Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found Miguel Albarran guilty of several crimes, including second degree rape of a child and second degree rape, based on a single act. At sentencing, the parties and the trial court all agreed that the rape and child rape convictions violated double jeopardy protections. The remedy for a double jeopardy violation was vacation of the conviction for the lesser offense. Here, the trial court concluded that the lesser offense was second degree child rape and vacated that conviction Albarran appealed because the enhanced second degree rape carried a mandatory sentence of 25 years, while the vacated conviction did not. Albarran argued that a different and more important violation occurred in this case: a violation of the so-called "general-specific rule." The remedy for a violation of the "general-specific" rule was vacation of the conviction for the "general" offense. Albarran argued that the more general offense in this case was second degree rape. The Court of Appeals agreed with Albarran, vacated the conviction for second degree rape, reinstated the conviction for second degree rape of a child, and remanded for resentencing. The Washington Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in reaching its conclusion, and reversed the Court of Appeals. The original judgment and sentence were reinstated. View "Washington v. Albarran" on Justia Law

Juvenile defendant Trey M. challenged his three convictions for felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020. The Court of Appeals certified the issue to the Washington Supreme Court of whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Elonis v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)) had any impact on the Washington Court's "reasonable person standard" for what constituted a "true threat" under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Washington Supreme Court held that because "Elonis" expressly avoided any First Amendment analysis, it provided no basis for the Court to abandon its established First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Trey M." on Justia Law

Kenneth Slert was convicted three times of killing John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed on appeal. Potential jurors in his third trial were given an initial written questionnaire in an attempt to determine whether any knew of Slert's prior convictions. Based on the written answers and after a discussion in chambers and out of Slert's presence, four jurors were dismissed. For the first time on appeal, Slert challenged his conviction on the grounds that the discussion in chambers violated his right to be present at a critical stage of his own trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Slert waived his right to raise his exclusion from the in chambers discussion by not raising it at trial. The Court also concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as it was clear the dismissed jurors had disqualifying knowledge of Slert's prior convictions or held disqualifying opinions about his guilt. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law

Jerry Swagerty raped a child in 2004, but he was not identified until DNA tests were done in 2012. Swagerty was charged well within the relevant statutes of limitations with first degree rape of a child and first degree child molestation. Because of his criminal history, he faced a life sentence if convicted as charged. In order to avoid a life sentence, Swagerty pleaded guilty to four lesser offenses in 2013. However, the statute of limitations had run on three of the amended charges. Swagerty sought to vacate those three convictions and be resentenced only on the one remaining charge. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may expressly waive an expired statute of limitations on lesser charges during plea negotiations to take advantage of a favorable plea offer. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded this case back to the trial court with direction to allow Swagerty a choice of two options: (1) he could withdraw his personal restraint petition (effectively keeping to the plea bargain he made); or (2) he could keep the victory he won at the Court of Appeals and move to vacate the 2013 judgment and sentence, and the State would have the opportunity to refile the original charges. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Swagerty" on Justia Law

In this personal restraint petition (PRP), the petitioner Bobby Colbert challenged his 2005 conviction for second degree rape, arguing the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "Washington v. W.R.," (336 P.3d 1134 (2014)), which held that instructing the jury that the defendant bears the burden to establish the victim's consent was error, should apply retroactively, and to his case. He argued: (1) that his PRP overcame the one-year time limit under chapter 10.73 RCW because the decision in "W.R." either involved statutory interpretation exempt from the time bar; or (2) was a significant change in the law material to his conviction that required retroactive application. The Court held that W.R. did not apply retroactively and denied the petition as time barred. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Colbert" on Justia Law

In "Taggert v. Washington," (822 P.2d 243 (1992)), the Washington Supreme Court held that the State could be held liable for crimes committed by parolees if those crimes resulted from the State's negligence in supervising the parolees. Plaintiffs asked the Court to extend "Taggert" to hold that a county jail could be held liable for crimes committed by a former inmate. The crimes at issue in this matter were committed well after the inmate served his time, and long after the county had any duty (or ability) to supervise him. The former inmate in this case was incarcerated for nonviolent crimes, and released approximately one year later. Shortly after release, the former inmate had a psychotic episode and went on a shooting spree, killing six people and injuring several others. Some of his victims and their families (plaintiffs) sued a number of parties, thus implicating the "Taggert" holding. Plaintiffs argued that the jail could have prevented the inmate from committing crimes after he was released, but the Court concluded a jail's duty to supervise and control inmates during incarceration did not include a general duty to somehow prevent inmates from committing crimes after they are lawfully released from incarceration. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment order in favor of Skagit County. View "Binschus v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

The Benton County District Court ordered petitioner Briana Wakefield to pay $15 each month toward her outstanding legal financial obligations (LFOs). Wakefield was homeless, disabled, and indigent. Her only income was $710 in social security disability payments each month, and as a result, she struggled to meet her own basic needs. Wakefield and amici asked the Washington Supreme Court to reverse the district court's order and hold that the practice of strict LFO enforcement against homeless, disabled, and indigent people in Benton County violated state and federal statutes. Because the district court's order was contrary to both the law and the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court reversed: "Under state law, LFOs should be imposed only if an individual has a present or future ability to pay, and LFOs may be remitted when paying them would impose a manifest hardship on the person. . . . we order that her LFOs be remitted." View "City of Richland v. Wakefield" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the circumstances officers making a lawful arrest may seize a companion of the arrestee in the absence of reasonable suspicion to independently justify a "Terri" stop of the companion. The Court held that where officers have an objective rationale predicated on safety concerns to seize a companion to secure the scene of the arrest, article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution allowed for the seizure, so long as it remained reasonable in scope and duration. Based on this holding, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that evidence of a gun taken from respondent Cody Flores during his brief seizure should not have been suppressed. View "Washington v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) created a new option for eligible retirees in which the retiree could opt for a pension that would allow a surviving spouse to continue to receive monthly pension benefits at the same amount after the retiree's death. To make this pension actuarially equivalent in value to the previous pension, the DRS provided for a greater reduction in the retiree's monthly benefits. In 2010, the DRS adopted rules that modified the degree of the actuarial reduction. Appellant Tim Lenander challenged the changes to the reduction, arguing that the changes violated the statutory scheme and impaired his contract right to a lower reduction in his pension payment. The Supreme Court found Lenander's arguments unavailing, holding that the DRS acted within its authority in amending the survivor benefit actuarial reduction regulations as set forth under former WACs 415-02-380 (2010) and 415-103-215 (2010). In amending these regulations, the DRS did not violate the contract clause of article I, section 23 of the Washington Constitution. Consequently, the Court held that the DRS did not infringe on Lenander's right to an "actuarial equivalent" survivor benefit, and that Lenander did not suffer substantial impairment to his pension contract rights. View "Lenander v. Dep't of Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Goss argued that the charging document the State used to accuse him of second degree child molestation failed to pass constitutional muster because it violated his right to know the "nature and cause of the accusation" made against him, and failed to give notice of every fact that increased any penalties he faced. Specifically, Goss contended the State's charging document failed to allege that the victim was "at least twelve years old," the lower limit of the age range for that degree of the crime. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fact that the victim was "at least twelve years old" was not an essential element of second degree child molestation, and that Goss had notice of every fact that exposed him to a greater penalty. View "Washington v. Goss" on Justia Law