Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Lewis County Superior Court found Defendant Michael Caton guilty of failure to report as a sex offender under the former RCW 9A.44.130 (2008). Defendant appealed, arguing among other things that the evidence did not support his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On May 19, 2009, Defendant registered with the Lewis County sheriff's office as a sex offender. On June 9, 2009, he was arrested for a driving offense. On June 10, after Defendant was released from jail, he appeared at the sheriff's office, believing that as a registered sex offender he was required to report to the sheriff after his release from confinement for any offense. But the sheriff's office did not give Defendant a new reporting date, leaving June 16 as the next reporting date. Defendant failed to report on June 16 and instead reported on June 17. The State charged him with failure to register as a sex offender for failing to report in person "on the required day for the 90 day reporting" period. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State had not proved that Defendant failed to report within 90 days of his registration: he reported on June 10 and again on June 17, both dates well within 90 days of his registration date of May 19, 2009. Accordingly, the Court reversed Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Caton" on Justia Law

Ron Teter was diagnosed with a tumor in his right kidney. Urologist Dr. Andrew Deck, assisted by Dr. David Lauter, performed surgery to remove Teter’s kidney. Immediately after surgery, Teter developed a condition in which increased pressure in one compartment of the body that compromised the tissues in that compartment. Even after a procedure to relieve the pressure, Teter continued to suffer from pain in his left leg that interfered with his ability to stand for long periods of time and with his ability to engage in his usual activities. Teter and his wife (the Teters) sued Drs. Deck and Lauter for negligence. The Teters eventually settled with Dr. Lauter and stipulated to his dismissal as a defendant. The parties encountered difficulties in preparing for trial for their case against Dr. Deck. Neither the Teters nor Dr. Deck complied completely with discovery deadlines and the trial court granted motions to compel by both sides. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who made a record of his strict requirements of conducting the trial in his court. Defense counsel was routinely cautioned about her conduct during trial, and the judge noted his displeasure with both parties' "disregard for protocol and rules of evidence." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court involved the court's exclusion of a key medical witness as sanction for the parties' conduct during trial. The Court concluded the pretrial motions judge excluded the expert without making the required findings that the violation was willful and prejudicial and could be imposed only after explicitly considering less severe sanctions. When the trial judge was reassigned to this case, he granted a new trial on the ground that the exclusion was a prejudicial error of law, and he was "well within his discretion in granting the new trial." The Supreme Court found that the facts of this case "amply" supported the ruling. View "Teter v. Deck" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Snapp was stopped by police when an officer observed air fresheners hanging from Defendant's rear view mirror that blocked the driver's view. Upon further inspection, the officer observed a carabiner that "patched together" the driver's seat belt, which he believed to be insufficient and defective. As the officer pulled Defendant's car over, he testified he saw Defendant dip his right shoulder as if he was placing something under the seat. The officer would ultimately arrest Defendant for driving under the influence, and a search of the car was conducted incident to his arrest. The officer found that Defendant had multiple credit and identification cards with other peoples' identities. The State would charge Defendant with 22 counts of identity theft and for possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from that search, arguing the initial stop was unlawful. Acting pro se, Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review, arguing that the search violated the Washington Constitution. Finding that the warrantless searches of Defendant's vehicle violated his right to privacy, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Snapp" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Posey,Jr. committed two counts of second degree rape when he was sixteen years old. A jury convicted him, and the superior court sentenced him as an adult. On direct review, the Supreme Court remanded Petitioner's case with instructions that a juvenile court sentence him. Prior to the Court's mandate, Petitioner turned twenty-one. On remand, Petitioner challenged the juvenile court's authority to sentence him. The presiding judge agreed. The superior court resentenced Petitioner as an adult, but imposed a sentence consistent with the standard juvenile range. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the issue of this case was whether legislation relating to juvenile courts could deprive the superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction. The Court held that the legislature did not have the power to alter that constitutional grant of felony jurisdiction. The Court thus affirmed the sentence imposed on remand by the superior court, and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding Petitioner's original sentence. View "Washington v. Posey" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "Blakely v. Washington" (542 U.S. 296 (2004)) applied to Petitioner Michael Rowland's resentencing hearing where he received an exceptional sentence on facts found by the trial court. Petitioner was convicted in 1991 of first degree murder and taking a motor vehicle without permission. In 2007, he challenged his sentence on the basis that his offender score was erroneous. The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded for resentencing. The resentencing court found "Blakely" did not apply and reimposed the exceptional sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: under the circumstances of this case, the Court concluded that "Blakely" did not apply when the trial court neither "touched the actual findings supporting the exceptional sentence nor increased the sentence." View "Washington v. Rowland" on Justia Law

