Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a traffic stop motivated by an uncorroborated tip (but also independently motivated by a reasonable, articulable suspicion) was unconstitutionally pretextual under the Washington Constitution. Upon review, the Court concluded that a "mixed motive" traffic stop is not pretextual "so long as the desire to address a suspected traffic infraction (or criminal activity) for which the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion is an actual, conscious and independent cause" of the stop. View "Washington v. Arreola" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nicholas Pappas challenged an appellate court decision that affirmed an exceptional sentence for vehicular assault based on the severity of the victim's injuries. The case arose from a 2008 motorcycle accident in which Petitioner's passenger was thrown from the vehicle and suffered multiple injuries, including permanent brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Washington case law and the language of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y) authorized an exceptional sentence when the jury finds the victim's injuries substantially exceed "substantial bodily harm." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Pappas" on Justia Law

"There exists a simple yet significant balancing test for trial courts to apply to consider whether specific circumstances warrant closing part of a trial to the public, set out in 'Washington v. Bone-Club,' (906 P.2d 325 (1995))." Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that that process was not followed in this case, and therefore found a violation of the public trial right. Because the violation constituted structural error and absence of an objection was not a waiver of the public trial right, prejudice is presumed, and a new trial is warranted. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Wise" on Justia Law

In this consolidated case, petitioners raised several issues, some common to both cases and others specific to each. Petitioner Michael Sublett challenged his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and felony murder, arguing the trial court wrongfully denied severance. He also challenged the comparability of out of state convictions used to support his sentence as a persistent offender. Petitioner Christopher Olsen challenged his conviction for felony murder, raising claims regarding lesser included offense jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Both petitioners challenged the content of the accomplice liability jury instruction, and both claim a violation of their article I, section 22 trial rights occurred when the trial judge considered, in chambers and with counsel present, a question from the jury during its deliberations. The Court of Appeals rejected the issues raised. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Sublett" on Justia Law

Rene P. Paumier appealed his conviction for residential burglary and second degree theft. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether Paumier's right to a public trial was violated when the trial court individually questioned potential jurors in chambers. The Court previously held that a court may close a courtroom to the public only after considering the factors established in "Washington v. Bone-Club," (906 P.2d 325 (1995)). Moreover, the Court held in "Washington v. Wise," (No. 82802-4, slip op. at 19 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012)), that individual questioning of potential jurors in chambers without first considering the Bone-Club factors is a closure creating a presumption of prejudice. Therefore, Paumier was entitled to a new trial because the trial court closed the courtroom without first considering the Bone-Club factors. Because the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on this issue, there was no reason to address whether the trial court also violated Paumier's right to self-representation. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court on the public trial right grounds alone. View "Washington v. Paumier" on Justia Law

Petitioner Patrick L. Morris filed a personal restraint petition, alleging a violation of his right to a public trial when the trial court conducted part of voir dire in chambers. Further, he claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the violation on direct review. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right claim, where prejudice would have been presumed on direct review, a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review. Morris additionally challenged evidentiary decisions by the trial court relating to a proposed defense expert witness and argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in handling the expert testimony issue. The Court held that Morris failed to meet his burden on the evidentiary and trial counsel issues. But because of Morris's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Morris" on Justia Law

Respondent Monte Hunley was convicted by a jury in 2009 of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sentencing court violated Respondent's right to due process by basing the imposed sentence on prior convictions demonstrated only by the prosecutor's written summary and Respondent's failure to object. The appellate court held that violated Respondent's right to due process. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "Washington v. Hunley" on Justia Law

When an insured defendant believes its insurer is refusing to settle a plaintiff's claims in bad faith, the insured can negotiate an independent pretrial settlement with the plaintiff, typically involving a stipulated judgment, a covenant not to execute the judgment, and an assignment of the insurer's bad faith claim to the plaintiff (collectively, a "covenant judgment). When accepted by the trial court, the settlement amount becomes the presumptive measure of damages in the later bad faith action. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned whether article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution entitles the insurer to have the reasonableness of the covenant judgment determined by a jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it does not, and affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Bird v. Best Plumbing Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

The Washington constitution limits municipal indebtedness to protect taxpayers from legislative and voter improvidence. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the city of Wenatchee (City) would exceed its debt limit by entering into a "contingent loan agreement" (CLA) with appellant Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (District) to help the District finance a regional events center. The District argued that the CLA was not subject to the City's debt limit because it created a "contingent" liability, triggered only if the District is unable to make payments on the District's bonds. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the City was unconditionally obligated to service the District's debt if the District could not and because the risk of loss fell upon the City and its taxpayers: "[o]ur decision accordingly places the approval of the CLA in the hands of the voters." View "In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Reg'l Events Ctr." on Justia Law

Lindy Deer was convicted of third degree rape of a child after having sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old boy on multiple occasions. Deer claimed that she was asleep during several acts of intercourse and could not be guilty of rape because she did not act with volition. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Deer's claimed lack of volition amounted to an affirmative defense, for which the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court correctly refused Deer's request to instruct the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was awake during the acts at issue. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Deer" on Justia Law