Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant William Brousseau was convicted of first degree rape and of child molestation. The court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether the alleged victim was competent to testify and whether her out-of-court statements were admissible under Washington's child hearsay exception. The court heard testimony from Appellant's witness, a psychologist who had interviewed the child, but did not permit Appellant to call the child as a witness. On appeal, Appellant claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by finding the victim competent without examining her at the competency hearing. He also claimed that the court's refusal to allow testimony from the victim at the competency hearing denied him due process of law. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the child victim was competent to testify. Additionally, the Court held that the state child hearsay exception does not require a child to testify at a child-hearsay hearing and that Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. View "Washington v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

Appellants Kim Koenig, Lawrence Koss and Althea Paulson sought review of two separate superior court orders that enjoined disclosure of investigative records compiled by the Cities of Puyallup and Mercer Island. The records contained results of internal police department investigations whereby Appellants complained of gross officer misconduct. Appellants argued the records were wrongfully withheld. The appellate court affirmed withholding the records, interpreting case law that held police investigative records relating to an arrest was exempt from retention and copying under state law. The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's interpretation: "the statute does not exempt information relating to the conduct of the police during the investigation." The Court reversed the trial courts with direction that the trial courts redact the offending officers' identities, but that the description of the police department's investigation should have been produced. View "Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City Of Puyallup" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Oppelt, Jr. was accused by his stepdaughter of sexually abuse. Police investigated, but Petitioner was not charged until six years after the alleged incident. Petitioner argued that his due process rights were violated by the pre-accusatorial delay and that the charges against him should have been dismissed. The trial court disagreed, and Petitioner was convicted of child molestation. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the trial court misapplied the "pre-accusatorial delay test" for determining whether due process was violated by the delay. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court engaged the proper test and found no violation of due process. The Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction. View "Washington v. Oppelt" on Justia Law

The City of Bothell charged Respondent James Barnhart with stalking within the portion of the City that falls within Snohomish County. The jury, which was composed of two King County and four Snohomish County jurors, ultimately convicted Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed Respondent's conviction because it found the impaneling of King County jurors, though valid under state law, violated Article 1 Section 22 of the state constitution. The City appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals finding "the composition of [Respondent's] jury violated his right to an 'impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed.'" The case was remanded for a new trial. View "City of Bothell v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the removal of a person from the courtroom during trial was a "closure" in violation of the right to a public trial and whether such a "closure" could be considered too trivial as to implicate a defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant Dean Lormor was arrested following a domestic disturbance. During his jail intake, a small bag of methamphetamine was found in his pants pocket. Defendant's daughter, who was four days shy of her fourth birthday, was excluded from the courtroom before trial. The daughter, who was terminally ill, was confined to a wheelchair and required a ventilator to breathe. Before trial, the prosecutor brought the matter up, because Defendant had either talked to or near one of the jurors regarding his daughter. The prosecutor requested that Defendant be precluded from discussing his daughter and her condition. Counsel and and Defendant acquiesced, but Defendant had concerns about eventual sentencing because he hoped to accompany his daughter to Disneyland with the Make-a-Wish Foundation. Defendant was eventually convicted on the possession charge and sentenced to 24 months. He was allowed to go to Disneyland with his daughter before serving his sentence. On appeal Defendant argued that the trial court violated his right to a public trial by excluding his daughter from trial. Additionally, Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the exclusion as a cautionary measure. The appellate court determined that the exclusion was a "closure" but that the trial court's actions did not implicate Defendant's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of one person is not a closure that violates a Defendant's right to a public trial, but instead is an aspect of the court's power to control the proceedings. Under the facts of this case, the Court found that the trial court's removal of the young daughter was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly the Court affirmed the trial court's conviction. View "Washington v. Lormor" on Justia Law

The issue before the court came from the involuntary commitment of D.F.F. The trial judge closed her proceedings to the public as a matter of course under state law. D.F.F. challenged her commitment on appeal, arguing that the mandatory closure of the proceedings violated her rights under the Washington Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the law was unconstitutional and reversed the commitment order. The Supreme Court held upon review that "a fundamentally different brand of justice is administered when courts are open and the parties, witnesses and judge all conduct their affairs in the light of day. Providing a transcript of a closed proceedings falls far short of guaranteeing open justice." The Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the applicable state law (MPR 1.3) is unconstitutional and reversed D.F.F.'s commitment order. The case was remanded for new commitment proceedings. View "In re Detention of D.F.F." on Justia Law

A reporter from the News Tribune newspaper sought access to the deposition of a material witness in a criminal trial. The deposition took place in a courtroom with the judge present. Without engaging in an inquiry into the factors pursuant to "Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa," the trial court closed the courtroom on the ground that depositions are not open to the public. The deposition was not introduced at trial and did not become part of the court's decision making process. The News Tribune sought a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the transcript and videotape of the deposition, arguing that it had the right to attend the deposition under the Washington State Constitution and the First Amendment to the federal constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the state or federal constitution was violated by the trial court's ruling that the deposition proceeding was not open to the public: "The News Tribune's claim that the location and presence of the judge turned the deposition into a 'hearing' to which the open courts protections apply" was incorrect. Accordingly, the Court denied the News Tribune's application for a writ of mandamus. View "Tacoma News, Inc. v. Cayce" on Justia Law

Defendant Cliff Jones challenged the trial court's denial of credit toward his sentence of community custody for the time he spent incarcerated in excess of his amended sentence of incarceration. After affirming the trial court's decision, the appeals court expressly declined to follow a sister division's holding that community custody began at completion of a sentence of confinement; an offender is entitled to credit toward a sentence of community custody for time spent incarcerated. Upon review, the Supreme Court disavowed the lower court's holding regarding credit, and affirmed the appellate division that heard Defendant's case. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Samuel Donaghe was convicted of second degree rape. In 1995, when Defendant’s incarceration was set to end, the State filed a petition to have Defendant committed as a “sexually violent predator” (SVP). In 2000 while awaiting his for his SVP commitment trial, Defendant moved to obtain a certificate of discharge for his rape convictions. The State argued against the discharge because Defendant had not fulfilled his community placement sentence, which the State argued tolled while he was confined. The trial court agreed with the State and denied Defendant’s motion. Three years later in 2003, the court found Defendant as an SVP. The Court of Appeals affirmed that determination in 2005. In 2007, Defendant renewed his motion for a certificate of discharge, but the trial court adhered to its 2000 ruling, holding that defendant’s custodial detention tolled the running of the community placement requirement. Defendant moved for reconsideration. The appeals court held that because Defendant had been detained as an SVP, his term of community placement could not “begin” until the State released him to the supervision of the community. Therefore, his sentence was not complete, and he was not entitled to a certificate of discharge. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the trial court had the authority to deny Defendant’s certificate of discharge because his community placement was indeed tolled by his confinement as an SVP. View "Washington v. Donaghe" on Justia Law

Defendant James Eserjose appealed his second-degree burglary conviction. In his appeal, Defendant argued that the confession he gave to a deputy sheriff was inadmissible at trial. The trial court determined that although deputies had probable cause to arrest Defendant and consent to enter the home where the arrest was made, they exceeded the scope of the consent when they entered an upstairs hallway and made the arrests. The trial court held that the arrest was unlawful. Nevertheless, the court determined that Defendant's confession was admissible and subsequently found him guilty of burglary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in determining that Defendant's confession was admissible. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Eserjose" on Justia Law