Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Sonia Graciano was injured after she was hit by a car driven by Saul Ayala. Ayala was insured by defendant California Automobile Insurance Company (CAIC). Three weeks after Graciano's attorney first contacted CAIC regarding the accident, Graciano misidentified both the driver and the applicable insurance policy. CAIC investigated the accident, identified the applicable policy and the correct driver, and offered to settle Graciano's claim with a "full policy limits offer." Graciano did not accept CAIC's full policy limits offer and, in this suit, alleged CAIC and its parent and affiliated companies acted in bad faith, based on an alleged "wrongful failure to settle." Graciano argued CAIC could have and should have earlier discovered the facts, and should have made the full policy limits offer more quickly. The jury found in favor of Graciano and this appeal followed. CAIC argued that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence to support the verdict that CAIC acted in bad faith by unreasonably failing to settle Graciano's claim against Saul. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the judgment. View "Washington v. Graham" on Justia Law

On methamphetamine, petitioner Jason Graham went on a shooting spree. He used an AK-47 to fire at six different police officers during a foot chase through downtown Spokane. He was eventually convicted by jury of 10 offenses, including "6 serious violent offenses" for sentencing purposes. He received an aggregate sentence of 1,225 months. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, but the Supreme Court granted review to reconsider the firearm enhancements under the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in light of "Washington v. Williams-Walker," (225 P.3d 913 (2010)). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a sentencing court could impose an exceptional sentence downward if the judge found the multiple offense policy resulted in a presumptive sentence that was clearly excessive. Reading the plain language of the SRA, the Supreme Court concluded the sentencing court has such discretion. View "Washington v. Berg" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether it violates due process to assign a defendant the burden of proving consent as a defense to a charge of rape by forcible compulsion. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court found W.R. committed rape in the second degree. The event in question was a sexual encounter between W.R. and J.P. that occurred while J.P. was visiting her aunt, who resided with W.R. and his sister. Both W.R. and J.P. were minors at the time. Throughout the police investigation, W.R. consistently denied ever having sexual intercourse with J.P. Shortly before trial, he admitted that they had engaged in sexual intercourse, but defended it as consensual. The court did not find W.R.'s and his sister's testimony to be credible, noting W.R.'s evasive responses to questions and inconsistent story, and his sister's uncorroborated story and "cavalier demeanor" at trial. The court found J.F.'s testimony to be credible, and concluded W.R. committed rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion. The court explained that the State had proved rape in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt and that W.R. had failed to prove the defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence. W.R. appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in allocating to him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was consensual. The Washington Supreme Court held in "Washington v. Camara," (and reaffirmed in Washington v. Gregory," that notwithstanding the "conceptual overlap" between consent and forcible compulsion, the defendant may be tasked with proving consent by a preponderance of the evidence. More recently than Camara and Gregory, the Court was asked to consider this issue again, but declined to reach it, instead resolving the case on Sixth Amendment grounds. Three justices would have reached the issue and overruled Camara and Gregory. With this case, the Supreme Court embraced that approach and rejected the due process precedent set in Camara and Gregory as both incorrect and harmful. The Court reversed W .R.'s conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. W.R." on Justia Law

In 2010, Christian Williams stole several items from the home of his childhood friend and former housemate, Bo Larsen. When Larsen confronted Williams about the stolen items, Williams admitted his involvement and returned most items, though some had already been used as collateral for a pawn shop loan. A jury convicted Williams of residential burglary and trafficking in stolen property in the first degree. At issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether sentencing courts have discretion to count prior convictions separately under the burglary antimerger statute notwithstanding a finding that they encompass the same criminal conduct under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). The Court of Appeals held they do not. Agreeing with the appellate court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Williams" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant with second and third degree assault, as well as first degree unlawful possession of a firearm based on multiple juvenile convictions for robbery that rendered him ineligible to possess a firearm. On the first day of trial, the parties informed the court that they had agreed to stipulate that defendant had been convicted of a "serious offense." Defense counsel indicated he did not want the jury to hear about the underlying convictions but informed the court that defendant disagreed with the stipulation. Both the defense attorney and the trial judge discussed the matter and agreed that stipulating to an element was a tactical decision that did not require the defendant's consent. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an attorney can stipulate to an element of a charged crime over his client's express objection and whether, in this case, any error was waived by defendant. An ancillary issues was whether defense counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals, in a two to one opinion, affirmed the defendant's convictions for assault in the second degree with a firearm enhancement and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed as to the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction and affirmed as to the assault conviction. View "Washington v. Humphries" on Justia Law

