Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Eddie Arnold challenged his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of ROW 9A.44.130. He argued he was not required to register because his 1988 conviction of statutory rape in violation of a statute amended in 1979, was not a "sex offense" within the meaning of the current sex offender registration statute. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed: the prior sex offense of which Arnold was convicted met the two critical prerequisites to a countable "sex offense" listed in former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(b) (2012): (1) that prior conviction was based on a statute that was 'in effect . . . prior to July 1, 1976" and (2) that prior conviction was based on a statute that is "comparable" to a current "sex offense" as defined in former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(a) (2012). The Court of Appeals felt bound by prior decisions of the two other divisions of the Court of Appeals, labeling this deference to a prior out-of-division decision a rule of "horizontal stare decisis." The Supreme Court rejected this rule, finding it conflicted with the statutes establishing the powers and duties of the Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court itself: “it conflicts with court rules on those topics, it conflicts with prior decisions, and it would tend to diminish the robust, adversarial development of the law that is the gem of our current approach. We therefore reverse.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Arnold" on Justia Law

Erik Petterson has been serving a term of community custody under a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) for over 15 years. After Petterson successfully completed treatment, the court removed most of his community custody conditions. The Washington State Department of Corrections (Department) sought to ensure that while Petterson was on community custody, he was required to comply with department-imposed conditions. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether trial courts had to require this condition and whether courts had authority to modify community custody conditions after terminating treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ultimate holding that the superior court did not have the authority to remove the department-compliance condition. However, the Supreme Court held: (1) the hearing in 2008 was an extended part of the treatment termination hearing that began in 2005; and (2) after imposing a SSOSA, courts retain jurisdiction and may modify discretionary community custody conditions even after treatment is terminated. View "Washington v. Petterson" on Justia Law

Brian Buckman pleaded guilty to second degree rape of a child. After sentencing, Buckman learned that he had been misinformed of the sentencing range that applied to him. Based on this misinformation, Buckman sought to withdraw his plea as involuntary. Because Buckman's motion to withdraw was a collateral attack on his judgment and sentence, he had to show that his plea was involuntary, and actual and substantial prejudice resulting from that error. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Buckman's plea was involuntary because he was misinformed that he might be sentenced to life in prison despite the fact that the statute provided that a sentence of life in prison could not apply to a 17-year-old (Buckman's age at the time of the offense). But the Court also held he was not entitled to withdraw his plea because he failed to show that the misinformation provided at the time of his plea caused him actual and substantial prejudice. As a result, the Supreme Court denied the motion to withdraw and remanded for resentencing only. View "Washington v. Buckman" on Justia Law

In 2002, Heidi Fero called emergency responders seeking help for an injured child. Minutes later, paramedics arrived and found fifteen-month-old Brynn Ackley unconscious and limp, with bruising on her face. Brynn's treating physicians later determined that she had suffered severe and debilitating injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. Fero was charged and convicted of first degree child assault. In 2014, many years after her judgment became final, she filed a personal restraint petition contending that the medical community's evolving understanding of shaken baby syndrome was newly discovered evidence that would undermine the expert evidence as to the causes and timing of Brynn's injuries. The Washington Supreme Court held that this evidence would not have changed the result at trial, and therefore dismissed Fero's petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Fero" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eduardo Sandoval was a member of the Tacoma-based Eastside Lokotes Surefios (ELS) gang. In a stolen van, ELS members pulled up to a car and fired no less than 12 gunshots from at least two firearms into the passenger door. The driver, Camilla Love, was hit three times and died from her injuries. The passenger, Joshua Love, was hit two times but survived. The van occupants targeted the Loves on the mistaken belief that Joshua Love was a Pirus gang member. At the time, the van occupants were seeking out rival Pirus members to retaliate for an earlier driveby shooting targeting ELS members, including Sandoval. In this personal restraint petition (PRP) concerning complicity charges based on murder by extreme indifference, the Washington Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s contentions that accomplice liability for murder by extreme indifference and conspiracy to commit murder by extreme indifference were not cognizable offenses. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court erred in failing to give a requested lesser included instruction on manslaughter, and on this limited basis the Court granted the PRP and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Sandoval" on Justia Law

