Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Adrian Sutlej Samalia fled on foot from a stolen car during a lawful traffic stop, leaving his cell phone behind in the vehicle. After Samalia successfully escaped, the police searched the cell phone without a warrant and made contact with one of the numbers stored in the cell phone. That contact led to Samalia's identification as the owner of the phone and driver of the stolen vehicle. The State used this evidence against Samalia at trial. Samalia contends that his right to be free from unreasonable searches was violated when the State introduced the identification evidence derived from the search of his cell phone. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that although Samalia initially had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the cell phone and its data, he abandoned that interest when he voluntarily left the cell phone in a stolen vehicle while fleeing from a lawful traffic stop. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Samalia" on Justia Law

A city of Lakewood police officer saw petitioner Robert Willis walk into the traffic lanes at Interstate 5's (I-5) northbound exit ramp on Gravelly Lake Drive. Willis carried a sign saying he was disabled and needed help. The officer issued Willis a criminal citation, not for walking into the traffic lane, blocking traffic, or disrupting pedestrian or vehicle progress, but for begging. Willis raised several challenges to the anti-begging ordinance under which he was charged (and later convicted). After review, the Washington Supreme Court found that Willis could challenge LMC 9A.04.020A(1) and (2) as facially overbroad regardless of his own conduct when cited. Because both provisions imposed a content-based speech restriction in a substantial number of traditional public forums, Willis' facial challenge succeeds. Thus, his conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Lakewood v. Willis" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to defendant Sayiden Mohamed's residence to follow up on several 911 hang-up calls that had originated from the house. Upon speaking with him, the officers observed that defendant was intoxicated but determined that no further action was needed. Shortly after ending the initial contact, the officers received information that there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest. When the officers returned to carry out the arrest, the defendant became hostile and belligerent and resisted the officers' attempts to place him in the patrol car. While the officers were in the process of forcibly subduing him until backup arrived, defendant spit in both of the officers' faces. He continued to spit at the officers even after a spit mask was placed over his head. Once defendant was restrained, the officers were able to place him in the patrol car and take him to jail. Defendant was charged with two counts of third degree assault for spitting on the arresting officers. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether it was permissible to impeach a hearsay declarant with his or her prior convictions under certain circumstances. In this case, defendant did not testify and his own out-of-court statements were admitted into evidence through his expert witness' testimony. Defense counsel expressly declined a limiting instruction offered by the trial court regarding the purpose of defendant's statements. The State then cross-examined the expert witness with the defendant's previously admitted prior convictions pursuant to ER 806. Defendant contended that his out-of-court statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, barring impeachment pursuant to ER 806. Because defense counsel declined an instruction that would have limited the evidence to its proper purpose, the Supreme Court held that the statements were also offered for their truth and that impeachment of the defendant's credibility was therefore permissible pursuant to ER 806. Consequently, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the convictions. View "Washington v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

Petitioner Clark Stuhr was in the custody of Department of Corrections (DOC), serving two consecutive sentences imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). As penalties for Stuhr's serious disciplinary infractions, DOC revoked potentially available good conduct time for both of his sentences. Stuhr filed a personal restraint petition (PRP), arguing that this loss of potential good conduct time violated statutory and constitutional law. The Supreme Court disagreed and therefore denied relief. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Stuhr" on Justia Law

Baron Ashley Jr. appealed his conviction for unlawful imprisonment with domestic violence. At trial, the State introduced evidence of Ashley's prior acts of domestic violence against the victim pursuant to ER 404(b). The Washington Supreme Court held that the evidence was properly admitted for the purpose of establishing an element of the charged crime but that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence for the purpose of bolstering the witness's credibility. However, because the Supreme Court held that the error was harmless, it affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Ashley" on Justia Law

The State challenged a Court of Appeals decision reversing Clifford Porter's conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Pursuant to a search warrant, police discovered portions of a stolen vehicle on Porter's property. At the close of trial, the jury convicted Porter as charged. On appeal, Porter argued for the first time that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document was constitutionally deficient for failing to allege that Porter withheld or appropriated the vehicle from the true owner. Specifically, Porter argued that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document omitted an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle: RCW 9A.56.140(1 )'s provision stating that possession means to "'withhold or appropriate [stolen property] to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto."' The State contended the information need not include the "withhold or appropriate" language because it merely defined the essential element of possession and was not itself an essential element. The Supreme Court concluded the State had the better argument, and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. View "Washington v. Porter" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kisha Fisher and Corey Trosclair were tried as codefendants for the felony murder of Leonard Masten. Prior to trial, Fisher made out-of-court statements that incriminated both herself and Trosclair. After denying both defendants' motions to sever, the State offered Fisher's statement at trial as evidence against her. Trosclair challenged the sufficiency of the redactions in protecting his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights under the federal constitution. Fisher challenged the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with her requested affirmative defense jury instruction. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the redaction of Trosclair's name to "first guy" in Fisher's confession was insufficient, as it obviously referred to Trosclair. The Court therefore held it was error to read Fisher's statement into evidence. However, in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence, the Court concluded this error was harmless and affirmed Trosclair's conviction. As to Fisher, the Court held she produced sufficient evidence at trial to warrant an affirmative defense jury instruction. Failure to do so constituted reversible error, and the Court reversed her conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Fisher" on Justia Law

K.H.-H., a 17-year-old male, was charged with assault with sexual motivation after he forced himself on C.R., a female acquaintance who attended the same high school. The issue this case presented on appeal involved whether a juvenile disposition condition requiring K.H.-H. to write an apology letter to the victim violated his constitutional free speech rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that it did not. View "Washington v K. H.-H." on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Farnsworth, Jr. and James McFarland were suffering heroin withdrawals and had no money to purchase more. The pair made a plan to "rob" a bank. They were arrested and charged with first degree robbery. The jury was instructed on both first degree theft and first degree robbery; it unanimously convicted Farnsworth of first degree robbery and, per the jury instructions, it did not consider the lesser-included crime of first degree theft. The trial court found that the conviction was his third strike under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) and sentenced Farnsworth to life in prison without the possibility of release. The main question raised by Farnsworth's appeal of that sentence was whether certain conduct constituted a "threat of force," making the crime a robbery, not a theft. Specifically, the question centered on whether Farnsworth's handwritten note demanding money from a bank teller contained an implied threat of force. "Although the note did not convey an explicitly threatening message, we believe it was laden with inherent intimidation. … As Farnsworth's partner in crime explained, they were well aware that banks generally instructed their employees to react to such notes as if they contained an explicit threat; in fact, the pair relied on that knowledge and fear to commit this crime. In this context, we hold that there is sufficient evidence that the pair's conduct implied a threat of harm." Furthermore, the Court concluded no errors at trial court accumulated to deprive Farnsworth of a fair trial. The Court therefore affirmed Farnsworth's conviction for first degree robbery. View "Washington v. Farnsworth" on Justia Law

Officer Scott Campbell made a traffic stop of petitioner Mark Mecham, observing that Mecham might have been driving while intoxicated. Officer Campbell asked Mecham to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs), which would have involved Officer Campbell's observing Mecham's eye movements and ability to walk a straight line and stand on one leg. Mecham refused, and his refusal was used against him at trial. Mecham argued on appeal that his constitutional rights were violated when the State introduced evidence of his refusal to submit to the FSTs. After review, the Supreme Court held that Mecham's rights were not violated because an FST is not a search under the state and federal constitutions, and Mecham had no constitutional right to refuse to perform the FSTs. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. View "Washington v. Mecham" on Justia Law