Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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This case concerned an untimely personal restraint petition that petitioner Jonathan Pitchlynn alleged was exempt from the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100(5) because the judgment and sentence was imposed in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court ordered a reference hearing to resolve a material factual dispute. Based on the factual findings, the Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, the Court dismissed petitioner’s personal restraint petition as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn" on Justia Law

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Petitioner James Hinton was 17 when he was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He received a 37-year standard range adult sentence. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Hinton argued he was less culpable than an adult when he committed those crimes, so his standard range adult sentence was a disproportionate punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hinton sought collateral relief in the form of a resentencing hearing so he could prove that his lesser culpability entitled him to a lesser sentence. The State argued RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP under RAP 16.4(d). To this, the Washington Supreme Court agreed: RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP because it eliminated the constitutional error that Hinton identified in his original sentence. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton" on Justia Law

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This case concerned the adequacy of the Washington early release statute, RCW 9.94A.730, as a remedy to petitioner Erik Carrasco’s alleged unconstitutional sentence for a crime he committed as a juvenile. Carrasco was serving a 93-year sentence imposed without any consideration of his youth. Carrasco was 17 years old and a member of “La Raza,” a Norteño gang in Yakima; he was ultimately convicted of second degree murder, four counts of first degree assault, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He would be eligible to petition for early release under RCW 9.94A.730 after serving 20 years of his sentence. Because Washington v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) was controlling, the Washington Supreme Court concluded Carrasco had an adequate remedy under the statute. The judgment dismissing his personal restraint petition was affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrasco" on Justia Law

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The State of Washington brought multiple claims alleging that TVI Inc., doing business as Value Village, used deceptive advertising and marketing in violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), ch. 19.86 RCW. TVI operated about 20 for-profit thrift stores in Washington under the name Value Village. Approximately 93 percent of Value Village’s retail inventory consisted of used goods donated by the community. To source these community donations, TVI contracted with third-party nonprofit organizations, which TVI called its “‘charity partners.’” By working with charity partners, TVI obtained inventory at a lower price than it would pay a for-profit supplier. The charity partners, in turn, received a predictable source of unrestricted funding, as well as publicity from TVI’s marketing. In 2013, the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General’s (AG’s) Office received a complaint from a Washington resident that TVI’s marketing gives the false impression that Value Village is a nonprofit. The AG wrote to TVI in November 2014, instructing it to register as a commercial fundraiser pursuant to the CSA. The AG’s November 2014 letter raised additional concerns that TVI’s “solicitations for charitable contributions and advertisements for its retail stores” were “misleading or deceptive” in violation of the CPA. By the summer of 2015, TVI had posted signs in its stores disclosing its status as a for-profit commercial fundraiser in its stores. Following three years of investigation, the State filed this lawsuit. TVI argued the State's claims infringed on its First Amendment right to solicit charitable contributions on behalf of nonprofit organizations. The Supreme Court agreed with TVI, and remanded this case to the trial court for dismissal of the State’s claims. View "Washington v. TVI, Inc." on Justia Law

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When J.W.M. was 17½ years old, he pointed what he thought was an unloaded gun at his friend W.B. and pulled the trigger. The gun was loaded, it discharged, W.B. died two days later. The State charged J.W.M. with first degree manslaughter while being armed with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm (UPFA). Because first degree manslaughter was a serious violent offense subject to the Washington “auto-decline” statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A), J.W.M. was tried in adult court, and a jury found him guilty of second-degree manslaughter, a lesser included offense. The trial court found him guilty of UPFA in a bifurcated bench trial. With neither offense being an auto-decline offense, J.W.M. was not sentenced in adult court but instead proceeded to a juvenile disposition hearing. More than two weeks before the disposition hearing, for the first time the State recommended a manifest injustice disposition. The juvenile court imposed the maximum possible manifest injustice upward disposition: confinement until age 25. J.W.M. challenged his disposition on several grounds, including that the juvenile court’s primary reason for imposing the disposition was J.W.M.’s need for treatment and services was an invalid basis under our decision in State v. B.O.J., 449 P.3d 1006 (2019). The Washington Supreme Court agreed a new disposition hearing was required, as a manifest injustice disposition was not justified by a juvenile offender’s need for services. View "Washington v. J.W.M." on Justia Law

