Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Waylon Hubbard pled guilty to second degree possession of stolen property. He was sentenced to a short term of confinement and 120 hours of community service. He was also ordered to pay legal financial obligations. By 2011, Hubbard had fulfilled his community service, and in 2013, he paid off his financial obligations. In 2016, Hubbard petitioned for a certificate and order of discharge (COD), with the effective date of February 25, 2013, the date he satisfied all the terms of his sentence. The State objected, arguing the court did not have the authority to enter an effective date that predated the date on which the court received notice that Hubbard completed his sentence. The Washington Supreme Court held the effective date of a certificate of discharge must be the state the offender completed all the terms of the sentence. View "Washington v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

When Brian Bassett was 16 years old, he was living in a "shack" with Nicholaus McDonald after Bassett's parents '"kicked [him] out'" of their home. With McDonald's assistance, Bassett snuck back into his home and shot his mother and father. His brother was drowned in the bathtub, an act that McDonald initially confessed to but later blamed on Bassett at trial. Bassett was convicted of three counts of aggravated first degree murder for the deaths of his mother, father, and brother. The judge commented that Bassett was "a walking advertisement" for the death penalty and sentenced him to three consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole. At issue here was the constitutionality of sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison without the possibility of parole or early release. The State appealed a Court of Appeals decision holding that the provision of Washington's Miller-fix statute that allows 16- and 17-year-olds to be sentenced to life without parole violated the Washington Constitution's ban on cruel punishment. The appellate court adopted the categorical approach, rather than Washington's traditional Fain proportionality test, and found that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole or early release constituted cruel punishment. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and held that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole or early release constitutes cruel punishment and therefore is unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution. View "Washington v. Bassett" on Justia Law

In 1996, Allen Gregory raped, robbed and murdered a woman at her home. In 1998, he was investigated for another rape. In 2001, he was convicted for first degree murder and three counts of first degree rape. A jury recommended the death sentence. The sentence was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court, which found (1) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing arguments in the penalty phase of the murder trial; and (2) the rape convictions were relied upon in the penalty phase of the murder case. A new jury was empaneled on remand and presided over a second special sentencing proceeding. The second jury also recommended the death sentence. With respect to the rape charges, the State determined a witness lied at the first trial, and moved to dismiss charges because of the inconsistent statements. The trial court dismissed the rape charges with prejudice. The issues this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review posited: (1) whether Washington's death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner; (2) whether statutory proportionality review of death sentences alleviates the alleged constitutional defects of the death penalty; and (3) whether the trial court should have reconsidered arguments pertaining to the guilt phase of Gregory's trial. The Supreme Court determined precedent did not hold the death penalty was per se unconstitutional; the Court found it was imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner. "The death penalty, as administered in our state, fails to serve any legitimate penological goal; thus it violates article I, section 14 of our state constitution." View "Washington v. Gregory" on Justia Law

Steven Yelovich and Faith De Armond dated for more than five years. Relevant to this appeal, Yelovich had an active restraining order against him, prohibiting him from coming near De Armond or having any contact with her. One day Yelovich saw someone through the fence of his son's house as he was moving boxes in the garage; he went to his car and discovered a window had been broken and some contents (including his cell phone) were missing. Yelovich saw De Armond walking down the street and had a hunch she broke the window and took his possessions. Yelovich was aware of the restraining order, but did not believe police would arrive in enough time to recover his phone. He chased her, and a struggle ensued. De Armond was treated for minor injuries; the responding police officer noted De Armond seemed intoxicated at the time of the incident. Yelovich was charged with one count felony violation of the no-contact order predicated on his assault of De Armond, and one count of bail jumping. At trial, he argued he was entitled to a jury instruction on defense of property because he was protecting his cell phone, which he believed De Armond had stolen. Yelovich appealed when the trial court denied his request. The Washington Supreme Court determined an instruction on defense-of-property is not available when there is a valid order prohibiting defendant from contacting the protected party. View "Washington v. Yelovich" on Justia Law

