Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jessica Wrigley brought a negligent investigation claim against the Washington Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) based on the placement of her son, A.A., with his biological father, Anthony Viles, during dependency hearings. Within three months of the placement, Viles killed A.A. The superior court dismissed Wrigley’s claim on summary judgment, finding the duty to investigate was never triggered. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the “trigger” was Wrigley’s prediction that Viles would harm A.A. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding a report predicting future abuse absent evidence of current or past conduct of abuse or neglect did not invoke a duty to investigate under RCW 26.44.050. View "Wrigley v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant Kenneth Brooks was a friend of fifteen-year-old C.H.’s brother. On the evening of August 16 2014, C.H., her sister, and Brooks played games while drinking beer and vodka into the morning of August 17. C.H. became intoxicated and passed in and out of consciousness. Brooks raped C.H. and then left her to sleep. C.H. was still intoxicated and was vomiting until the afternoon of August 17. C.H. told her sister what happened, and police were notified. Police came to C.H.’s home and gathered evidence regarding the rape allegation. Brooks was ultimately charged with third-degree rape of a child, and third-degree child molestation. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion to expand the time period noted in the information after both the State and defense rested. The Court held that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err, and this affirmed the Court of Appeals, which affirmed defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Michael Biehoff and Karl Pierce were tried by jury and convicted of first degree murder. Before the Washington Supreme Court, they both contended (among other things) that their jury was not fairly selected because the State improperly elicited a conversation about the death penalty during voir dire and improperly used a peremptory strike to dismiss an African-American juror. The Court of Appeals found the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting a conversation about the death penalty in a noncapital case, and that the trial court abused its discretion in not curtailing that conversation. Since that conversation led to the dismissal of at least two jurors, the Court of Appeals reversed both men's convictions. The Washington Supreme Court found that while the prosecutor did not explicitly raise the death penalty during voir dire, as a direct result of his questions, ten jurors all expressed concerns about sitting on a possible death penalty case. As a result of the questions, all of the potential jurors' minds were drawn to the possible sentence, which could have had an "unfair influence on a jury's deliberations" sufficient to violate Washington v. Townsend, 142 Wn.2d 838 (2001). The Washington Supreme Court found the jurisprudential landscape had changed in two relevant ways since Townsend was tried: (1) it was error to tell potential jurors during selection that they were not being asked to sit on a death penalty case; and (2) in the wake of "increasing evidence" that the Batson rule did not adequately protect Washington's jury selection process from racial bias, the Supreme Court promulgated GR 37. The Supreme Court held that Townsend was incorrect and harmful because it "artificially prohibits informing jurors whether they are being asked to sit on a death penalty case," and overruled it. And because an "objective observer could conclude that race was a factor" in the State's peremptory challenge to juror 6, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in result and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Because respondent David Brown did not signal continuously while his vehicle turned left through an intersection, he violated RCW 46.61.305. State patrol officers observed Brown turn right onto a four-lane street. While turning, the left side tires of Brown’s truck briefly crossed the white dashed divider line before moving back to the correct lane. Eventually, Brown activated his turn signal and moved his truck left while the signal blinked a few times before shutting off. Officers driving behind Brown initiated a traffic stop; a breath test was administered, and Brown was found to have had a 0.26 breath alcohol content. In court, Brown moved to suppress the evidence gathered during the traffic stop. The State argued violation of RCW 46.61.305 was grounds for the stop. The trial court concluded a driver was not required to reactivate his turn signal when he entered a turn-only lane, thus officers had no cause to stop Brown. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, reversed the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Brown" on Justia Law

The clerk of DivisionTwo of the Washington Court of Appeals imposed a $200 fine on attorney Travis Stearns for seeking an extension of time to file an opening brief in an indigent criminal appeal. Stearns' client, Randolph Graham, was convicted of first degree murder and other crimes and sentenced to 800 months' confinement, about 300 months above the standard range. Graham appealed, and counsel from the Washington Appellate Project was appointed to represent Graham when his original attorney left the practice to join the judiciary. The opening brief in Graham's case was originally due on January 17,2019, but the first attorney the Washington Appellate Project assigned to Graham's case asked for an extension of time to file the opening brief after discovering that the record was incomplete and that more transcripts had to be ordered. In requesting a second extension of time, Stearns explained that the record was voluminous: 1300 pages of transcripts, which he received 63 days previous to the second request; coupled with the other demands o his time, Stearns anticipated filing the brief as soon as possible, working quickly as he could within his constitutional obligations and the Standards for Indigent Defense. The clerk of the Court of Appeals granted the extension, but also sanction Stearns $200 for not filing the opening brief by April 17. Because Stearns was fulfilling his duty of effective representation in asking for an extension, the Washington Supreme Court granted discretionary review and reversed the Court of Appeals with regard to Stearns' motion and sanction. View "Washington v. Graham" on Justia Law