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Six months after United States and global health authorities declared COVID-19 a public health emergency, the city of Seattle (City) passed an ordinance (Seattle Ordinance 126094) authorizing hazard pay for certain workers who delivered food to consumers’ homes. By that time, Governor Inslee had issued stay-at-home orders requiring Washingtonians to leave home only for the most essential of trips. Among some of the conditions in the ordinance were that food delivery network companies could not reduce workers’ compensation or otherwise limit their earning capacity as a result of the ordinance, and they were prohibited from reducing the areas of the City they served or to pass on the cost of the premium pay to customers’ charges for groceries. The Washington Food Industry Association and Maplebear Inc., d/b/a Instacart, challenged the ordinance, seeking a declaration invalidating the ordinance on statutory and state and federal constitutional grounds. The trial court dismissed the statutory claim under chapter 82.84 RCW but permitted all remaining claims to proceed. After review of the limited record, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) affirming dismissal of the 82.84 RCW claim; (2) reversing dismissal of the equal protection claim; and (3) reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the privileges and immunities claim. The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wash. Food Indus. Ass'n v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

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"became overwhelmed" and punched himself in the face. After several jurors expressed concern, the trial court questioned juror 9 and two other jurors before dismissing juror 9 for cause. The reconstituted jury found Norman guilty of one of two counts. The Court of Appeals reversed Norman’s conviction, holding juror 9’s dismissal was improper under the heightened evidentiary standard set forth in Washington v. Elmore, 123 P.3d 72 (2005). The Washington Supreme Court found the Elmore standard applied only where a juror was accused of nullification, refusing to follow the law, or refusing to deliberate. As there was no such accusation here, and the trial court found juror 9’s conduct likely affected the jury’s process of deliberating freely, it did not abuse its discretion in dismissing juror 9. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed Norman’s conviction. View "Washington v. Norman" on Justia Law

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Petitioners Robert Ayerst and Justin Lewis were represented at their criminal trials by Robert Van Idour. Though a licensed attorney in Idaho, Van Idour was never admitted to practice in Washington. Accordingly, Van Idour was not authorized to practice law when he represented the petitioners, along with 100 other indigent defendants in Asotin County. Th Washington Supreme Court found Van Idour’s failure to gain admittance to the Washington bar was not just shockingly unprofessional, it was "unethical and indefensible." The issue presented here was whether a lawyer who is licensed in Idaho but not in Washington was nevertheless a lawyer for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ayerst and Lewis contended this failure resulted in a complete denial of counsel, which constituted structural error and demanded reversal of their convictions. While the Washington Supreme Court agreed Van Idour’s actions violated state licensure rules, it disagreed that they amounted to a constitutional denial of counsel. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ denial of Ayerst’s and Lewis’s personal restraint petitions. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Lewis" on Justia Law

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Tyler Bagby was convicted of residential burglary, fourth degree assault, and harassment. At his trial, the prosecutor repeatedly asked witnesses to identify Bagby by his “nationality.” All the witnesses responded by identifying Bagby as either Black or African-American. Bagby was born in the United States; he was an American citizen; and his race, ethnicity, and identity were not at issue in this case. The Washington Supreme Court granted review to address whether the prosecutor’s repeated use of the word “nationality,” among other statements, to distinguish a defendant from other witnesses evoked racial bias in a manner that constituted prosecutorial misconduct and prejudiced the trial. The Court held that it did. "Because the race-based misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that a timely objection and jury instruction could not have cured resulting prejudice, the errors are per se prejudicial, warranting reversal." View "Washington v. Bagby" on Justia Law

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Brandon Ducharme appealed a trial court’s finding that the four charges in his recall petition against Washington Governor Jay Inslee were factually and legally insufficient. Ducharme's allegations against the governor fell into two general groups: (1) charges alleging the misuse of vetoes to legislation that occurred in 2019; (2) allegations relating to the governor’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Washington state. After granting Ducharme’s motion for accelerated review, the Washington Supreme Court issued an order affirming the trial court’s ruling. The Court explained that Ducharme did not show that Governor Inslee intended to violate the law in connection with any of the recall charges. Furthermore, the petition failed to demonstrate that the governor acted in a manner that was manifestly unreasonable or unjustified when the actions were taken. Therefore, charges one, two, three, and four were factually and legally insufficient. View "In re Recall of Inslee" on Justia Law