A jury convicted David Ramirez of third degree assault and possession of a controlled substance, and found by special verdict that he committed the assault with sexual motivation and displayed an egregious lack of remorse. After sentencing, Ramirez presented a notice of appeal and a motion for an order of indigency, which the the trial court granted. Prior to imposing his legal financial obligations, the trial court asked only two questions relating to Ramirez' then-current and future ability to pay, both of which were directed to the State. The trial court did not ask Ramirez directly about his ability to pay at any point during sentencing. The Washington Supreme Court found that a trial court has an obligation to conduct an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future ability to pay before imposing legal financial obligations at sentencing. An adequate inquiry must include consideration of certain mandatory factors, including the defendant's incarceration and other debts, and the court rule GR34 criteria for indigency. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case for the trial court to strike the improperly imposed LFSs from Ramirez's judgment and sentence. View "Washington v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Adrian Sassen Van Elsloo appealed the dismissal of an impaneled juror excused midtrial because she had a minor connection to an important defense witness. The Washington Supreme Court concluded the trial judge erred by dismissing the juror because there was no evidence the juror was biased. The Court decided as remedy for the erroneous dismissal was to grant defendant a new trial if the dismissal stemmed from the juror's views on the merits of the case. No new trial should be granted if the State could establish the error was harmless. The Court surmised there was a reasonable possibility the juror was dismissed because of her views on the merits of the case, so it granted a new trial. View "Washington v. Sassen Van Elsloo" on Justia Law

Defendants Hai Nguyen and Dominique Norris' cases were consolidated for the Washington Supreme Court's review; the issue they shared was whether the community custody conditions imposed by their respective sentencing courts were sufficiently crime related or unconstitutionally vague. Each case involved a defendant convicted of sexually assaulting a minor. For Nguyen, the sentencing court imposed a condition prohibiting defendant from possessing or viewing sexually explicit material. The Supreme Court determined that condition was not unconstitutionally vague and crime related. For Norris, the sentencing court imposed conditions requiring defendant to inform community corrections officers of any "dating relationship" and prohibited defendant from entering any "sex-related business." The Supreme Court determined the dating condition was unconstitutionally vague but that the sex-related business condition was crime related. View "Washington v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

The Washington civil forfeiture statute allows law enforcement agencies to seize and take ownership of property that had a sufficient factual nexus to certain controlled substance violations; if law enforcement cannot prove the forfeiture is authorized, the claimant would be entitled to have the property returned and receive reasonable attorneys' fees incurred to get the property back. This case presented two issues of first impression for the Washington Supreme Court regarding the attorney fee provision of the statute: (1) who qualifies as a claimant when the property at issue is owned by a corporation; and (2) is a substantially prevailing claimant's fee award strictly limited to fees incurred in the forfeiture proceeding itself? The Court held: (1) a corporate shareholder who did not file a claim in the forfeiture case is not a claimant and cannot recover fees pursuant to the statute's plain language; and (2) the award is not strictly limited to fees incurred in the forfeiture proceeding itself - the statute gives courts discretion to award fees from the related criminal case if reasonably incurred for the primary purpose of resisting the forfeiture. View "Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12 Inclusive" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Tyler Watkins was charged with first degree burglary as an adult. The former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009) provided that juvenile courts had to automatically decline jurisdiction over 16- and 17-year-olds charged with certain offenses. Watkins argued his due process rights were violated because the automatic decline component of the statute applied without him first having a hearing on whether the juvenile court should have retained jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court held the automatic decline did not violate due process because juveniles did not have a constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court. View "Washington v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Kenneth Linville, Jr. was charged with leading a wave of burglaries throughout Thurston County, Washington. The State charged Linville with one count of "leading organized crime," in addition to 137 other offenses. Some of those 127 were listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4) as predicate offenses, which when combined, formed the requisite "pattern of criminal profiteering" on which "leading organized crime" was based. Some of the 127 were not listed in the statute as predicate crimes at all. The issue for the Washington Supreme Court's contemplation was whether the "joinder bar" rule of RCW 9A.80.085, permitted both predicate and nonpredicate crimes to be joined in a single "leading organized crime" information. Linville argued the State was barred from joining charges outside of the predicated offenses listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4). Linville also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not move to sever the unlisted offenses. The Supreme Court determined the Criminal Profiteering Act supported Linville's interpretation. However, the Court did not find Linville showed counsel was ineffective for choosing to defend against these crimes in one prosecution rather than several. The Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Linville" on Justia Law