Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Washington charged Ken Wu with "felony DUI," violating an ignition interlock requirement, and first-degree driving with a suspended license. The felony DUI charge was based on Wu having, within 10 years of his present arrest, four "prior offenses" as defined by the applicable statute. By this case, the Washington Supreme Court clarified the required elements for felony DUI, and who must determine whether such required elements are med: a judge or a jury. The Court held that the essential elements of felony DUI were set forth in RCW 46.61.5055(14)(a), and following a trial court's determination of admissibility, a jury should determine whether the essential elements of felony DUI have been met based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt provided by the State. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Wu" on Justia Law

Brandon Cate was found guilty by jury of burglary, theft and malicious mischief. At sentencing, the State calculated Cate's offender score as 9+, the highest category, based on numerous alleged prior convictions. In proving the alleged prior convictions, the State failed to provide copies of the relevant judgment and sentence forms, relying instead on a prosecutor's summary of Cate's criminal history. Cate did not object, the 9+ score was thus used to calculate his present sentence. On appeal, Cate challenged the sentence as erroneous because the State failed to meet its burden of proving his criminal history at sentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed: relying on a portion of RCW 9.94A.530(2) risked shifting the burden to prove criminal history from the State to the defendant. Thus, the matter was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "Washington v. Cate" on Justia Law

Shelly Arndt was convicted by jury for first degree aggravated murder and first degree arson. She received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Arndt appealed, arguing her Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and her right to be free from double jeopardy were violated. After a careful review of the record, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the trial court's rulings limiting the testimony of Arndt's expert witness did not violate Arndt's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and were well within the court's discretion. Furthermore, the Court concluded Arndt's convictions for both first degree aggravated murder and first degree arson did not offend double jeopardy as the two crimes had separate purposes and effects, thus multiple punishments were allowed. View "Washington v. Arndt" on Justia Law

In late 2015, two men severely beat and killed 89-year-old Robert Hood. The two men, respondents Robert Pry and Robert Davis, forced their way into Hood's home, tied him up, and beat and robbed him. Pry and Davis contacted respondent Arnold Cruz for assistance. Cruz was not involved in the murder or robbery of Hood's home. Sometime later, Hood's caretaker visited Hood's home and, after noticing that. Hood was gone and someone had rifled through the house, alerted the police. Hood's body was eventually discovered stuffed in a blue plastic barrel. The police released Cruz's name to the press as a person of interest, and Cruz surrendered himself to law enforcement. At issue in this case was whether the information charging Cruz with rendering criminal assistance was constitutionally sufficient. Specifically, he contended the charging document had to include additional statutory elements from RCW 9A.76.050. The Washington Supreme Court held that because section .050 provided essential elements for rendering criminal assistance and Cruz's information lacked those elements, the information was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, dismissed the charge of rendering criminal assistance without prejudice, and remanded Cruz's case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Pry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bisir Muhammad was convicted by jury of first-degree felony murder and first degree rape. His victim, 69 years old at the time of her death; the jury found Muhammad knew or should have known his victim was particularly vulnerable. He received an exceptional sentence of two terms totaling 866 months to be served consecutively. The main issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying Muhammad's motion to suppress physical evidence collected from his vehicle after police located it via a warrantless cell phone "ping." Muhammad contended the location information provided by the cell phone ping was protected from warrantless searches under both the Washington and federal Constitutions. The majority of a divided Supreme Court agreed the ping was a search, permissible, and Muhammad's convictions for both felony murder predicated on rape and first degree rape violated double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals was affirmed in part, and reversed in part. By a vote of six to three, the Supreme Court agreed with ping was permissible. By a vote of five to four, the Court held felony murder and rape violated double jeopardy, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to dismiss the lesser-included offense. View "Washington v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

