Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Christopher Smith was apprehended by police on the doorstep of his motel room and charged with rape, assault, harassment, kidnapping and child rape. Prior to trial, the Supreme Court invalidated the practice of random motel registry searches. At Petitioner's suppression hearing, he argued that the evidence gathered against him was the fruit of an unlawful registry search, and therefore should have been suppressed. The trial court allowed the evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The appellate court upheld Petitioner's convictions, concluding that the evidence was admissible under the attenuation and independent source doctrines. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction, holding the evidence was admissible because the warrantless search that led to its discovery was justifiable under the warrant exception for when lives were in danger. View "Washington v. Smith" on Justia Law

An officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation. When it turned out that the driver and his passenger both had suspended drivers' licenses and alternate arrangements could not be made, the officer arranged for a tow truck to move the car. In order to turn the vehicle over to the towing company, the officer conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered methamphetamine during the search. The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine and driving while his license was suspended. He appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence on the ground the search was pretextual. He also argued that because he did not consent to the search, it was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed, finding that under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, law enforcement officers do not have to obtain consent in order to conduct an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle. View "Washington v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2009, Petitioner Lowell Finstad faced at least seven felony charges. After he was convicted by jury on two, he and the State negotiated a global plea agreement on the remaining charges. The agreement resulted in less prison time, and in exchange, Petitioner agreed to dismiss his appeal of the jury convictions. Under the terms of the agreement, the sentences would run concurrently. However, the State indicated that it would ask the judge to run a sentence for delivery of a controlled substance conviction consecutive to the others. From the record, it appeared that neither the State nor Petitioner nor the trial court realized that the last consecutive sentence would constitute an exceptional sentence that required special findings. The judge accepted the pleas without making any special findings. Petitioner did not appeal. Three years later, he filed a personal restraint petition contending he received an exceptional sentence that did not comply with Washington law. The State argued in response to the petition that under the facts of this case, Petitioner was not entitled to relief because he could not show he was prejudiced by the error. The Supreme Court agreed with the State and dismissed Petitioner's petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad" on Justia Law

Abeda Jafar filed an action in superior court to obtain a parenting plan involving her 19-month old son. She also filed a motion under GR 34 to waive all mandatory fees and surcharges on the basis of indigency. The trial court found that Jafar was indigent, but granted her only a partial waiver of the fees and surcharges. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether under GR 34 trial courts had discretion to grant partial waivers of fees and surcharges. The Court held that GR 34 provided a uniform standard for determining whether an individual is indigent, and further required the court to waive all fees and costs for individuals who meet this standard. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the trial court's order with instructions to waive all filing fees and surcharges. View "Jafar v. Webb" on Justia Law

In 2003, members of the Committee Against the VietCong Flag disseminated an e-mail message throughout the Olympia Vietnamese community accusing Duc Tan and the Vietnamese Community of Thurston County (VCTC), a nonprofit corporation, of engaging in procommunist activities. Additionally, defendant Norman Le authored three newsletter articles repeating allegations from the e-mail and also accusing Tan and the VCTC of being undercover Viet Cong agents. Tan and the VCTC sued the authors of the publications for defamation. The trial judge determined that Tan and the VCTC were public figures as a matter of law at summary judgment. The case then proceeded to trial where a jury found Le and his coauthors liable for defamation and awarded Tan and the VCTC $310,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal, finding the statements in the e-mail and newsletters were protected opinion supported by disclosed facts, with the exception of the allegation that members of the VCTC, including Tan, were undercover Viet Cong agents. The court found Tan and the VCTC failed to make the requisite showing that the authors published any of the statements with actual malice. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defamatory statements made by Nonnan Le and the other authors were not protected opinion and therefore actionable. The Court also held that that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the jury's finding of actual malice with respect to those statements. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Tan v. Le" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the public disclosure of Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) grievance hearing decisions pursuant to the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW. SHA hearing decisions contain welfare recipients' personal information; this information is exempt from disclosure under the PRA, but the PRA requires redaction and disclosure of public records insofar as all exempt material can be removed. Applicable federal regulations do not exempt the hearing decisions from disclosure, nor do applicable federal regulations preempt the PRA. Thus, in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly ordered SHA to produce the grievance hearing decisions pursuant to the redaction requirement of the PRA, properly ordered SHA to produce the responsive records in electronic format and to establish necessary policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the PRA, and properly awarded statutory damages. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court and awarded respondent Resident Action Council (RAC) its attorney fees on appeal. View "Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court violated petitioner Brandon Coristine's constitutional rights by offering an affirmative defense instruction over his objection. Petitioner argued that offering the instruction to the jury violated his right to control his defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where a defendant chooses not to argue or invoke an affirmative defense, offering an instruction on the defense over the defendant's objection violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Washington v. Coristine" on Justia Law

In 2010, Mike Siegel moved to intervene and to unseal the court file in the criminal case of "Washington v. Richardson,"(King County Superior Court No. 93-1-02331-2). The court file was originally sealed in 2002. The trial court authorized intervention but denied the motion to unseal. Siegel petitioned the Supreme Court for direct review of the trial court's order denying his motion to unseal. The deputy clerk denied appeal as a matter of right and redesignated the matter as a motion for discretionary review. The Court granted direct discretionary review. Siegel argued that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to unseal because it failed to perform an "Ishikawa" analysis and failed to comply with GR 15; (2) the denial of his motion to unseal is appealable as of right; and (3) he should have been entitled to attorney fees under RAP 18 .1. Because the trial court failed to apply Ishikawa and GR 15( e )(2); and failed to articulate its reasons for continued sealing on the record, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if the records should remain sealed under Ishikawa and GR 15(e)(2). View "Washington v. Richardson" on Justia Law

During its investigation of Ameriquest Mortgage Company's lending practices, the Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AGO) obtained a number of e-mail messages from Ameriquest that Ameriquest employees had created while processing consumer loans. The AGO wanted to disclose redacted versions of a subset of these e-mails to Melissa A. Huelsman, an attorney who has requested the records in accordance with the Public Records Act (PRA). Ameriquest claimed that the Supreme Court decided in the first appeal of this case that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. secs. 6801-6809, and its accompanying regulations, prohibited the disclosure of any e-mails containing nonpublic personal information, even after redaction. Ameriquest also claimed that the e-mails were shielded by the PRA's investigative records exemption, and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which shields materials produced in response to a civil investigative demand (CID). Additionally, Ameriquest claimed it should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery into why the AGO is not invoking the investigative records exemption. The trial court held that the GLBA did not prevent disclosure, that the PRA exemption and CPA shield were inapplicable, and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court in part, holding that the GLBA prevented the AGO from newly redacting and disclosing those e-mails that contained nonpublic personal information, even when the redaction process removed all of the nonpublic personal information. The Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the PRA investigative records exemption and the CPA's shield did not apply and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. View "Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Att'y Gen." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved an exceptional sentence, imposed for a second degree assault conviction, where the jury found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense. Defendant Richard Duncalf was tried on charges of first degree assault and, as an alternative, second degree assault. The jury acquitted on the first degree assault but found defendant guilty of second degree assault. The jury also was instructed on an aggravating factor and found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy second degree assault to support the exceptional sentence imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging whether, under the statute defining second degree assault, a victim's injuries can legally exceed those contemplated by the statutory definition absent a jury finding of "great bodily harm." Defendant also challenged the exceptional circumstances inquiry as being unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed and after its review, finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Duncalf" on Justia Law