Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The respondents' cases were unrelated, but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of recommitment under former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii). M.W. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he attacked another patient at Navos psychiatric hospital, stomping on his head three times. W.D. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he punched a stranger in the face with no warning or provocation. Both men's charges were dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. The State petitioned for civil commitment on three statutory grounds: those contained in RCW 71.05.280(2), (3) and (4). M.W. and W.D. each stipulated to commitment for a 180-day period and waived their right to a full evidentiary hearing. The trial court committed M.W. and W.D. to Western State Hospital for 180 days of involuntary treatment on multiple grounds, including RCW 71.05.280(3). Leading up to the expiration of the initial period of involuntary commitment, the State petitioned for an additional 180-day period of involuntary treatment. The State alleged two grounds for recommitment: RCW 71.05.280(4) (gravely disabled); and (3) (incompetent person charged with a violent felony who continues to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts). The latter ground triggered the provision at issue, former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii), which provided a special procedure for recommitting individuals subject to a judge's special finding under RCW 71.05.280(3)(b) that they committed a violent felony. The superior court commissioner declared former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) unconstitutional on multiple grounds: substantive and procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial. The court ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D. then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds. The Supreme Court concluded M.W. and W.D failed to meet their burden to prove that former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) violated substantive or procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, or the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court commissioner's ruling and upheld former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) as constitutional. View "In re Det. of M. W." on Justia Law

Petitioner Nalda Otton sought reversal of his convictions for second degree assault and felony harassment. Otton and the victim had a romantic relationship and lived in the same household. The victim was disabled due to a history of multiple brain surgeries and sometimes had difficulties with memory and speaking. Late one night in December 2012, Otton and the victim had a confrontation. After Otton left the house, the victim called 911. When the police arrived, the victim gave a written statement, signed under penalty of perjury, alleging that Otton held her on the bed and against the wall by her neck so that she could not breathe and told her he was going to kill her. The victim testified at Otton's trial, and because her testimony was inconsistent with her prior sworn statement to police about the incident, the trial court admitted the victim's prior statement as substantive evidence. Otton acknowledged that the trial court's decision and the Court of Appeals opinion affirming that decision were proper in accordance with long-standing precedent. But in this appeal, Otton asked the Supreme Court to reject that precedent. The victim's statement was not hearsay, and admissible as substantive evidence. A question arose on whether the victim's police interview was an "other proceeding" contemplated by ER 801(d)(1)(i). When confronted with the same question in 1982, the Supreme Court declined to issue a categorical ruling that a police interview was either always or never considered an "other proceeding." The Court had not reexamined that 1982 case since it was issued. Based on that precedential case, the Court of Appeals formulated a four-factor test for determining whether an out-of-court statement by a nonparty witness was admissible. Otton did not challenge the trial court's discretionary determinations with regard to the four-part test; instead he argued the Supreme Court should reject the 1982 case. Finding that Otton has not shown that the 1982 case was incorrect, or any other reversible reason, the Supreme Court declined Otton's invitation and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Otton" on Justia Law

Appellants sought reversal of a King County Superior Court order declaring Initiative 1366 (I-1366) unconstitutional. At the center of this case, the fact that I-1366, if enacted, would "result[] in either a onetime reduction in the sales tax or [the proposal of a constitutional amendment]." Based on the plain language of the initiative, the Supreme Court held that I -13 66 required the legislature to choose between two operative provisions. "This does not constitute valid contingent legislation. Instead, this is the kind of logrolling of unrelated measures article II, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution was adopted to prevent." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that I-1366 violated the single-subject rule of article II, section 19, and that it was void in its entirety. View "Lee v. Washington" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether police officers had to give resident-respondent Michael Budd "Ferrier" warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the resident's home in order to seize an item containing suspected contraband. In 2009, the Washington State Patrol received an anonymous cybertip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children alleging that respondent possessed child pornography on his computer, used Internet messaging services to communicate with minors, and bragged about molesting his nine-and-a-half-year-old daughter. After review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Ferrier warnings were required under such circumstances. Here, the trial court found that the officers did not give respondent the warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the home to seize his computer. Based on this finding, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent's consent was invalid. View "Washington v. Budd" on Justia Law

