Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Teacher Tanya James-Buhl was charged with failure to comply with the mandatory reporting law that requires specified professionals to report incidents of child abuse when they have reasonable cause to believe a child has suffered abuse or neglect. James-Buhl received notice of child abuse from her three daughters alleging that they were being touched inappropriately within the home by their stepfather, but she did not make an immediate report. At issue is whether James-Buhl's employment status as a teacher required her to report the alleged abuse of her own children, who were not her students, when the abuse occurred within the home and was perpetrated by another family member. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that a teacher's failure to comply with the mandatory reporting duty must have some connection to his or her professional identity. View "Washington v. James-Buhl" on Justia Law

Evan Bacon, a juvenile, pleaded guilty to second degree robbery and received a suspended disposition. The State challenged the juvenile court's authority to enter such a disposition, arguing that the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW, does not give trial courts the statutory authority to suspend juvenile dispositions (except in specific situations that are absent here). The Court of Appeals agreed, and so did the Washington Supreme Court. The Court therefore affirmed, holding that juvenile court judges lack statutory authority to suspend JJA dispositions, even manifest injustice JJA dispositions, unless the disposition fits under one of the specifically listed exemptions in RCW 13.40.160(10). View "Washington v. Bacon" on Justia Law

Conner Schierman was convicted of four counts of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced to death. He appealed his convictions and sentences on multiple grounds. Schierman was convicted for the 2006 stabbing deaths of members of the Milkin family; he was also charged with the first-degree arson of their house. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed all of Schierman’s challenges to trial and his death sentence. The Court affirmed all convictions; a majority of the Court rejected Schierman's challenges to his death sentence. View "Washington v. Schierman" on Justia Law

Justin Vanhollebeke drove his truck the wrong way down a one-way street. An officer stopped him. Vanhollebeke ignored the officer's command to stay in the vehicle, got out and locked the vehicle behind him, left a punched out ignition and apparent drug paraphernalia behind in plain view of the police, and had no key. The police asked Vanhollebeke for consent to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke refused. A police officer then contacted the truck's owner, received the absent owner's consent and a key to search, and then returned to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm found in the truck, and he challenged the legality of the vehicle search. Vanhollebeke moved to suppress evidence found in the vehicle, citing his refusal at the scene and the officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle as a violation of his Constitutional rights. The officer lacked a warrant; the State relied instead on the consent of the owner as an exception to the warrant requirement. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held the present driver's refusal to consent to the search of his or her vehicle generally had to be respected. But where, as here, circumstances like a punched out ignition and a driver with no key raises a significant question about whether the driver had any legitimate claim to the vehicle at all, the police could contact the absent owner and get that owner's consent to search instead. View "Washington v. Vanhollebeke" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether there were any limitations on the scope of a community corrections officer’s search. “It is well established that an individual on probation has a reduced expectation of privacy, and a community corrections officer (CCO) may conduct a warrantless search if he or she suspects the individual has violated a probation condition.” The Washington Supreme Court held article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution required a nexus between the property searched and the suspected probation violation. There was no nexus in the search at issue here. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and petitioner Curtis Cornwell’s convictions. View "Washington v. Cornwell" on Justia Law

Charles Fletcher was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault and related crimes in 2013. The judge ordered him committed. Fletcher initiated the process for obtaining release in 2015 by mailing a motion for release directly to the superior court judge. The court directed Fletcher to file with Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) instead, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s consideration centered on the self-petition process. If a criminal defendant was acquitted due to insanity, the judge must then decide what to do with him or her. An acquitted person who constitutes a substantial danger to others, or who presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control of the court, other persons, or institutions, "shall" be committed under Washington’s involuntary commitment statute, RCW 10.77.110(1). If those safety concerns disappear, the insanity acquittee must be released. Either DSHS or the insanity acquittee may initiate the process for obtaining such release. The Court held that the insanity acquittee may petition the court directly for conditional release. Furthermore, he or she is entitled to legal counsel once a petition for conditional release is filed with the court or an application for release is submitted to DSHS. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Charles Fletcher was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault and related crimes in 2013. The judge ordered him committed. Fletcher initiated the process for obtaining release in 2015 by mailing a motion for release directly to the superior court judge. The court directed Fletcher to file with Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) instead, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s consideration centered on the self-petition process. If a criminal defendant was acquitted due to insanity, the judge must then decide what to do with him or her. An acquitted person who constitutes a substantial danger to others, or who presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control of the court, other persons, or institutions, "shall" be committed under Washington’s involuntary commitment statute, RCW 10.77.110(1). If those safety concerns disappear, the insanity acquittee must be released. Either DSHS or the insanity acquittee may initiate the process for obtaining such release. The Court held that the insanity acquittee may petition the court directly for conditional release. Furthermore, he or she is entitled to legal counsel once a petition for conditional release is filed with the court or an application for release is submitted to DSHS. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Herrick was an alleged sexually violent predator (SVP) awaiting trial after stipulating to probable cause and agreeing to be evaluated by the State's expert. At the request of the State's expert and pursuant to ROW 71.09.050(1), the trial court ordered Herrick to submit to penile plethysmograph (PPG) and polygraph tests. Herrick refused to comply with the court order, which resulted in a finding of contempt. Herrick brought a facial and as-applied challenge to the statute, and he also challenged the lawfulness of the contempt order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Washington Supreme Court found that compelled PPG testing pursuant to court order in accordance with RCW 71.09.050(l)(c) complied with substantive due process, including in Herrick's case. Therefore, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Det. of Herrick" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Herrick was an alleged sexually violent predator (SVP) awaiting trial after stipulating to probable cause and agreeing to be evaluated by the State's expert. At the request of the State's expert and pursuant to ROW 71.09.050(1), the trial court ordered Herrick to submit to penile plethysmograph (PPG) and polygraph tests. Herrick refused to comply with the court order, which resulted in a finding of contempt. Herrick brought a facial and as-applied challenge to the statute, and he also challenged the lawfulness of the contempt order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Washington Supreme Court found that compelled PPG testing pursuant to court order in accordance with RCW 71.09.050(l)(c) complied with substantive due process, including in Herrick's case. Therefore, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Det. of Herrick" on Justia Law

Pro se petitioner Donna Zink and the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) sought reversal of a published Court of Appeals decision, which affirmed the trial court's summary judgment ruling in favor of respondents, John Does G, I, and J (John Does). This case presented two issues: (1) whether special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) evaluations were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 ROW, because they contained "health care information;" and (2) whether pseudonymous litigation was proper in this action. In July 2014, Zink sent a PRA request to the DOC for all SSOSA evaluations "held, maintained, in the possession of or owned" by the DOC since 1990. The DOC responded to Zink, intending to release the SSOSA evaluations on an installment basis. The DOC explained that it would review the SSOSA evaluations and make appropriate redactions as required under the PRA before disclosure. The John Does obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO), which prevented the DOC from releasing any SSOSA evaluations of level I sex offenders. Upon the TRO's expiration, the trial court granted the John Does a preliminary injunction. The Washington Supreme Court held the SSOSA evaluations did not contain "health care information" because they were forensic examinations done for the purpose of aiding a court in sentencing a sex offender. The Court also held that pseudonymous litigation was improper in this action because the trial court did not adhere to the requirements of article 1, section 10 of the Washington Constitution and General Rule (OR) 15. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "John Doe G v. Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law