Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case concerned whether Washington Substitute Senate Bill (SSB) 5493, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. SSB 5493 amended RCW 39.12.015 to modify how the Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) industrial statistician calculated prevailing wage rates for public works projects. Associated General Contractors of Washington, Associated Builders and Contractors of Western Washington Inc., Inland Pacific Chapter of Associate Builders and Contractors Inc., and Inland Northwest AGC Inc. (collectively AGC), filed suit against the State of Washington and various government officials in their official capacities (collectively State), for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that requiring the industrial statistician to use the wages from CBAs constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s cross motion for summary judgment, holding that SSB 5493 was constitutional, and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that SSB 5493 was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, holding that the amendments have neither the standards nor adequate procedural safeguards as required by the two-part test set forth in Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wn.2d 155, 163-64, 500 P.2d 540 (1972). The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: SSB 5493 was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because it provided standards and procedural safeguards under the test in Barry & Barry. "The legislature made a policy decision to adopt the highest CBA wage rate and has directed the L&I industrial statistician to identify the highest CBA wage rate and adopt it as the prevailing wage. In addition there are procedural safeguards in related statutes and inherent in the collective bargaining process that protect against arbitrary administrative action or abuse of discretionary power." The case was remanded back to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the remaining issue not addressed because of its disposition in this case. View "Associated Gen. Contractors of Wash. v. State" on Justia Law

As part of an effort to reduce racial bias in the judicial system, the Washington Supreme Court enacted GR 37, which directed trial judges to deny a peremptory challenge when an objective observer could view race as a factor in its use. Over GR 37 objections, two potential jurors, both people of color, were struck from the jury in this case. The jury found Tesfasilasye guilty of third degree rape. He was sentenced to 12 months in jail. Tesfasilasye appealed, alleging, among other things, that an objective observer could have viewed race as a factor for striking Juror 25 and juror 3 as prohibited by GR 37. The Supreme Court, after a review of the trial court record, determined an objective observer could view race as a factor for striking both juror 25 and juror 3. Tesfasilasye asked the Court to reverse his conviction, and the State did not dispute that the remedy for a GR 37 violation. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Tesfasilasye" on Justia Law

Tonelli Anderson petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review of his 61-year sentence he received for two first degree murders committed at age 17. Anderson asked the Court to find his sentence was unconstitutionally cruel under the Washington constitution, arguing that Washington v. Haag announced a bright line rule that no juvenile offender could ever receive a sentence of 46 years or longer, no matter how serious or numerous their crimes might be. The Supreme Court agreed that Haag limited the category of juvenile offenders who could receive a de facto life without parole (LWOP) sentence, but when the offender’s crimes do not reflect those “mitigating qualities of youth,” Washington’s constitution does not bar a de facto LWOP sentence. In light of the evidence presented at trial, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court appropriately determined Anderson’s crimes did not reflect “youthful immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Therefore his sentence was affirmed. View "Washington v. Anderson" on Justia Law

King County, Washington petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the presiding judge of Pierce County Superior Court to turn over court reporters’ backup audiotapes and to search court employees’ private files and devices for records responsive to a records request. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition because it failed to demonstrate why the Court should grant the extraordinary remedy: the superior court presiding judge was not the proper subject of a writ of mandamus to turn over audiotapes or other records under GR 31 or GR 31.1. Furthermore, the Court found King County had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy that precluded the issuance of a writ of mandamus. View "King County v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

Petitioner Antoine Davis was 21 when he was convicted of first degree murder and second degree attempted murder. He received a standard range sentence of 767 months. Davis filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) more than one year after his judgment and sentence finalized, contending it was. timely for two reasons: (1) In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) constituted a significant, material, and retroactive change in law that applied to his de facto life sentence; and (2) recent advances in neuroscience for late-aged adolescents qualified as newly discovered evidence. The Washington Supreme Court found: (1) Monschke applied to 19- and 20-year-old defendants; and (2) Davis did not satisfy any of the statutory criteria that exempted his petition from the one-year time bar. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cristian Lupastean was convicted by a jury of driving while license suspended (DWLS), driving a commercial vehicle without a valid commercial driver’s license (CDL), and reckless driving. He sought a new trial because one of the seated jurors failed to disclose information that was requested in voir dire. Lupastean contended the nondisclosure impaired his ability to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and showed that the juror had actual and implied bias. After a review of the controlling Washington case law with respect to peremptory challenges in jury trials, the Supreme Court held that a motion for a mistrial or new trial may not be granted solely because undisclosed information about a juror might have triggered a peremptory challenge. "Instead, juror nondisclosure must be treated similarly to other nonconstitutional errors that require a new trial only on an affirmative showing of prejudice. Such a showing may be made if the moving party shows that the undisclosed information would have supported a valid challenge for cause or that the nondisclosure was otherwise prejudicial to the moving party’s right to a fair trial." The Court found Lupastean did not make the necessary showing here. The Court therefore affirmed his convictions. View "Washington v. Lupastean" on Justia Law