Defendants were tried together as codefendants, each charged with three counts of first degree assault while armed with a firearm with intent to benefit a criminal street gang. All three defendants appealed, raising a number of issues. The Court of Appeals largely rejected their claims, but found that the trial court had erred in two ways: (1) some of the generalized gang evidence that the trial judge allowed was irrelevant, "had little or no probative value," and was not appropriately limited (however, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the additional generalized gang evidence was unlikely to have materially affected the outcome of the trial, and upheld all three convictions); and (2) the trial court erred when it ruled that the defendants' statements on jail intake forms regarding gang affiliation were voluntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals explained that "the State's own trial evidence demonstrated that there was a real and ongoing danger of violence and retaliation between rival gangs that presented these defendants with a credible threat of harm if housed with rival gang members in the Sunnyside jail." As a result, the statements were made by the defendants to avoid a very real risk of danger, and thus were not made voluntarily. However, the Court of Appeals found that the latter error was harmless as to two of the defendants (Anthony DeLeon and Robledo) because of other admissible evidence of their gang affiliation, and upheld their gang aggravators. Because of the scant evidence of Ricardo DeLeon's gang involvement, the Court of Appeals reversed his gang aggravator and remanded for a new trial on the aggravator and resentencing. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial for all three defendants, finding that they were forced to choose between making incriminating statements and facing physical violence, and that those incriminating statements were then used against the defendants at trial. "Under these circumstances, we do not see how the statements could possibly be considered voluntary and admissible. One should not have to risk physical violence to assert a constitutional right." View "Washington v. Juarez" on Justia Law

Curtis Stump was convicted of possession of heroin following a bench trial. He filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed a lawyer to represent Stump on the appeal at public expense. That lawyer, however, did not file a brief in support of Stump's appeal. Instead, Stump's appointed lawyer moved to withdraw and filed an "Anders" brief, arguing not that the appeal was meritorious but that it was wholly frivolous. The commissioner of the Court of Appeals granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw, agreed with defense counsel's assessment that the appeal was wholly frivolous, dismissed the appeal, and affirmed Stump's conviction. The State then filed a cost bill, and the commissioner imposed appellate costs against Stump under RAP 14.2. At least one other Division of the Court of Appeals has declined to order costs in this situation. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the issue of the propriety of imposing costs against an indigent criminal defendant whose appointed lawyer files an Anders brief and motion to withdraw. "In order to serve the ends of justice," the Supreme Court held that RAP 14.2 did not apply to this unique situation. The appellate court's award of costs was reversed, and no costs were awarded to either party for review by the Supreme Court. View "Washington v. Stump" on Justia Law

A little after midnight in Yakima one summer night in 2009, someone in a car shot into a home, grazing Kyle Mullins' head. Petitioner Chad Duncan was charged with six counts of first degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Duncan moved to suppress the evidence and confessions that flowed from a traffic stop shortly after the incident on several grounds, including that the police had insufficient grounds to stop him and that their initial warrantless search of his car was improper. At the pretrial suppression hearing, held a year and a half after the events of that summer night, the judge found that the stop was justified and that the search was reasonable, and denied the motion. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges. This case presented two questions for review: (1) whether Duncan could challenge the legal financial obligations (LFOs) imposed by the trial court for the first time on appeal; and (2) whether the police properly searched his car for a gun after a drive-by shooting. The Supreme Court answered "yes" to both questions, affirmed Duncan's conviction, and remanded for resentencing with proper consideration of his ability to pay LFOs. View "Washington v. Duncan" on Justia Law

