to comply with department-imposed conditions. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether trial courts had to require this condition and whether courts had authority to modify community custody conditions after terminating treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ultimate holding that the superior court did not have the authority to remove the department-compliance condition. However, the Supreme Court held: (1) the hearing in 2008 was an extended part of the treatment termination hearing that began in 2005; and (2) after imposing a SSOSA, courts retain jurisdiction and may modify discretionary community custody conditions even after treatment is terminated. View "Washington v. Petterson" on Justia Law

Brian Buckman pleaded guilty to second degree rape of a child. After sentencing, Buckman learned that he had been misinformed of the sentencing range that applied to him. Based on this misinformation, Buckman sought to withdraw his plea as involuntary. Because Buckman's motion to withdraw was a collateral attack on his judgment and sentence, he had to show that his plea was involuntary, and actual and substantial prejudice resulting from that error. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Buckman's plea was involuntary because he was misinformed that he might be sentenced to life in prison despite the fact that the statute provided that a sentence of life in prison could not apply to a 17-year-old (Buckman's age at the time of the offense). But the Court also held he was not entitled to withdraw his plea because he failed to show that the misinformation provided at the time of his plea caused him actual and substantial prejudice. As a result, the Supreme Court denied the motion to withdraw and remanded for resentencing only. View "Washington v. Buckman" on Justia Law