Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether records "sealed for good cause" submitted in support of a motion that was never decided became public information. The issue stemmed from a petition for the dissolution of a marriage. Smith Bunday Berman Britton PS (Smith Bunday) was the accounting firm for the parties Todd and Rondi Bennett. Rondi Bennett sued Smith Bunday alleging it aided Todd Bennett in embezzling and hiding money that belonged to businesses she co-owned with her ex-husband and her father. As part of discovery, plaintiffs requested tax records of nonparties to the suit. Smith Bunday objected on the ground that the disclosure was prohibited without the nonparty's consent. To resolve the problem, plaintiffs proposed a protective order, stipulated by the parties. The documents were ultimately produced under seal; Rondi Bennett moved to remove certain documents from the protective order so that they could be attached unsealed to her motion in response to Smith Bunday. The trial court ordered that the documents should be filed under seal first, then upon receipt, the court would examine them and determine whether they should remain subject to the protective order. A few hours after the response was filed but before the court had examined the motion to dismiss, the response and the documents, the case settled. Smith Bunday notified the court that the case had been settled and that its summary judgment motion should be removed from the calendar. Settlement did not bring resolution. Smith Bunday noticed that Rondi Bennett's response and supporting declaration contained or made reference to documents that had been stamped "confidential," but were not filed them under seal as required by the stipulated protective order. This was apparently accidental. After discussing the matter, and despite the fact the case had settled, the parties stipulated the plaintiffs would refile redacted and sealed versions of the response and declaration in accordance with the stipulated protective order. The plaintiffs' expert moved to intervene. He asserted his right as a member of the public to open access to court records in the case already filed under seal. The trial court granted his motion to intervene, but denied his motion to unseal. The expert appealed, and the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's order. The expert then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the trial court made no decision involving the disputed information, the Supreme Court concluded the supporting material (produced under seal) could not be relevant to a nonexistent decision. "We hold that because the information at issue in this case was not relevant to any decision made by the court, it is not presumptively public under article I, section 10 [of the Washington Constitution]." View "Bennett v. Smith Bundy Berman Britton, PS" on Justia Law

The King County Superior Court relied on "Waples v. Yi," (234 P.3d 187 (2010)) in invalidating RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to lawsuits against the State, including governmental agencies such as Harborview Medical Center. This case stemmed from a paragliding accident Petitioner Glen McDevitt suffered, for which he underwent surgery at Harborview. Petitioner sued Harborview for malpractice in relation to his treatment. Harborview moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Petitioner failed to comply with the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1). Harborview requested that Petitioner's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In response, Petitioner argued that our decision in "Waples" invalidated the presuit notice requirement against both private and public defendants. Harborview then argued that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the presuit notice requirement as applied to lawsuits against the State. The King County Superior Court denied Harborview’s motion for summary judgment. Harborview then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court on the grounds that the legislature could establish conditions precedent, including presuit notice requirements, to inform the State of future cost and delay associated with court resolution of an issue. "[W]e hold that the presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to the State is a constitutionally valid statutory precondition for suit against the State because it was adopted by the legislature as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution. View "McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a traffic stop motivated by an uncorroborated tip (but also independently motivated by a reasonable, articulable suspicion) was unconstitutionally pretextual under the Washington Constitution. Upon review, the Court concluded that a "mixed motive" traffic stop is not pretextual "so long as the desire to address a suspected traffic infraction (or criminal activity) for which the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion is an actual, conscious and independent cause" of the stop. View "Washington v. Arreola" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nicholas Pappas challenged an appellate court decision that affirmed an exceptional sentence for vehicular assault based on the severity of the victim's injuries. The case arose from a 2008 motorcycle accident in which Petitioner's passenger was thrown from the vehicle and suffered multiple injuries, including permanent brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Washington case law and the language of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y) authorized an exceptional sentence when the jury finds the victim's injuries substantially exceed "substantial bodily harm." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Pappas" on Justia Law

"There exists a simple yet significant balancing test for trial courts to apply to consider whether specific circumstances warrant closing part of a trial to the public, set out in 'Washington v. Bone-Club,' (906 P.2d 325 (1995))." Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that that process was not followed in this case, and therefore found a violation of the public trial right. Because the violation constituted structural error and absence of an objection was not a waiver of the public trial right, prejudice is presumed, and a new trial is warranted. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Wise" on Justia Law

In this consolidated case, petitioners raised several issues, some common to both cases and others specific to each. Petitioner Michael Sublett challenged his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and felony murder, arguing the trial court wrongfully denied severance. He also challenged the comparability of out of state convictions used to support his sentence as a persistent offender. Petitioner Christopher Olsen challenged his conviction for felony murder, raising claims regarding lesser included offense jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Both petitioners challenged the content of the accomplice liability jury instruction, and both claim a violation of their article I, section 22 trial rights occurred when the trial judge considered, in chambers and with counsel present, a question from the jury during its deliberations. The Court of Appeals rejected the issues raised. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Sublett" on Justia Law

Rene P. Paumier appealed his conviction for residential burglary and second degree theft. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether Paumier's right to a public trial was violated when the trial court individually questioned potential jurors in chambers. The Court previously held that a court may close a courtroom to the public only after considering the factors established in "Washington v. Bone-Club," (906 P.2d 325 (1995)). Moreover, the Court held in "Washington v. Wise," (No. 82802-4, slip op. at 19 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012)), that individual questioning of potential jurors in chambers without first considering the Bone-Club factors is a closure creating a presumption of prejudice. Therefore, Paumier was entitled to a new trial because the trial court closed the courtroom without first considering the Bone-Club factors. Because the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on this issue, there was no reason to address whether the trial court also violated Paumier's right to self-representation. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court on the public trial right grounds alone. View "Washington v. Paumier" on Justia Law

Petitioner Patrick L. Morris filed a personal restraint petition, alleging a violation of his right to a public trial when the trial court conducted part of voir dire in chambers. Further, he claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the violation on direct review. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right claim, where prejudice would have been presumed on direct review, a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review. Morris additionally challenged evidentiary decisions by the trial court relating to a proposed defense expert witness and argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in handling the expert testimony issue. The Court held that Morris failed to meet his burden on the evidentiary and trial counsel issues. But because of Morris's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Morris" on Justia Law

Respondent Monte Hunley was convicted by a jury in 2009 of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sentencing court violated Respondent's right to due process by basing the imposed sentence on prior convictions demonstrated only by the prosecutor's written summary and Respondent's failure to object. The appellate court held that violated Respondent's right to due process. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "Washington v. Hunley" on Justia Law

When an insured defendant believes its insurer is refusing to settle a plaintiff's claims in bad faith, the insured can negotiate an independent pretrial settlement with the plaintiff, typically involving a stipulated judgment, a covenant not to execute the judgment, and an assignment of the insurer's bad faith claim to the plaintiff (collectively, a "covenant judgment). When accepted by the trial court, the settlement amount becomes the presumptive measure of damages in the later bad faith action. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned whether article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution entitles the insurer to have the reasonableness of the covenant judgment determined by a jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it does not, and affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Bird v. Best Plumbing Grp., LLC" on Justia Law