Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Samantha A. is a 15-year-old with a wide range of medical maladies. Samantha is unable to perform a many activities necessary for independent living. The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) determined that Samantha is eligible for 24-hour institutional care because of the extreme nature of her needs. Because Samantha is cared for by a single mother, Samantha qualified for the Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver Program so that she can receive benefits at home and not be institutionalized. As part of the in-home benefits, Samantha receives Medicaid Personal Care (MPC). DSHS assessed Samantha as needing 90 hours of MPC per month. In 2005, DSHS adopted changes to its assessment formula pertaining to MPC. Under the new rules, Samantha's MPC hours were reduced. Samantha petitioned the Superior Court for review of the DSHS reassessment. The court invalidated some of the DSHS rule changes. DSHS appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the rule changes were valid. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court, finding the rule changes invalid under the Medicaid laws. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

Petitioner Timothy Martin appealed his conviction on kidnapping and robbery charges. His principal claim on appeal was that the State prosecutor violated his constitutional rights when, on cross-examination at trial, the prosecutor inferred Petitioner had tailored his testimony to be consistent with police reports, witness statements and testimony presented by prior witnesses. After a thorough review of the pertinent case law and clauses of the federal and state constitutions, the Supreme Court found no violation of Petitionerâs constitutional rights. The Court affirmed Defendantâs conviction.

Washingtonâs criminal rules authorize a trial judge to release a person before trial, subject to electronic home monitoring (EHM). If convicted of a felony, the defendant is entitled to have the days spent on pretrial EHM credited against any sentence of confinement he or she may receive. Petitioner Joshua Harris pled guilty to two misdemeanors and sought credit for his time spent on EHM. When the trial court did not give him the credit, Petitioner petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus alleging unlawful restraint because he did not receive the credit. The Superior Court granted the writ and ordered the trial court to grant the credit. The appellate court reversed the habeas court order. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that according to state law, there were rational bases for treating felons and misdemeanants differently when crediting EHM. Petitioner was not entitled to the credit he sought as a misdemeanant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision to reverse the trial courtâs grant of credit for time served under EHM.

Petitioner Jack Sims appealed only part of his sentence stemming from child molestation charges. As his defense against the charges, Petitioner argued that the contact he had with the victim was an isolated event, and that the evidence supported his contention at trial. The Department of Corrections recommended Petitioner receive a âspecial sex offender sentencing alternativeâ (SSOSA) sentence. The recommendation was supported by testimony from an expert that opined that Petitioner had a very low risk of re-offending. The trial court ordered a lifetime âno-contactâ order, and banished Petitioner from the city and county in which the victim lived. Petitioner challenged the banishment portion of his sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed that the sentence was unconstitutional, and concluded that the proper remedy in this case would be a resentencing for the limited purpose of narrowly tailoring the geographic condition of Petitionerâs SSOSA sentence that banished him from the county. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Petitioner Raymond Martinez challenged his conviction for first degree burglary, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a deadly weapon within the meaning of the applicable statute. At trial, a knife and sheath were admitted into evidence, but none of the witnesses provided a verbal description of the sheath, or indicated whether it was fastened or unfastened when it was found on Petitionerâs person. On appeal, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor misstated the evidence, mislead the jury, and made an inflammatory statement in his closing remarks. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on procedural grounds without reaching the merits. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a first degree burglary conviction. The Court vacated Petitionerâs conviction, and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.

Petitioner Glen Nichols was charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and with possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana. Following a denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his arrest, the case proceeded to a bench trial at which Petitioner was found guilty on both charges. After he was sentenced, Petitioner appealed his convictions. Petitioner filed a Personal Restraint Petition (PRP) challenging the police search of the motel registry where he was staying when he was arrested. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided State v. Surge where it held that a random, warrantless check of motel registry records was unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed Petitionerâs convictions and denied his PRP. On appeal, Petitioner argues that in light of the Supreme Courtâs decision in the âSurgeâ case, evidence stemming from the police search of the motel registry should have been suppressed. The Court was not persuaded by his argument, holding that Petitionerâs case differed from the âSurgeâ case in that police were not doing a random check of the records, rather, they had âindividualized suspicion that drug selling activity had taken place fromâ his room. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.

Kemper Freeman and several other Washington taxpayers appealed directly to the Supreme Court to try to stop the governor and other state officials from "taking any action" on plans to convert high-occupancy lanes on Interstate 90 into light rail lines. Though Petitioners asked the Court to grant a writ of mandamus, the Court found that Petitioners were essentially seeking a declaratory judgment to bar the State Department of Transportation from selling or leasing any portion of the Interstate for light rail use. The Court found that such a request was outside of it's jurisdiction, and refused to issue the writ.