This case began with the theft of a backpack from a vehicle: the backpack contained cash and checks obtained for a school fundraiser. Several days after the vehicle prowl, defendant Jose Barboza-Cortes was video recorded at an ATM (automated teller machine) depositing four checks in his bank account, three of which had been in the stolen backpack. The fourth check listed "Dava Construction Company" in the top left comer. Police obtained a warrant to search defendant's residence for the backpack. During the search, police found methamphetamine in defendant's basement apartment and a shotgun under the mattress in the bedroom. There was no testimony that defendant owned the shotgun. A jury found defendant guilty of nine crimes, including second degree unlawful possession of a firearm and second degree identity theft. In this case the issue defendant’s appeal presented for the Washington Supreme Court was whether the second degree unlawful possession of a firearm statute, RCW 9.41.040(2)(a), and the second degree identity theft statute, RCW 9.35.020(1), were each alternative means statutes, and, if so, whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was required to give a unanimity instruction addressing the alternative means. The Supreme Court held that neither statute was an alternative means statute. Accordingly, the absence of a specific unanimity instruction regarding counts based on these statutes did not result in error. The Court of Appeals was reversed with respect to its holding that the second degree identity theft statute was an alternative means statute. View "Washington v. Barboza-Cortes" on Justia Law

Sergeant Paul Snyder stopped a jeep driven by defendant Joel Villela for speeding late one night in January 2018. The officer smelled alcohol on defendant's breath, and after defendant declined a roadside sobriety test, he was arrested on suspicion of driving while under the influence. The officer impounded the jeep under RCW 46.55.360. Pursuant to the statute, the officer did not consider whether there was a reasonable alternative to impounding the jeep, such as releasing it to one of defendant's two passengers. After the jeep was impounded, an inventory search was conducted whereby police found sandwich bags, digital scales, black cloth, pipes and cash, all of which were believed to have been associated with drug dealing. A search incident to arrest discovered cocaine on defendant himself; a possession with intent to deliver controlled substances charge was added to the DUI charge. Defendant moved to suppress fruits of the inventory search on grounds the search was not a lawful seizure under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. At issue before the Washington Supreme Court was whether RCW 46.55.360 was an unconstitutional expansion of what article I, section 7 allowed in only limited circumstances. To this, the Supreme Court agreed: "[o]ur constitution cannot be amended by statute, and while the legislature can give more protection to constitutional rights through legislation, it cannot use legislation to take that protection away." View "Washington v. Villela" on Justia Law

Matthew Schwartz pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. At sentencing, the State and Schwartz disputed whether two of Schwartz’s prior class C felony convictions should not have been included in his offender score under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (“SRA”). Specifically, the parties disagreed as to whether time spent n jail as a sanction for failing to pay legal financial obligations ordered on a felony conviction reset the five-year washout period under the Act. The Washington Supreme Court determined the Legislature did not intend that time spent in jail as a sanction for failing to pay legal financial obligations reset the five-year washout period. Accordingly, Schwartz’s 1997 and 2001 convictions washed out under the Act, and should not have been included in his offender score. View "Washington v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

Dean Imokawa’s truck collided with another vehicle during a lane change, propelling him into oncoming traffic and causing another collision with another vehicle. The State charged Imokawa with vehicular homicide and vehicular assault for the resultant injuries to others from the collision. The trial court denied Imokawa’s request to include a specific jury instruction that the State had to prove the absence of a superseding intervening cause beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury found Imokawa guilty of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning the State had the burden of proving the intervening cause, the jury was not sufficiently instructed on this burden, and the error was not harmless. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, finding the jury was adequately instructed. View "Washington v. Imokawa" on Justia Law

In a moot case of substantial and continuing public interest, a juvenile offender challenges whether her need for treatment was an appropriate basis for imposing a manifest justice disposition. B.O.J. pled guilty to two counts of third degree theft for shoplifting from a grocery store. These offenses subjected her to a "local sanctions" standard sentencing range. In exchange for a plea, the prosecution promised to recommend 6 months of community supervision, 8 hours of community service, credit for time served, release at her sentencing disposition, and no contact with the victims. One month later, the State contended B.O.J. violated the conditions of her release by running away from placement. The State thereafter recommended a manifest justice disposition with confinement in a Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration facility. The trial court stated its findings that both B.O.J.'s need for treatment and the standard sentencing range as too lenient supported the manifest injustice disposition. The Washington Supreme Court determined the trial court's findings were not an appropriate basis for imposing a manifest injustice disposition. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that B.O.J.'s need for treatment supported the trial court's finding that a standard range disposition would effectuate a manifest injustice. View "Washington v. B.O.J." on Justia Law