This case involved interpretation of chapter 7.90 RCW, the Sexual Assault Protection Order (SAPO) Act. In this case, the commissioner granted petitioner Megan Roake's temporary SAPO, and it was served. Respondent Maxwell Delman moved to dismiss, challenging both the assertion of nonconsensual assault and the claim of reasonable fear of future dangerous conduct. At the later hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition, holding that Roake's petition was legally insufficient because the petition failed to allege a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts. Roake appealed the dismissal, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that the final order statute, RCW 7.90.090, did not require proof of a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts. It further held that the SAPO Act provided no basis for considering the validity of the temporary order in determining whether to grant a final protection order. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that RCW 7.90.130(2)(e) provided the procedure and opportunity to contest the sufficiency and validity of the petition and temporary order, and that the trial court correctly held that Roake's petition was legally insufficient under RCW 7.90.020(1). View "Roake v. Delman" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the invited error doctrine applied to Hector Serano Salinas's personal restraint petition (PRP), which argued for the first time on collateral review that his public trial right was violated by private questioning of some potential jurors in chambers and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the public trial right violation on direct review. Based on the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held Salinas invited the courtroom closure error that he now argued on appeal, and was precluded from raising that error. Further, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Weaver v. Massachusetts, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), the Washington Court held Salinas's assertion of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed because he did not meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the courtroom closure error. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Serano Salinas" on Justia Law

Following a search of Marco Wences' car in 2003, the State charged him with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to manufacture or deliver. The State also alleged that Wences was armed with a firearm during the commission of the crime. A jury convicted Wences of all charges in 2005. The trial court instructed the jury that a firearm was a deadly weapon, and the jury answered "yes" to a special verdict form that asked whether Wences was "armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime." The question this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the rule announced in Washington v. Williams-Walker, 225 P.3d 913 (2010), applied to appellate review of Wences' 2015 sentence. Williams-Walker held that the Washington Constitution prohibited a sentencing court from imposing a firearm enhancement based on a deadly weapon special verdict finding. In 2005, Wences did not appear for a scheduled sentencing hearing. Concluding that Wences "should not benefit from changes in the law that apply to him solely because he absconded and delayed his sentencing," the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision to impose the firearm enhancement based on pre-Williams-Walker law. The Washington Supreme Court held, however, that this result was impermissible under settled law. The Court therefore reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for resentencing consistent with Williams-Walker. View "Washington v. Wences" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on application of RCW 9.73.030 of the Washington privacy act to an inadvertent recording on a cell phone voice mail of a domestic violence assault. The Court held that the recording in this case did not contain a "conversation" within the meaning of the privacy act. Further, even if the recorded verbal exchange here could be considered a private conversation within the privacy act, nevertheless an exception contained in the privacy act applies, rendering the recording admissible. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent it held otherwise. View "Washington v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Joseph was convicted of second degree criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of second degree vehicle prowling. He challenged his conviction on the ground that unlawful entry into a vehicle is not a trespass "in or upon premises of another." This case presented a “challenging” question of statutory interpretation because of the overlapping and intersecting definitions of "building" and "premises" in Title 9A RCW. The Court of Appeals affirmed Joseph's conviction, concluding that a vehicle was a "premises" for the purpose of the second degree trespass statute because a vehicle is a type of "building" and "premises" includes "any building." The Washington Supreme Court concluded the legislature plainly intended second degree criminal trespass to encompass trespass into any "building" as defined in the criminal code, RCW 9A.04.110(5), save for trespass into a building in its ordinary sense. This interpretation properly restricts first degree trespass to unlawful entries into ordinary "buildings," a descriptor that needed no further definition. The more severe charge (a gross misdemeanor) was justified by the increased likelihood of trespass into a home or business. All other trespasses fall under the term "premises" and are treated as simple misdemeanors. RCW 9A.52.080. This includes trespasses into premises that are "buildings" broadly conceived, but are not ordinarily thought of as buildings—as relevant here, vehicles. View "Washington v. Joseph" on Justia Law