Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Alvin Witherspoon appealed his conviction and life sentence for second degree robbery. Because the robbery conviction was his third "most serious offense," he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Witherspoon: challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to convict him; argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and that his persistent offender sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Witherspoon" on Justia Law

"TC" took a loaded gun from the home where his mother lived with her boyfriend, Douglas Bauer. The gun belonged to Bauer. TC brought that loaded gun to school in his backpack a few days after he stole it. The gun discharged as TC was rummaging in his pack at the end of the day. The bullet struck one of TC's classmates, and it seriously injured her. The State charged Bauer with assault in the third degree, alleging that he, "[w]ith criminal negligence, cause[d] bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm." Before trial, Bauer moved to dismiss, arguing that the facts did not support a third degree assault charge as a matter of law. The State argued that the statutory phrase "causes bodily harm" reached Bauer's conduct as a primary "cause" of the harm to TC's classmate. The trial court agreed with the State and denied the motion to dismiss but then certified the matter to the Court of Appeals. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. The Supreme Court agreed with Bauer, however: "Although causation in fact is the same in criminal and civil cases, legal causation is not. Our case law suggests that legal causation does not extend as far in criminal cases as it does in tort cases, and even our civil cases do not extend liability as far as the State seeks to do in this case. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals." View "Washington v. Bauer" on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Villanueva-Gonzalez was convicted of second degree assault and fourth degree assault for attacking his girl friend. On appeal, he contended that his actions constituted one assault, and therefore two convictions violated double jeopardy. Finding that the legislature has not provided a definition of assault and the common law definition was ambiguous, the Washington Supreme Court was "guided by the many other jurisdictions that have treated assault as a course of conduct crime," and was "mindful of the 'rule of lenity,'" which required the Court to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the defendant. It therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Villanueva-Gonzalez's two assault convictions violated double jeopardy because the underlying acts occurred during the same course of conduct. View "Washington v. Villanueva-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Johnson was arrested and convicted for driving on a suspended license (in the third degree). His license had been suspended for failing to pay a traffic fine. Johnson appealed his DWLS 3rd conviction, arguing: (1) the former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) (2008) did not proscribe his continuing to drive after the suspension of his license for failing to pay a traffic fine; or alternatively, (2) that because he was indigent, the suspension was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses, which required the State to inquire into his ability to pay the fine before suspending his license. Furthermore, Johnson argued the trial court erred by denying him counsel to fight these charges, and wanted reimbursement for attorney fees spent in his defense. The Supreme Court rejected Johnson's arguments on appeal, but remanded the case for further proceedings to determine Johnson's right to reimbursement for attorney fees. The plain meaning of former RCW 46.20.342(1 )( c )(iv) allows the State to convict a driver for DWLS 3rd where the underlying license suspension occurred for failure to pay a fine. Johnson was not constitutionally indigent, but statutorily so; on remand, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to enter an order designating Johnson either as (1) indigent or (2) indigent and able to contribute. If Johnson is able to contribute, the district court would have to enter an order determining the costs he should bear for his appeal. View "Washington v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the permissible scope of these protective frisks. An officer stopped Tanner Russell for violating several minor traffic laws. The officer recognized Russell from a previous encounter where Russell had told officers he was not armed, when in fact he had a small gun in his pocket. Fearing for his safety, the officer frisked Russell for weapons and felt a small box in Russell's pants pocket. The officer removed the box, opened it, and found a syringe filled with methamphetamine. The State charged Russell with possession of a controlled substance; the syringe was the only evidence against him. Russell moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was unlawful, and the trial court granted his motion and dismissed the case. The trial court found that although the initial stop was justified, the frisk was not because the stop occurred in a well-lit area and Russell did not verbally threaten the officer, nor did he make any threatening gestures or movements. The court also found that even if the frisk was justified, the search of the container was not because it posed no threat once it was in the control of the officer. The Supreme Court held that the initial protective frisk was justified to protect officer safety, but the warrantless search of the container was not because it exceeded the permissible scope of a protective frisk. View "Washington v. Russell" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sione Lui was charged with second degree murder. This case presented the issue of when the confrontation clause requires testimony from laboratory analysts who conduct tests on evidence. DNA test results were admitted into evidence at Petitioner's trial, and he challenged that admission as violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that based on the trial court record, there was no violation of Petitioner's rights under the confrontation clause when DNA test results and temperature readings taken from the victim's body were admitted. However, Petitioner's confrontation rights were violated by the admission of the victim's postmortem toxicology results and several statements from the autopsy report. The Court deemed those admissions harmless. View "Washington v. Lui" on Justia Law

