Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Frederick Hardtke was charged with two counts of second degree rape, one count of second degree assault, two counts of fourth degree assault, and malicious mischief. All were alleged to be acts of domestic violence that took place while Hardtke claimed he was blacked out from alcohol abuse. At his arraignment, the trial court imposed conditions of release, including that Hardtke not consume alcohol, pay a performance bond, and wear an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet while awaiting trial. Hardtke objected multiple times to paying for the cost of the bracelet, but he wore the bracelet as a condition of his release. Hardtke eventually pleaded guilty to amended charges, and as part of his sentence he was ordered to reimburse the county for the cost of the alcohol monitoring. He appealed, challenging only the imposition of this cost. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, the costs for an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet fit under the statutory meaning of "pretrial supervision." Because the trial court imposed nearly $4,000 in monitoring costs, the reversed and remanded for imposition of costs consistent with the statute. View "Washington v. Hardtke" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Barry appealed his conviction on two counts of child molestation, claiming that the trial court's instruction in response to a jury question violated his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The jury asked the court whether it may consider "observations of the defendant's actions-demeanor during the court case" as "evidence." In response, the trial court instructed the jury that "[e]vidence includes what you witness in the courtroom." All parties agreed that the record contains no references whatsoever to Barry's in-court demeanor and so the Supreme Court had no way of determining what aspects of Barry's "demeanor" drew the jury's attention and whether the jury's observations were favorable or unfavorable to Barry. Therefore, after review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's instruction did not amount to constitutional error. The Court instead applied the nonconstitutional error standard and affirmed. View "Washington v. Barry" on Justia Law

The State charged Christopher Maynard in juvenile court with six counts of malicious mischief. Less than one month later, he turned 18 years old. Maynard's counsel did not move for an order to extend the court's statutory jurisdiction before Maynard turned 18. As a result, the juvenile court ruled that it had lost jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The State then filed the case in superior court. Maynard moved to dismiss, arguing that preaccusatorial delay and ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of the benefits of juvenile court jurisdiction, including the opportunity to accept a plea offer from the State. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ineffective assistance of counsel, not preaccusatorial delay, caused the loss of jurisdiction. The court, however, determined that remand to adult trial court for a new trial was the proper remedy. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Maynard received ineffective assistance of counsel which then deprived him the benefit of the opportunity to accept a plea deal. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' order with regard to remanding of the case to the adult trial court and instead, directed the State to reoffer the plea proposal of deferred disposition consistent with the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW. View "Washington v. Maynard" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to the constitutionality of the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP statute). Anti-SLAPP statutes punish those who file lawsuits (labeled strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPPs) that abuse the judicial process in order to silence an individual's free expression or petitioning activity. Plaintiffs and supporting amici curiae contended the anti-SLAPP statute's burden of proof, stay of discovery, and statutory penalties are unconstitutional on several grounds. They contended some or all of these provisions violated the right of trial by jury under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution; the Washington separation of powers doctrine under "Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, PS"(216 P.3d 374 (2009)); the Washington right of access to courts under Putman; the petition clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the vagueness doctrine under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the anti-SLAPP statute violated the right of trial by jury, but did not resolve how these other constitutional limits may have applied to the anti-SLAPP statute's provisions: "The legislature may enact anti-SLAPP laws to prevent vexatious litigants from abusing the judicial process by filing frivolous lawsuits for improper purposes. But the constitutional conundrum that RCW 4.24.525 creates is that it seeks to protect one group of citizen's constitutional rights of expression and petition-by cutting off another group's constitutional rights of petition and jury trial. This the legislature cannot do." View "Davis v. Cox" on Justia Law

The issue common to these consolidated cases centered on whether the totality of circumstances in each case provided law enforcement with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a Terry stop. Both cases involved the stop of a defendant after the defendant entered a high-crime apartment complex and visited an apartment occupied by a suspected drug dealer. However, other circumstances distinguished the cases and lead to different results. Because the circumstances included a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the Supreme Court affirmed in "Washington v. Fuentes." Finding that there were insufficient facts to give rise to an individualized suspicion, the Court reversed in "Washington v. Sandoz." View "Washington v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Glasmann asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the holdings of "Washington v. Daniels," (156 P.3d 905 (2007) (Daniels I), adhered to on recons., 200 P .3d 711 (2009) (Daniels II)). The Daniels case law established that if (1) the State charges a person with greater and lesser offenses and the jury is unable to agree regarding the greater offense but finds the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and (2) the defendant's conviction for the lesser offense is reversed on appeal, then the State may retry the defendant for the greater offense without violating double jeopardy. Glasmann asked the Washington Court to reconsider the Daniels decision in light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' approach to the subject. "We will overturn our precedent only when someone shows that it is incorrect and harmful. Since Glasmann has not made that showing regarding the Daniels decisions, we see no reason to overturn them." View "Washington v. Glasmann" on Justia Law

Ryan Peeler was serving a prison sentence on a Snohomish County charge at the Washington Corrections Center (WCC) when he requested a final disposition of an untried charge in Skagit County. By the time that the Skagit County prosecutor received Peeler's final disposition request, however, the Department of Corrections (DOC) had transported him to the King County jail to await trial on unrelated charges. Peeler was not returned to WCC until well after the Skagit County prosecutor received his request. The State failed to bring Peeler to trial in Skagit County within 120 days of receiving his final disposition request. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that even though Peeler was physically located in King County when the State received his final disposition request, his request was valid and the State failed to meet the 120-day deadline to bring him to trial in Skagit County. View "Washington v. Peeler" on Justia Law

As applied to Washington, the holding in "Padilla v. Kentucky," (559 U.S. 356 (2010) was an affirmation of the duty to provide effective assistance of counsel, which included the duty to reasonably research and apply relevant statutes. However, language in certain Washington appellate cases made it appear that this rule did not apply to RCW 10.40.200. "Padilla" superseded those cases, significantly changing state law. Muhammadou Jagana raised a claim that would have been rejected before "Padilla" based on those superseded appellate cases. The Washington Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Jagana's personal restraint petition (PRP) and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. However, Yung-Cheng Tsai's claim was available before "Padilla," and Tsai did in fact raise his claim with the assistance of an attorney in 2008. That motion was denied based on an issue of law not affected by Padilla, and Tsai did not appeal. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Tsai's PRP. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai" on Justia Law

William Reis was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance after a search of his home produced evidence of a marijuana grow operation. Reis moved to suppress the results of the search on the ground that the search warrant was invalid, arguing that the 2011 amendments to the Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA) decriminalized the possession of cannabis for medical use. The trial court denied Reis's motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals granted discretionary review and affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the plain language of MUCA, supported by the context in which the language appeared, the overall statutory scheme, and the legislative intent as captured in the governor's veto message, did not support the conclusion that the medical use of marijuana was not a crime. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for trial. View "Washington v. Reis" on Justia Law

Toby Erhart's judgment and sentence on multiple counts of first degree child rape and incest became final on direct appeal in 2008. During Erhart's trial, the court interviewed several prospective jurors privately in chambers without first conducting the courtroom closure analysis required by "Washington v. Bone-Club." The jury found Erhart guilty of multiple sex offenses, and the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence. Erhart did not raise a public trial issue on direct appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but reversed the exceptional sentence and remanded for resentencing. In 2010 Erhart filed a personal restraint petition challenging his convictions, arguing for the first time that his constitutional right to a public trial was violated. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review. Finding that Erhart filed his personal restraint petition more than one year after his judgment and sentence became final, the petition was indeed untimely, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Erhart" on Justia Law