Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Seattle appealed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed a $12.75 million verdict in favor of former Seattle fire fighter Mark Jones. Jones was injured when he fell fifteen feet through a station "pole hole." The City argued that the trial court erred by excluding three late-disclosed defense witnesses without first conducting the necessary inquiry under "Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance," (93 3 P .2d. 1036 (1997)) and by denying the City's motion to vacate the judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that though the trial court erred in excluding testimony by the late-disclosed witnesses, the Court agreed with both parties that the error was harmless. Further, the Court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the City's motion to vacate. Therefore the trial court was affirmed. View "Jones v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

Respondent Tamara Frizzell borrowed $100,000 from petitioner Barbara Murray, secured by a deed of trust on Frizzell's home. Frizzell defaulted and a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was set. Before the sale, Frizzell sued Barbara and her husband Gregory Murray, alleging several claims, and filed a motion for an order to enjoin the sale. A judge stayed the sale, unless Frizzell made a payment of $25,000 into the court registry by the following morning. Frizzell failed to make the payment and the sale took place. The trial court then dismissed Frizzell's claims on summary judgment, stating her failure to enjoin the sale resulted in a waiver of her claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, determining it would be inequitable to conclude Frizzell waived her claims. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Frizzell waived her claims as to the foreclosure sale. The Court remanded her other claims to the trial court for consideration under RCW 61.24.127. View "Frizzell v. Murray" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Brown appealed a Court of Appeals holding that venue for this sexual harassment suit was proper in Clark County. Respondents Robin Eubanks and Erin Gray alleged Brown engaged in sexual harassment against then from September 2007 to July 2010 while Brown was a deputy prosecuting attorney in the Klickitat County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Eubanks mistakenly believed that RCW 36.01.050 allowed for venue in any neighboring county, rather than the two nearest judicial districts. Upon realizing it was only the two nearest judicial districts, Eubanks moved to transfer venue to an appropriate county, Clark County Superior Court. Brown responded, claiming that under RCW 4.12.020(2), only Klickitat County Superior Court was an appropriate venue for the claims. However, his response did not request a change of venue to Klickitat County Superior Court or ask the Benton County Superior Court to deny the transfer of venue to Clark County Superior Court. Benton County Superior Court granted the motion to transfer venue to Clark County Superior Court. After the change of venue to Clark County Superior Court, Brown moved for a dismissal or a change of venue to Klickitat County Superior Court based on RCW 4.12.025(1) and RCW 4.12.020(2). He argued that venue was proper in Klickitat County Superior Court because he resided there and, alternatively, because the alleged tortious acts occurred in virtue of his public office and took place there. Clark County Superior Court denied Brown's motion to dismiss or motion to change venue on both grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that RCW 4.12.020(2) required that suits against public officers for acts done "in virtue of his or her office" proceed in the county where the acts occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed venue was proper in Clark County because the Court held that the acts alleged in this complaint were not "in virtue of" Brown's public office under RCW 4.14.020(2). View "Eubanks v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether law enforcement officers must expressly advise a person of his or her right to refuse entry into a home (provide "Ferrier") warnings-when the officers seek to execute an arrest warrant. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that sheriffs deputies unlawfully entered Petitioner Dara Ruem's mobile home in an attempt to execute an arrest warrant for Ruem's brother, Chantha. The deputies lacked probable cause to believe Chantha was present, and Ruem revoked his initial consent to the entry. Thus, the evidence recovered from the search of the home was illegally obtained and unlawfully admitted. The Court held that Ferrier warnings were not required in this instance, though any consent obtained must be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.View "Washington v. Ruem" on Justia Law