This case presented questions regarding a defendant's public trial right and right to be present as applied to the designation of alternate jurors by a random drawing performed after both sides have rested at trial. The random drawing was done by the trial court's judicial assistant at a brief recess during closing arguments. Defendant Martin Jones contended that this violated his constitutional rights to a public trial and to be present at all critical stages of trial proceedings. Based on the specific facts presented by the record before us, the Washington Supreme Court held that the random drawing by the judicial assistant did not implicate Jones' public trial right. The Court also held that Jones waived his right-to-presence claim by failing to raise an objection until after the jury reached its verdict. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals, and reinstated Jones' conviction. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Prison inmate Steven Kozol sought to file a statutory petition for writ of review under chapter 7.16 RCW to challenge a prison disciplinary sanction imposed by the Department of Corrections. The Department of Corrections alleged that Kozol committed a serious infraction as defined under WAC 137-25-030 (Category D, 740: committing fraud or embezzlement, or obtaining goods, services, money, or anything else of value under false pretenses). A disciplinary hearing officer found Kozol guilty of the infraction and imposed a sanction of 10 days of cell confinement. There was no apparent loss of early release credit. Ordinarily, an inmate challenging a prison disciplinary sanction would file a personal restraint petition. But Kozol instead filed a pro se action for declaratory relief, alleging among other things that the department violated disciplinary hearing procedures set forth in chapter 137-28 WAC. He later amended his complaint to name individual defendants and assert additional causes of action, including a claim for damages. On Kozol' s appeal of the superior court's denial of his request to present a writ petition, the Court of Appeals held that Kozol could petition for such a writ in challenging a prison disciplinary decision. But because a personal restraint petition was an "adequate remedy at law" for challenging such a decision in this case, Kozol could not establish a basis for a statutory writ. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action but reversed denial of Kozol's motion to amend his complaint to seek a statutory writ of review, holding that Kozol could seek such a writ in challenging a prison disciplinary decision not involving loss of good conduct credits. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' judgment. After review, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Kozol v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Someone attempted to burglarize Lancer Lanes and Casino around 2:00a.m. on May 14, 2013. The burglar cut the surveillance feed. However, the burglar's activities awoke Eric Glasson, an individual who occasionally slept overnight at Lancer Lanes, and Glasson's presence apparently spooked the burglar into leaving without taking anything. On May 23, Petitioner Troy Wilcoxon, a card dealer at Lancer Lanes, invited Glasson, James Nollette, and two other casino employees to a "strip club" called the Candy Store. State's theory of the case was that the purpose of inviting Glasson and the other casino employees to the Candy Store was to get them out of Lancer Lanes so the burglary could occur without any interference. The group arrived around midnight, but Wilcoxon left by himself less than an hour later after talking privately with Nollette. Shortly after 2:00a.m., the Candy Store's surveillance footage showed Nollette talking on his cell phone with someone-the conversation lasted roughly 15 minutes. Cell phone records showed several calls between Nollette and Wilcoxon around 2:00a.m. Wilcoxon's phone's signal relied on a cell tower near Lancer Lanes. Soon after Nollette's conversation ended, Nollette, Glasson, and the two casino employees left the Candy Store. That same night, surveillance footage from Lancer Lanes showed the same garbage-bag-wearing burglar enter the building just before 2:00 a.m. The burglar again cut the surveillance feed, but this time, the cameras were backed up by batteries and recorded the burglary. Surveillance footage showed the burglar take $29,074 from Lancer Lanes's money drawer. The State charged Wilcoxon with second degree burglary, first degree theft, and second degree conspiracy to commit burglary. Wilcoxon's case was joined for trial with Nollette's case. Prior to trial, Wilcoxon moved to sever his trial from Nollette's, arguing that since Nollette would likely not testify, Wilcoxon would be unable to cross-examine him regarding certain statements Nollette made. The trial court denied Wilcoxon's motion. The jury convicted Wilcoxon of all three charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed Wilcoxon's convictions, finding no confrontation right violation or requirement to provide a limiting instruction sua sponte. After review, the Supreme Court found that Nolette's out of court statements made to another person were not testimonial, and as such, were not subject to the confrontation right. Wilcoxon's convictions were affirmed. View "Washington v. Wilcoxon" on Justia Law