In 2009, Kristine Failla, a Washington resident and experienced salesperson, was looking for a job she could perform from her Gig Harbor home. She e-mailed Kenneth Schutz looking for such a position. Schutz was the founder and chief executive officer (CEO) of FixtureOne Corporation, which sells fixtures, casework, and displays for use in retail stores. Both FixtureOne and Schutz are based in Pennsylvania, and at the time of Failla's email, FixtureOne had no physical presence or customers in Washington. FixtureOne hired Failla as an account executive. In December 2010, Failla requested a promotion and a raise. Schutz agreed and promoted her to FixtureOne's vice president of sales, increased her yearly salary. Although there were outstanding commissions owed, Failla accepted the promotion and salary increase based on the assurances that the commissions would be paid. Schutz provided a draft employment agreement for Failla to sign in connection with the promotion. Among other things, the agreement contained a provision that it would be interpreted in accordance with Pennsylvania law. Failla proposed revisions to the agreement, but for reasons unknown neither Failla nor Schutz ever signed it. Failla continued working for FixtureOne from her Washington home until May 2011. She received regular paychecks, and the only issue in this case was the sales commissions owed to her that were not paid. In May 2011, Schutz emailed Failla to tell her that FixtureOne was "clos[ing] its doors" and ended her employment the following day. He assured Failla that FixtureOne would "pay your commissions and expenses asap in the next several weeks." For two months following her termination, Schutz returned Failla's requests for payment with various explanations as to why the commissions remained unpaid. Schutz eventually advised Failla that she would not receive a commission check and for the first time disputed whether such commissions were even owed. Failla filed suit against FixtureOne and Schutz for the wilfull withholding of wages, including an allegation that Schutz was individually liable under Washington's wage laws. Failla served Schutz in Pennsylvania but was unable to serve FixtureOne. Consequently the suit proceeded against Schutz alone. Failla and Schutz cross moved for summary judgment. Schutz argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because he did not have the requisite minimum contacts with the state, and even if Washington could exercise jurisdiction over him, there were genuine issues of material fact preventing the entry of summary judgment. The trial court concluded it had personal jurisdiction and denied Schutz's summary judgment motion. The court granted summary judgment to Failla, awarding double damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Washington's long-arm statute did not reach Schutz because the employment relationship between Failla and FixtureOne was inadequate to confer jurisdiction over Schutz. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, and reversed. View "Failla v. FixtureOne Corp." on Justia Law

While petitioner Mario Medina was awaiting retrial on charges of second degree murder, he was ordered to participate in two King County Community Center for Alternative Programs (CCAP): "CCAP Enhanced" and "CCAP Basic." Petitioner participated in these programs for approximately five years before his second trial resulted in a conviction. He argued that he was entitled, as a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, to credit for time served in the alternative programs. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Medina" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the "vested rights doctrine" applied to permit applications filed under plans and regulations that were later found to be noncompliant with the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). In 2006, BSRE Point Wells LP asked Snohomish County to amend its comprehensive plan and zoning regulations to allow for a mixed use/urban center designation and redevelopment of the Point Wells site. BSRE wanted to redevelop the property by adding over 3,000 housing units and over 100,000 square feet of commercial and retail space. The petitioners, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach Inc., opposed the project. They argued that the area lacked the infrastructure needed to support an urban center, namely sufficient roads and public transit. These nearby communities did not want to "bear the burden of providing urban services to the site." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the vested rights doctrine did apply to the permit applications filed in this case: local land use plans and development regulations enacted under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, are presumed valid upon adoption. Should a valid plan or regulation later be found to violate SEPA, the exclusive remedies provided by the GMA affect only future applications for development-not development rights that have already vested. In this case, BSRE Point Wells LP (BSRE) submitted complete applications for development permits before the local land use ordinances were found to be noncompliant with SEPA. BSRE's rights vested when it submitted its applications. A later finding of noncompliance did not affect BSRE's already vested rights. View "Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Ronald Mendes was "compelled" to waive his constitutional right not to testify as a witness in his own criminal case after the trial court refused to rule on whether the evidence presented during the State's case in chief entitled Mendes to a self-defense instruction. Mendes challenged his conviction for felony murder based on allegations that he shot and killed Danny Saylor after an altercation at Saylor's home. At trial, Mendes's theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense after Saylor came at him with a baseball bat. After the State rested, Mendes's counsel asked the court to make a preliminary ruling on whether enough evidence had been presented through the State's witnesses to warrant a self-defense instruction. The State objected, and the trial court declined to rule on Mendes's request. Mendes then testified on his own behalf. Mendes was convicted of felony murder. On appeal, Mendes argued that the trial court improperly compelled him to testify when it declined to rule on whether the State's evidence alone entitled him to a self-defense instruction. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held that Mendes was not entitled to an advisory ruling on jury instructions before the close of all the evidence and that Mendes's decision to testify was voluntary and tactical. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Washington v. Mendes" on Justia Law

Robert Kinnaman pleaded guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. He also agreed to a special finding that supported a sentence enhancement. At sentencing Kinnaman moved to withdraw his agreement to the sentencing enhancement only. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Kinnaman. The Court of Appeals found the plea involuntary and indivisible and reversed, remanding the matter to the trial court for vacation of the entire plea. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's holding that the entire plea should be vacated; neither party sought that result. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order denying Kinnaman's motion to withdraw his agreement to the special finding. View "Washington v. Kinnaman" on Justia Law