Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mark Besola and Jeffrey Swenson lived together in Besola's house. After a friend of Swenson's, Kellie Westfall, was arrested, she told police that she had seen drugs and child pornography at Besola' s house. Besola was a veterinarian, and Westfall said that he provided prescription drugs from his veterinary clinic to Swenson, who was a drug addict. Based on the information provided by Westfall, a judge issued a search warrant for illegal drugs but declined to issue a search warrant related to child pornography at that time. At the scene, police saw CDs (compact disks) and DVDs (digital video disks) with handwritten titles that implied that they contained child pornography. On the basis of this observation, police requested and obtained an addendum to the search warrant. The language of that amended warrant (and whether it was sufficiently particular) is at the heart of the legal issue in this case. The Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that the warrant in “Washington v. Perrone,” 834 P.2d 611 (1992)) failed to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, in part because it provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess, such as adult pornography. That holding was binding in this case, where the warrant similarly provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess. The State argued that the warrant in this case was saved by a citation to the child pornography statute at the top of the warrant. The Supreme Court held that the State was incorrect because the statutory citation did not modify or limit the items listed in the warrant, so it did not save the warrant from being overbroad. “More importantly, the State's position conflicts with our reasoning in Perrone and would hinder the goals of the warrant particularity requirement.” Because the warrant failed to meet the Constitution's p View "Washington v. Besola" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mathew Moi was tried for the murder of Keith McGowan and for unlawful possession of the gun that killed McGowan. No physical evidence tied Moi to the gun, and perhaps because of that, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. Based on the same evidence, Moi was acquitted of unlawful possession of the gun. On its second tryMoi was convicted of murder. In the second trial, the State still argued that McGowan was killed with the gun Moi was acquitted of possessing. The State conceded that the same issue of ultimate fact was decided in both trials but argued it would be unjust to apply double jeopardy against it because it was surprised by Moi' s testimony in the first trial that someone else shot McGowan and because Moi had moved to sever the two charges. Given the State's concession, the Supreme Court granted Moi’s personal restraint petition. Moi met his burden of showing actual and substantial prejudice following from having “be[en] twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Moi" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a deputy sheriff inadequately advised the defendant of his Miranda rights when he initially told the defendant that a lawyer would be appointed for him prior to questioning if he could not afford one but also said that no lawyer would be appointed for him unless he was arrested, jailed, and taken to court. The deputy did not clarify that the defendant was not obligated to respond to questions until he had the opportunity to confer with a lawyer. The Supreme Court held that although this Miranda advisement was contradictory and confusing and thus violated the defendant's Miranda rights, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and sustained defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Mayer" on Justia Law

Rolando Reyes was committed to the custody of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) following a determination that he was a sexually violent predator (SVP). On appeal, Reyes requested a new SVP commitment hearing, arguing that the trial court committed structural error by closing a pretrial hearing in violation of article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. The Court of Appeals rejected Reyes' argument and affirmed his commitment. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a trial court commits structural error by closing a pretrial hearing in a civil proceeding without first conducting an "Ishikawa" analysis. The Court concluded it does not, and therefore affirmed. View "In re Det. of Reyes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Adrian Ozuna challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for intimidating a former witness. Ozuna contended the jury impermissibly convicted him based only on a letter he wrote that authorities confiscated before it was delivered to anyone. In affirming his conviction, the Supreme Court concluded that a rational jury could have found Ozuna guilty of the crime based on the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. View "Washington v. Ozuna" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Carson appealed his conviction on three counts of first-degree child molestation. He argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney objected to a "Petrich" instruction proposed by the State. The Supreme Court concluded defense counsel reasonably concluded that the proposed instruction's language, tailored as it was for use in single-count cases, would have been confusing and potentially prejudicial in Carson's multicount case. Under these circumstances, Carson could not establish deficient performance. Moreover, defense counsel's objection did not prejudice Carson because the prosecution's closing argument clearly elected the acts on which the State was relying. View "Washington v. Carson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Rickey Beaver was found not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of residential burglary. The court found that Beaver suffered from a mental disease or defect and held that he posed a substantial danger to other persons and presented a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control by the court. The court committed Beaver to Western State Hospital (WSH) and to the custody of the secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services. Beaver was granted a conditional release in 2007. Between 2007 and his final discharge in 2014, Beaver violated the terms of his conditional release several times. In 2011, Beaver petitioned for final discharge. WSH recommended Beaver's final discharge, but the Public Safety Review Panel (PSRP) opposed it. A jury trial was held, but before resting, Beaver voluntarily withdrew his petition. Beaver agreed that he continued to suffer from a mental illness that made him a threat to public safety, and stipulated to an agreed order of conditional release. On conditional release, Beaver violated the terms by using cocaine, drinking alcohol, and driving a motor vehicle, and by being charged with the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol. In 2013, the State successfully moved to revoke Beaver's conditional release. Beaver appealed the trial court's order revoking his conditional release, arguing that due process required a finding of current mental illness before the court could revoke his conditional release and recommit him to WSH. While this appeal was pending, Beaver filed a petition for final discharge under RCW 10.77.200(3). Based on agreement of the parties, Beaver was granted conditional release in October 2013. Then in May 2014, again based on agreement of the parties, Beaver was granted final discharge. Although the Court of Appeals found that the case was moot, it reviewed the merits and held that substantive and procedural due process did not require a judicial finding of current mental illness before the court could revoke conditional release. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the appellate court's holding. Chapter 10.27 RCW, the statutory scheme that governed insanity acquittals, required the trial court find that a conditionally released insanity acquittee violated the conditions of release or posed a threat to the public to revoke an insanity acquittee' s conditional release. The Court found that the statute did not require the trial court make a finding regarding the acquittee's mental state at a conditional release revocation hearing. The Court therefore held that the statute satisfied due process and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Beaver" on Justia Law