Washington charged Ken Wu with "felony DUI," violating an ignition interlock requirement, and first-degree driving with a suspended license. The felony DUI charge was based on Wu having, within 10 years of his present arrest, four "prior offenses" as defined by the applicable statute. By this case, the Washington Supreme Court clarified the required elements for felony DUI, and who must determine whether such required elements are med: a judge or a jury. The Court held that the essential elements of felony DUI were set forth in RCW 46.61.5055(14)(a), and following a trial court's determination of admissibility, a jury should determine whether the essential elements of felony DUI have been met based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt provided by the State. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Wu" on Justia Law

Brandon Cate was found guilty by jury of burglary, theft and malicious mischief. At sentencing, the State calculated Cate's offender score as 9+, the highest category, based on numerous alleged prior convictions. In proving the alleged prior convictions, the State failed to provide copies of the relevant judgment and sentence forms, relying instead on a prosecutor's summary of Cate's criminal history. Cate did not object, the 9+ score was thus used to calculate his present sentence. On appeal, Cate challenged the sentence as erroneous because the State failed to meet its burden of proving his criminal history at sentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed: relying on a portion of RCW 9.94A.530(2) risked shifting the burden to prove criminal history from the State to the defendant. Thus, the matter was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "Washington v. Cate" on Justia Law

Shelly Arndt was convicted by jury for first degree aggravated murder and first degree arson. She received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Arndt appealed, arguing her Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and her right to be free from double jeopardy were violated. After a careful review of the record, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the trial court's rulings limiting the testimony of Arndt's expert witness did not violate Arndt's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and were well within the court's discretion. Furthermore, the Court concluded Arndt's convictions for both first degree aggravated murder and first degree arson did not offend double jeopardy as the two crimes had separate purposes and effects, thus multiple punishments were allowed. View "Washington v. Arndt" on Justia Law

In late 2015, two men severely beat and killed 89-year-old Robert Hood. The two men, respondents Robert Pry and Robert Davis, forced their way into Hood's home, tied him up, and beat and robbed him. Pry and Davis contacted respondent Arnold Cruz for assistance. Cruz was not involved in the murder or robbery of Hood's home. Sometime later, Hood's caretaker visited Hood's home and, after noticing that. Hood was gone and someone had rifled through the house, alerted the police. Hood's body was eventually discovered stuffed in a blue plastic barrel. The police released Cruz's name to the press as a person of interest, and Cruz surrendered himself to law enforcement. At issue in this case was whether the information charging Cruz with rendering criminal assistance was constitutionally sufficient. Specifically, he contended the charging document had to include additional statutory elements from RCW 9A.76.050. The Washington Supreme Court held that because section .050 provided essential elements for rendering criminal assistance and Cruz's information lacked those elements, the information was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, dismissed the charge of rendering criminal assistance without prejudice, and remanded Cruz's case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Pry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bisir Muhammad was convicted by jury of first-degree felony murder and first degree rape. His victim, 69 years old at the time of her death; the jury found Muhammad knew or should have known his victim was particularly vulnerable. He received an exceptional sentence of two terms totaling 866 months to be served consecutively. The main issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying Muhammad's motion to suppress physical evidence collected from his vehicle after police located it via a warrantless cell phone "ping." Muhammad contended the location information provided by the cell phone ping was protected from warrantless searches under both the Washington and federal Constitutions. The majority of a divided Supreme Court agreed the ping was a search, permissible, and Muhammad's convictions for both felony murder predicated on rape and first degree rape violated double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals was affirmed in part, and reversed in part. By a vote of six to three, the Supreme Court agreed with ping was permissible. By a vote of five to four, the Court held felony murder and rape violated double jeopardy, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to dismiss the lesser-included offense. View "Washington v. Muhammad" on Justia Law