Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the conflicting authority on which the standard of review applies to a sentencing court's determination of "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Defendant Julio Cesar Aldano Graciano was charged by amended information with four counts of first degree rape of a child and two counts of first degree child molestation relating to E.R. The jury was instructed that a guilty verdict required unanimous agreement on which act was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was further instructed that the acts constituting each count must be separate and distinct from one another. The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Furthermore, the jury found Defendant not guilty of the molestation charge relating to a second child, J.R. At sentencing, defense counsel argued the crimes should have been considered the "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) for purposes of calculating Defendant's offender score. Both Defendant and the State sought review of the trial court's sentence. The Court of Appeals (Division Two) reviewed the trial court's determination de novo, adopting the reasoning of Division Three in "Washington v. Torngren," (196 P.3d 742 (2008)). The Torngren Court acknowledged a long line of precedent stating the proper standard is abuse of discretion but held that a de novo standard “seem[s] more appropriate." The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reaffirmed that determinations of same criminal conduct are reviewed for abuse of discretion or misapplication of law, and concluded that the sentencing judge acted within her discretion in declining to find that Defendant's crimes constituted the same criminal conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's sentence. View "Washington v. Aldana Graciano" on Justia Law

Brandon Afoa was paralyzed in an accident while he was working at Sea-Tac Airport and sought to recover from the Port of Seattle on three theories the Supreme Court applied in other multiemployer workplace cases: as a business invitee; for breach of safety regulations under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA); and the duty of a general contractor to maintain a safe common area for any employee of subcontractors. The Court concluded that the same principles that apply to other multiemployer workplaces apply to Sea-Tac and that a jury could find the Port (which owns and operates the airport) liable under any of these three theories. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing Afoa's claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Afoa v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

The City of Seattle and Officers Kevin McDaniel and Pohna Lim challenged an appellate court's decision affirming the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. Respondent Elsa Robb, on behalf of her deceased husband Michael Robb, alleged that law enforcement acted negligently by failing to pick up and remove shotgun shells lying near Samson Berhe after stopping him on suspicion of burglary. After the stop, Berhe returned to retrieve the cartridges, and shortly thereafter used one of them to kill Michael Robb. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B may create an independent duty to protect against the criminal acts of a third party where the actor’s own affirmative act creates or exposes another to the recognizable high degree of risk of harm. However, the Court also held that in this case, the police officer’s failure to pick up shotgun shells lying near defendants in a "Terry" stop was not an affirmative act as contemplated by the Restatement. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Robb v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sealing of juror questionnaires amounted to a trial closure, implicating a defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to a public trial. Questionnaires were given to and completed by prospective jurors to assist counsel in jury selection and to possibly identify who would be individually questioned outside the presence of the entire venire but in open court. Several days after the jury was selected, the trial court sealed the questionnaires. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the right to a public trial had not been violated. However, the court held that the trial court’s failure to conduct a "Bone-Club" analysis before sealing the questionnaires was inconsistent with the public’s right of open access to court records and remanded the case for reconsideration of the sealing order. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Washington v. Beskurt" on Justia Law

Defendant Jon Strine was charged with and tried for vehicular homicide and vehicular assault after he crashed his vehicle into a motorcycle carrying a married couple. After a two-day deliberation, the jury returned verdict forms finding Defendant “not guilty” on both charges. The trial judge polled the jury on the mistaken belief that polling was required. Six jurors dissented from the original verdict and the presiding juror stated that the jury would be unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial judge declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Defendant then moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds but the trial court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, finding that double jeopardy clause does not prevent the State from reprosecuting Defendant because his original jeopardy never terminated. View "Washington v. Strine" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court in this case. A Clark County deputy sheriff sought to proceed to trial and recover damages from Burger King Corporation under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) on a claim that he suffered ongoing emotional distress from discovering he was served a burger with phlegm inside the bun. Specifically, the issue was whether, in the absence of physical injury, the WPLA permits relief for emotional distress damages caused by being served and touching, but not consuming, the contaminated food product. The Supreme Court concluded that the WPLA permits relief in such circumstances, provided that the emotional distress is a reasonable reaction and "manifest by objective symptomatology." View "Bylsma v. Burger King Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner Bryan Allen challenged his felony harassment conviction, raising three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the potential fallibility of cross-racial eyewitness identification; (2) whether the “true threat” requirement is an essential element of a harassment statute that must be pleaded in the information and included in the "to-convict" instruction; and (3) alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Court of Appeals rejected the arguments raised. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Allen" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether Jeffrey Manary or Edwin Anderson were entitled to a decedent's interest in real property that had been deeded to a trust. Manary claimed the interest as a successor trustee; his claim was based on the trust. Anderson claimed the interest as a testamentary beneficiary; his claim was based on chapter 11.11 RCW (the Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Act). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that an owner complies with the Act when he specifically refers to a nonprobate asset in his will, even if he does not refer to the instrument under which the asset passes. Anderson was entitled to the decedent's interest in the property, but he was not entitled to attorney fees for answering the petition for review. View "Manary v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Doctor's Associates Inc. (DAI) franchises Subway sandwich shops across the country. Waqas Saleemi and Farooq Sharyar operated three Subway franchises in Washington State. Their franchise agreements provided that any disputes would be arbitrated in Bridgeport, Connecticut, under Connecticut law, except for Connecticut franchise law. After a dispute arose, a Washington State superior court judge found the choice of law and forum selection clause unenforceable and entered an order compelling Washington arbitration. DAI did not seek discretionary review at the time. Saleemi and Sharyar prevailed at arbitration. DAI appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, asking the Court to vacate the trial court's order compelling arbitration that would require this dispute to be arbitrated, again, but in Connecticut. The Supreme Court concluded that DAI failed to show that it has been prejudiced by the trial court's order compelling arbitration. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order compelling arbitration in Washington. View "Saleemi v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Under chapter 10.05 RCW, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor in a Washington court of limited jurisdiction may petition the court for deferred prosecution if the crime was the result of substance dependency or mental illness. After the defendant fulfills the statutory requirements, the judge may dismiss the charges. RCW 10.05.130 requires the appropriation of public funds "to provide investigation, examination, report and treatment plan for any indigent person who is unable to pay the cost of any program of treatment" within a deferred prosecution. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the statutory interpretation of the term "treatment plan" in RCW 10.05.130. The Court held that according to the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 10.05.130, the legislature did not intend to commit public funds for the full course of treatment programs for indigent defendants in deferred prosecutions. View "Washington v. Velasquez" on Justia Law