Adam Lewis challenged two portions of a Court of Appeals opinion denying him credit for time served awaiting trial on his burglary and assault charges. After the Washington Supreme Court granted review, the State conceded that Lewis was entitled to 387 days of additional time served. The Supreme Court accepted the State's concession, struck oral argument, and remanded this case back to the trial court for sentencing. View "Washington v. Lewis" on Justia Law

This case was a direct review of a King County Superior Court decision that found certain portions of Initiative 1240 (I-1240) (Charter School Act), codified at chapter 28A.710 RCW, unconstitutional but left the remainder of the Act standing. In November 2012, Washington voters approved I-1240 providing for the establishment of up to 40 charter schools within five years. The Act was intended to provide parents with "more options" regarding the schooling of their children. But the new schools came with a trade-off: the loss of local control and1local accountability. Charter schools are exempt from many state rules. With the exception of "the specific state statutes and rules" identified in RCW 28A.710.040(2) and any "state statutes and rules made applicable to the charter school in the school's charter contract," charter schools were "not subject to and are exempt from all other state statutes and rules applicable to school districts and school district boards of directors ... in areas such as scheduling, personnel, funding, and educational programs." Alarmed over the lack of local accountability and fiscal impacts of the Act, appellants sued the State seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. Several supporters of charter schools intervened. All three parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the State and intervenors on all issues but one. The trial court held that charter schools were not "common schools" under article IX of Washington's Constitution and, therefore, the common school construction fund could not be appropriated to charter schools. The trial court found, however, that the provisions permitting such appropriations were severable. The trial court concluded that the Act was otherwise constitutional. All parties sought direct review, which the Washington Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of I-1240 that designated and treated charter schools as common schools violated article IX, section 2 of the state constitution and were void. This included the Act's funding provisions, which attempted to tap into and shift a portion of moneys allocated for common schools to the new charter schools authorized by the Act. Because the provisions designating and funding charter schools as common schools were integral to the Act, such void provisions were not severable, and that determination was dispositive of this case. View "League of Women Voters of Wash. v. Washington" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether under the State Constitution article I, section 7, an officer may search an arrestee's backpack as a search incident to arrest when the arrestee was wearing the backpack at the moment that he was stopped by police, but not at the time he was arrested several minutes later. When Officer Erik Olson stopped and seized Antoine Brock, he had Brock remove the backpack he was wearing and placed it where Brock could not readily access it. After a period of questioning, the officer arrested Brock and then searched the backpack. Ten minutes elapsed between the time Olson separated Brock from his backpack and the arrest. The trial court denied Brock's motion to suppress the evidence taken from the backpack. The Court of Appeals reversed. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that the backpack was a part of Brock's person at the time of arrest and that the search was valid incident to arrest. View "Washington v. Brock" on Justia Law