Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the adjudication of water rights in the Yakima River Basin. The parties brought various challenges to the conditional final order of the trial court determining their water rights. The Court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court for direct appeal. Upon review, the Court reversed the trial court's decision concerning the quantification of irrigable land on the Yakama reservation, and reversed the trial court's determinations regarding the Nation's right to store water. The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusions regarding the rights of nontribal claimants to excess water, but reversed the application of the "future development excuse" under RCW 90.14.140(2)(c) for nonuse of a water right. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of several individual water rights claims. View "In re Rights to Waters of Yakima River Drainage Basin (Acquavella)" on Justia Law

Appellant Catherine Lakey and twelve other homeowners owned property that bordered a parcel owned by Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) on which there was an electrical substation. The homeowners sued PSE and the City of Kirkland after PSE constructed a new substation on PSE property. The homeowners sought review of the trial court's decision to exclude testimony of their expert under the "Frye" rule, and the court's ultimate decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of PSE. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly excluded the expert's testimony under the "Frye" rule but properly excluded it under the Rules of Evidence ER702. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision with respect to their Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) claims, finding that LUPA did not apply to the homeowners' inverse condemnation claim. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a domestic violence protection order that included a child visitation provision qualified as a "court-ordered parenting plan" under Washington's first degree custodial interference statute, RCW 9A.40.060(2). Upon review, the Court concluded that it did not, because the legislature specifically created the phrase "court-ordered parenting plan" as a term of art to refer to a document created under chapter 26.09 RCW. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for dismissal of Petitioner Jose Veliz, Jr.'s custodial interference conviction for insufficient evidence. View "Washington v. Veliz" on Justia Law

In 2009, Philip Haberthur nonjudicially foreclosed on Petitioner Steven Schreoder's property. Petitioner attempted to restrain the sale on grounds that his land was agricultural and not subject to nonjudicial foreclosure. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the parties to a deed of trust may waive the statutory requirement that agricultural land must be foreclosed judicially. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "although the procedure here was admittedly convoluted," the trial court abused its discretion in failing to restrain the sale of Petitioner's property without first determining whether the land was agricultural, and for dismissing Petitioner's other claims on summary judgment. The Court held that agricultural land must be foreclosed judicially; parties may not waive the statute. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a challenge to two provisions of the voter-enacted RCW 43.135.034 (2011) (Initiative 1053). The first provision required that any bill containing tax increases be passed by a two-thirds majority vote of the legislature, and the second provision required that any tax bill increasing state spending above a prescribed limit be approved by the voters. The Court addressed only whether the challenges to the provisions were justiciable and whether they violated the Washington Constitution. A superior court found both provisions justiciable but that the supermajority requirement and referendum requirement both violated the Constitution. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed the superior court's holding that one provisions were justiciable, and that justiciable provision, the supermajority requirement, violated Article II, section 22 of the state Constitution. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that the referendum provision was justiciable. Accordingly, the Court made no determination as to its constitutionality. View "League of Educ. Voters v. Washington" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bruce Cedell lost his home in a fire. After hearing nothing from his insurer for several months, the company threatened to deny coverage and issued an ultimatum to Petitioner to accept one quarter of what the trial court eventually found Petitioner's claims to be worth. Petitioner brought suit alleging bad faith. The company resisted disclosing its claims file, among other things, and Petitioner moved to compel production. After a hearing and a review of the claims file in camera, the trial court granted Petitioner's motion. On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals held that the attorney-client privilege applied to a bad faith claim by a first party insured, that the fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege required a showing of actual fraud, and that the trial court erred in reviewing Petitioner's claims file in camera because Petitioner had not made a sufficient prima facie showing of fraud. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial for further proceedings. "In first party insurance claims by insured's claiming bad faith in the handling and processing of claims, other than UIM claims, there is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege. However, the insurer may assert an attorney-client privilege upon a showing in camera that the attorney was providing counsel to the insurer and not engaged in a quasi-fiduciary function. Upon such a showing, the insured may be entitled to pierce the attorney-client privilege. If the civil fraud exception is asserted, the court must engage in a two-step process. First, upon a showing that a reasonable person would have a reasonable belief that an act of bad faith has occurred, the trial court will perform an in camera review of the claimed privileged materials. Second, after in camera review and upon a finding there is a foundation to permit a claim of bad faith to proceed, the attorney-client privilege shall be deemed to be waived. . . . Cedell is entitled to broad discovery, including, presumptively the entire claims file. The insurer may overcome this presumption by showing in camera its attorney was not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating the claim." View "Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash." on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Toledo-Sotelo filed an untimely personal restraint petition but argued that his judgment and sentence recited an incorrect offender score and offense seriousness level. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court used the sentencing range that resulted from the correct offender score and seriousness level. Thus the sentencing court did not exceed its statutory authority and the judgment and sentence was valid on its face. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and dismissed Toledo-Sotelo’s untimely petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Toledo-Sotelo" on Justia Law

John George Cooper was arrested in Washington State in 2009 for attempting to obtain pain-killers with a fake prescription. In October while his case was pending, Cooper jumped bail. According to Cooper, he was summoned to Texas by his father to assist in his grandfather's funeral. While in Texas in 2010, Cooper committed another theft for which he was arrested and convicted. Cooper was sentenced at the same time for two thefts he had previously committed in Texas in 2008. The Texas court deferred those sentences in March 2010. Cooper returned to Washington a few months later and pled guilty to the pain-killer incident as well as bail jumping. The two deferred sentences he had received in Texas were counted as part of his offender score in Washington. Cooper's sole argument on appeal to the Supreme Court was that the Texas deferred sentences were not adjudications of guilt and so should not have counted as convictions for the purpose of calculating his Washington offender score. The trial court and Court of Appeals rejected his argument. The Supreme Court also rejected his argument and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the enforceability of a binding arbitration clause included within a debt adjustment contract. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the motion was untimely and that the binding arbitration clause was unconscionable. Upon review of the trial court record and the clause at issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the clause was unconscionable, which then required the Court to decide whether this conclusion as to the validity of the binding arbitration clause is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Finding no preemption, the Court affirmed. View "Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner James John Chambers Jr. was charged with several crimes arising from three incidents that occurred in 1999. Before committing the November crimes, Petitioner plead guilty to charges resulting from the February and May incidents. Prior to sentencing on these charges, Petitioner entered into an agreement that provided that he would plead guilty to the November crimes and stipulate to a 240 month sentence to run consecutively to the sentences for the February and May crimes. Petitioner was sentenced for the February and May crimes and pled guilty to the November crimes on the same date. He was sentenced for the November crimes at a subsequent hearing. Several years later, Petitioner filed personal restraint petitions (PRPs), seeking to withdraw his plea to the February charges and argued that his sentence on the November charges was incorrectly calculated. The trial court granted his motion to withdraw his February plea but denied his request for resentencing on the November charges. The Court of Appeals consolidated the PRPs and reversed, holding that the pleas were indivisible and declining to consider the validity of the sentence arising from the November crimes. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner entered into a global plea agreement that was indivisible and that he failed to demonstrate that his 240 month sentence was calculated in error. View "Washington v. Chambers" on Justia Law