When Petitioner Andrew Kennedy was 19 years old, he killed his cousin’s 11-month-old daughter while she was in his care. Following a bench trial in 2007, the court convicted Kennedy of homicide by abuse and sentenced him to 380 months in confinement. Kennedy’s judgment and sentence became final after direct appeal in 2009. In 2019, he filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) seeking to be resentenced based on “[n]ewly discovered evidence.” Kennedy argued that advancements in the scientific understanding of adolescent brain development for young adults since his 2007 sentencing would have probably changed the trial court’s discretionary sentencing decision by allowing him to argue for a mitigated sentence based on youthfulness. The Court of Appeals dismissed Kennedy’s PRP as time barred, concluding that scientific evidence supporting such an argument for young adults Kennedy’s age was available at the time of sentencing. After the Washington Supreme Court granted Kennedy’s motion for discretionary review, he raised a second argument for relief based on the “significant change in the law” exemption to the time bar. The Supreme Court found Kennedy's PRP meet neither exemption to the time bar. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the Department of Natural Resources' ("DNR") land management strategies applicable to certain federal land grants (“state lands”) and county land grants (“forest board lands”), which involves harvesting timber from these lands to generate revenue for state institutions and counties. The petitioners, a group of individuals and nonprofit organizations (collectively Conservation NW), challenged DNR’s land management strategies on the grounds they violated the mandate under Washington Constitution article XVI, section 1 that “[a]ll the public lands granted to the state are held in trust for all the people.” Conservation NW argued DNR’s strategies prioritized maximizing revenue from timber harvests and undercut its obligation to manage granted lands for the broader public interest, which would have been better served by prioritizing conservation and efforts to mitigate climate change, wildfires, and land erosion. DNR contended it had a trustee obligation to manage the state and forest board lands specifically for the state institutions enumerated in the Enabling Act and the county beneficiaries. DNR acknowledged its land management strategies generated revenue but not “at the expense of forest health.” The trial court dismissed Conservation NW’s lawsuit against DNR pursuant to County of Skamania v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 (1984), establishing DNR as a trustee under the Enabling Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case. View "Conservation Northwest v. Commissioner of Public Lands" on Justia Law

A trial court granted petitioner Mary Walker’s motion to dismiss with prejudice based on a violation of CrR 3.3. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that Walker waived the right to object to the trial date because, according to that court, defense counsel knew at the time of trial setting that the trial date set was untimely and failed to advise the trial court of the known time-for-trial violation. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in result, but for differing reasons, finding Walker lost the right to object to the untimely trial date under CrR 3.3(d)(3) because the trial date was set before the time-for-trial period expired, but she failed to raise an objection until after the time-for-trial deadline expired. View "Washington v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner Lance Thomason attempted to steal about $15 worth of meat and cheese from Yoke’s Fresh Market in Spokane and fought with a security guard on his way out. A jury convicted him of second degree robbery, and the trial court imposed a 63-month sentence—a sentence at the bottom of the standard sentence range. Thomason appealed, arguing that the “de minimis” nature of his crime, especially his supposedly minimal use of force, justified an exceptional sentence below the standard range. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court concluded that under RCW 9.94A.535(1), the de minimis nature of a crime could constitute a substantial and compelling factor that supported an exceptional sentence below the standard range, in the appropriate case. An appropriate case was one in which (1) the legislature did not consider the mitigating factor already when it listed the elements of the crime or set the standard sentence range and (2) the factor constitutes a substantial and compelling reason to depart below the range. The Supreme Court concluded Thomason failed to satisfy the statute's criteria. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Thomason" on Justia Law