William France was convicted of five counts of felony harassment and one count of witness intimidation for making multiple harassing calls to his former attorneys. The jury was instructed consistent with the pattern jury instructions on witness intimidation. There was no evidence presented that France, who was in jail when he made the calls, intended immediately to use force against any person present at the time of the charged conduct. France contended under the law of the case doctrine, his felony harassment convictions should have been dismissed. The State argued that the instructions, taken as a whole, accurately informed the jury of the elements of felony harassment and that it presented sufficient evidence to sustain France's convictions. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and affirmed the trial court. View "Washington v. France" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the proper scope of the effective law enforcement exemption of the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW. The Seattle Police Department (SPD) used this exemption to justify withholding documents regarding the investigation of an altercation between petitioner Evan Sargent and an SPD officer. Sargent raised several challenges to the Court of Appeals decision which held that the exemption applied categorically to an investigation file where the prosecutor has declined to file charges and has referred the case back to the SPD for follow-up investigation and to information contained in an internal investigation file. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the exemption does not apply categorically to the requested criminal investigation information or to the requested internal investigation information. Further, although the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the exemption does not apply categorically to witness identification, it held that remand on this issue was not warranted. The Court also agreed with the Court of Appeals that the SPD properly withheld Sargent's nonconviction information under the Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act (CRPA), and that the Court of Appeals correctly remanded for reconsideration of penalties. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the appropriate penalty. View "Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep't" on Justia Law

The State brought a paternity action in 2008 to establish the parentage of C.M.F. Respondent Jonathan Fairfax was adjudicated C.M.F.'s father. Petitioner Amanda Simpson was designated custodian. Fairfax petitioned the family court to establish a parenting plan for C.M.F. Trial began on two years later. After Mr. Fairfax completed his case, Simpson moved the court to dismiss the petition under CR 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Fairfax had filed the wrong petition and failed to establish that there was adequate cause to hold a modification hearing. The court denied the motion, finding that the parentage order was not a custody decree and that Simpson's motion was untimely. Simpson presented her case, and the court created a final parenting plan that had C.M.F. residing with Fairfax for the majority of the time and designated Fairfax the "custodian of the child solely for purposes of all other state and federal statutes…" Simpson appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Because the superior court previously entered a parentage order that qualified as a custody decree, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Parentage of C.M.F." on Justia Law

In 2010, two Fare Enforcement Officers entered a train car at the Rainier Beach station and instructed all passengers to present proof of fare. When FEO Willet asked fifteen-year-old K.L.B. and his two companions to present proof of fare payment, they gave him their bus transfers. FEO Willet informed them that while bus transfers used to be valid on the light-rail, they were no longer accepted. The three young males were instructed by FEO Willet to exit the train at the next station. The FEOs asked the three males for identification once they exited the train. All three were either unable or unwilling to provide identification. K.L.B. was temporarily detained at the Othello station. The King County Sheriff's Office was called to assist in identifying K.L.B. and his companions so they could potentially be cited for fare evasion. Deputy Adams then asked K.L.B. to identify one of his male companions. He responded that he did not know his companion's full name and that he: knew him only as '"Marty."' Deputy Adams returned to the station and used a computer database to identify "Marty." There was an assault warrant out for "Marty's" arrest. K.L.B. was charged with two counts of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant under RCW 9A.76. 175. K.L.B. was found guilty of making a false statement to FEO Willet (count II). He was found not guilty of making a false statement to Deputy Adams (count I). K.L.B. appealed to Division One of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction. K.L.B. argued that a Sound Transit FEO was not a "public servant" as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(23). He also argued that the definition of "public servant" was unconstitutionally vague and that to convict a person of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant, the State must prove that the defendant knew the statement was made to a public servant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that under the statute, FEO Willet was a public servant at the time K.L.B. made the false statement. The Supreme Court held that under these circumstances, because FEOs are not government employees, are not officers of government, and do not perform a governmental function, they are not "public servants" as defined by the statute. View "Washington v. K.L.B." on Justia Law