The principal issue in three consolidated cases was whether certifications attesting to the existence or nonexistence of public records are "testimonial statements" subject to the demands of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,"(557 U.S. 305(2009)), the Washington Supreme Court held the confrontation clause does not forbid the admission of such evidence. "The teaching of 'Melendez-Diaz,' however, is that certifications declaring the existence or nonexistence of public records are in fact testimonial statements, which may not be introduced into evidence absent confrontation." Accordingly, the Court overruled its prior decisions to the extent they were contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. Here, defendants' confrontation rights were violated by admission of testimonial certifications. Excepting the hit and run conviction at issue in "Washington v. Jasper," admission of the certifications was not harmless. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in "State v. Jasper," affirmed the superior court in "Washington v. Cienfuegos," and reversed the superior court in "Washington v. Moimoi." View "Washington v. Jasper" on Justia Law

Respondent Aaron Hahn asked someone to make a girl "disappear" or appear as if she "never existed" or "just be gone." Respondent was convicted of solicitation to commit first degree murder. Respondent was charged with four counts of third degree child rape, sexual exploitation of a minor, possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and stalking. While confined in jail awaiting trial, Respondent mentioned to another inmate, Mike Hendrickson, that he wished the complaining witness "S.M." was dead and that he would hurt her. Respondent asked Hendrickson if he knew anyone who could "get to" S.M., but Hendrickson said he could not help. Respondent then asked inmate Norman Livengood if he had any mafia connections, stating that he wanted someone hurt or killed. Livengood related the encounter to the police and agreed to cooperate in the resulting investigation. The police obtained a warrant and wired Livengood to record his conversations with Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Respondent was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of "solicitation" to commit fourth degree assault. Because the evidence did not support such an instruction, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Hahn" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case involved a preelection challenge by Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government to an initiative measure (Proposition 1) which repealed an ordinance governing the use of automated traffic safety cameras in the city of Mukilteo. The trial court declined to grant an injunction, and Proposition 1 was placed on the November 2, 2010 Snohomish County general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the legislature expressly granted authority to the governing body of the city of Mukilteo to enact ordinances on the use of automated traffic safety cameras, the subject matter of Proposition 1 was not within the initiative power. The Court reversed the trial court's order that denied the Citizens declaratory relief. View "Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Gov't v. City of Mukilteo" on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved two different statutory schemes awarding attorney fees. One scheme, RCW 7.06.050-.060, discourages frivolous appeals from mandatory arbitration. The other scheme, RCW 4.84.250-.300, encourages parties to settle before going to court in cases where the amount in controversy is $10,000 or less by allowing a plaintiff to recover attorney fees if the plaintiff makes an offer of settlement at least 10 days before the initial trial, the offer is rejected, and the plaintiff recovers more than was offered. The question before the Court was whether the second scheme may be invoked for the first time 10 days before a trial de novo, rather than 10 days before the arbitration hearing, by a plaintiff that appealed an arbitration decision. After success at the trial de novo, Plaintiffs Patrick Williams and Andrea Harris applied for and received prevailing party attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. Plaintiffs argued that although they offered to settle for under $10,000 after the mandatory arbitration, RCW 4.84.250-.300 allowed them to recover attorney fees as long as they made their offers 10 days before the trial de novo. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that RCW 4.84.250-.300 applies only to a plaintiff that seeks recovery of $10,000 or less and makes an offer of settlement 10 days before the initial hearing whether it is a trial or an arbitration. View "Williams v. Tilaye" on Justia Law

After trial, a judge found that the State had established all statutory and constitutional factors necessary for the termination of Appellant Nyakat Luak's parental rights to her twin sons. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding two of the statutory factors: (1) that the State expressly and understandably offered or provided to her all the necessary services to correct her parental deficiencies; and, (2) that there was little likelihood those deficiencies could be remedied in the foreseeable future. Additionally, Appellant contended the trial judge erred in not appointing counsel to represent her twin sons. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to support the judge's findings. The Court agreed that children whose parents are subject to dependency and termination proceedings have vital liberty interests at stake and may constitutionally be entitled to counsel to protect those interests. "But whether any individual child is entitled to counsel must be decided case by case." The Court held that the deprivation, if any, of a child's right to counsel in such circumstances may be protected by appellate review. Appellant raised her due process claim for the first time on appeal, denying the trial judge of the opportunity to timely consider the issue. Accordingly, Appellant failed to meet her burden of showing reversible error, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed. View "In re Dependency of M.S.R." on Justia Law