After an alternate was substituted for a juror, the trial court told the reconstituted jury that the remaining original jurors should bring the alternate "up to speed" as to what had already occurred and deliberate from there. The defendant claimed error for the first time on appeal because the jury was not instructed to begin deliberations anew. The Court of Appeals concluded the claimed error was a violation of CrR 6.5 that could be raised for the first time on appeal, then reversed the trial court judgment because the rights to jury impartiality and unanimity were violated. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the error was only a rule violation that did not constitute manifest constitutional error that could be raised for the first time under RAP 2.5(a)(3). The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, although for different reasons. "It is unnecessary to address CrR 6.5 because the trial court's affirmative instruction to the reconstituted jury violated the right to a unanimous jury verdict regardless of any violation of CrR 6.5." View "Washington v. Lamar" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the proper assignment of the burden of proof at a pretrial competency hearing following treatment designed to restore competency. The trial court placed the burden on respondent Blayne Coley to prove his incompetence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the burden rested with the State to prove restoration of competency and that the trial court's mistake created structural error. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the relevant statute, interpreted by its language, the context of the provision, the statutory scheme as a whole, and related provisions, placed the burden on the party contesting competency where, after an evaluation ordered under RCW 10.77.060, the individual has been evaluated as competent. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to rule on Coley's requests to proceed prose pending a competency determination, and that Coley's request after he was deemed competent to stand trial, and therefore eligible for self-representation, was equivocal. View "Washington v. Coley" on Justia Law

KOMO-TV news reporter Tracv Vedder made three unsuccessful public records requests to the Seattle Police Department (SPD) relating to "dash-cam" videos taken by SPD officers. The Supreme Court concluded that two of the requests should have been granted. The Court found that the SPD complied with the Public Records Act when it declined Vedder's request for officer log sheets, but failed to comply when it failed to produce a list of retained videos. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Fisher Broadcasting. v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

Appellants James Kumar, Ranveer Singh, Asegedew Gefe, and Abbas Kosymov brought a class action lawsuit against their employer, Gate Gourmet Inc., alleging two common law torts and two violations of Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). The lawsuit stemmed from Gate Gourmet's employee meal policy, which barred employees from bringing in their own food for lunch (for security reasons), leaving only employer-provided food for the employees to eat. According to plaintiffs, the policy forced them to work without food or eat food that violated their religious beliefs. The meals ostensibly consist of one vegetarian and one meat-based main dish. The employees alleged that Gate Gourmet used animal by-products in the "vegetarian" option, and despite switching to turkey for a meat-based option, the company reverted to using a beef/pork mixture in violation of others' religious dietary restrictions. The complaint, therefore, alleged that Gate Gourmet deceived "putative class members [to] unknowingly eat[ing] food forbidden by their beliefs," and that class members "have faced the choice of eating food forbidden by their sincerely held beliefs or not eating. Those that did consume meals, they argued, suffered offensive touching due to their contact with food prohibited by their beliefs, and suffered distress as a result." The trial court granted in full Gate Gourmet's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, finding that the WLAD contained no requirement that employers make reasonable accommodations for their employees' religious practices. The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review and reversed. The Court held that the WLAD created a cause of action for failure to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practices. With regard to plaintiffs' tort claims, the Court found the trial court dismissed them at the pleading stage, and the tort claims went without analysis. "In light of this fact and in light of Washington's relatively liberal standard for stating a cognizable claim," the Court remanded the case back to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of an incident of domestic violence committed by petitioner Edward Olsen against the mother of his children, Bonnie Devenny. Olsen broke into Devenny's house, poured gasoline on her while she was sleeping, and told her that she was going to die. Olsen had a history of threatening and committing acts of domestic violence against Devenny, including a California conviction for terrorist threats for which he pleaded no contest. During the California incident, Olsen allegedly wrapped duct tape around Devenny's legs and told her that he was going to kill her, cut her up into little pieces, and put the pieces in a plastic storage container. The issue this case presented to the Washington Supreme Court was Washington's treatment of foreign convictions for sentencing purposes in light of "Descamps v. United States" (133 S. Ct. 2276) (2013)). Olsen's offender score at sentencing was six and he received an exceptional sentence of 360 months. Olsen claimed that a foreign conviction for terrorist threats was not comparable to Washington's felony harassment and should not have been included in his offender score. The Court of Appeals affirmed Olsen's convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Olsen" on Justia Law

Erick Jordan appealed the Court of Appeals' decision affirming his convictions and sentence for second degree murder with a firearm enhancement and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. At issue was whether differences between self-defense standards in Washington and Texas barred a sentencing court from finding that manslaughter convictions in these states were legally comparable. The Washington Supreme Court held they did not and affirmed the lower court. View "Washington v. Jordan" on Justia Law