Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found Alexander Ortiz-Abrego guilty on charges of child rape. The trial court held a contested competency hearing. The court determined that Ortiz-Abrego was incompetent during his trial, though various accommodations suggested by an expert who evaluated him midtrial could have helped him follow the proceedings. The court ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court departed from the established competency standard by analyzing whether Ortiz-Abrego actually understood his trial and by injecting concepts from disability accommodations law. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse the wide discretion appropriate to competency determinations. "This case is unusual in that the competency hearing took place after the trial concluded. Viewing the record in that context, the trial court's consideration of the defendant's observed behavior during trial, and its discussion of whether accommodations could have been made, do not reflect a departure from the established competency standard." Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's ruling. View "Washington v. Ortiz-Abrego" on Justia Law

As a juvenile homicide offender facing a de facto life-without-parole sentence, petitioner Joel Rodriguez Ramos was entitled to a "Miller" hearing, just as a juvenile homicide offender facing a literal life-without-parole sentence would be. Based on the record presented, the Supreme Court found that that Ramos received a constitutionally adequate Miller hearing and he did not show that his aggregated 85-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. View "Washington v. Rodriguez Ramos" on Justia Law

Guadalupe Solis-Diaz Jr. seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision vacating his sentence a second time and remanding for resentencing but declining to disqualify the sentencing judge. In 2007, 16-year-old Solis-Diaz was tried as an adult in connection with a drive-by shooting in Centralia and was convicted of six counts of first degree assault, each with a firearm enhancement; one count of drive-by shooting; and one count of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Judge Nelson Hunt imposed a standard range sentence of 1,111 months (92.6 years) of imprisonment. After his judgment and sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, Solis-Diaz filed a personal restraint petition challenging his sentence. The Court of Appeals ordered resentencing on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a sentencing report and properly inform the trial court that SolisDiaz's case had been automatically declined to adult court as a result of his age and the nature of the charges. At resentencing, again before Judge Hunt, the State noted recent changes in the law that allowed the judge to consider an offender's youth in deciding whether to impose an exceptional downward sentence, and it asked Judge Hunt to conduct an individualized determination of the propriety of an exceptional downward sentence for Solis-Diaz. Judge Hunt again imposed a prison sentence of 1,111 months, but in doing so, he commented on the Court of Appeals' holding that defense counsel had been ineffective in connection with the original sentencing. He found it "insulting" for the court to postulate that he would be "so ignorant, lazy, or stupid as to not know or inquire" why a teenage offender was in adult court, and that it was particularly insulting that the court presupposed that he did not "review the file or was so behind in the law not to know ... about the automatic adult jurisdiction" in Washington, and was even "ludicrous" given the judge's years practicing as a prosecutor and defense attorney and his work on juvenile justice issues. Solis-Diaz's request to disqualify Judge Hunt from presiding over resentencing was still declined. "Judge Hunt will be asked to exercise discretion on remand regarding the propriety of a sentence he has twice imposed, and the record reflects that he not only has strong opinions on sentencing generally and juvenile sentencing in particular, but also suggests he has already reached a firm conclusion about the propriety of a mitigated sentence in this case and may not be amenable to considering mitigating evidence with an open mind." As such, the Supreme Court reversed with respect to resentencing only, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Solis-Diaz" on Justia Law

Shacon Barbee was a pimp that made money from prostitutes working under his supervision. The State charged Barbee with two counts of promoting sexual abuse of a minor (SE), one count of first degree promoting prostitution (BK), one count of second degree promoting prostitution (CW), one count of leading organized crime, two counts of first degree theft from the Social Security Administration, and one count of second degree theft from the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The jury found Barbee guilty on all counts, except that they found him guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree promoting prostitution of BK. The jury made a special finding that promoting commercial sexual abuse of SE was part of a pattern of abuse over a "prolonged period of time," and the court imposed exceptional sentences of 420 months for the first two promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor (PCSAM) convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed all of Barbee's convictions. At issue for the Supreme Court’s review was whether a pimp could be convicted on multiple counts of promoting prostitution when multiple prostitutes were involved. The Court had not previously considered the unit of prosecution for second degree promoting prostitution. In light of the statute's plain language and its prior decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the legislature expressed its clear intent to authorize multiple convictions when one pimp exploits multiple individuals. View "Washington v. Barbee" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether the State could offer a driver's refusal to take a breath test under Washington's implied consent statute, RCW 46.20.308, as evidence of guilt at a criminal trial after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in “Missouri v. McNeely,” (133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)). In the two cases here, an officer asked each defendant to submit to a breath test. Dominic Baird agreed to the test; Collette Adams refused it. Baird's test results showed a BAC above the legal limit. Pretrial, both defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the breath test was a request to consent to a warrantless search and they had a constitutional right to refuse consent. Consequently, the State could not use their refusal as evidence of guilt. Baird further argued that because the officer told him that his refusal could be used as evidence, the officer coerced his consent through an unlawful threat, thereby invalidating his consent. The State took the position that the defendants had no constitutional right to refuse because the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied in all DUI cases. Due to the body's natural elimination of alcohol from the bloodstream as time passes, the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is impractical since the delay will cause the destruction of DUI evidence. The Washington Supreme Court found that the district courts correctly rejected the State's argument that alcohol dissipation constituted exigency per se. The Court held that the implied consent statute did not authorize a warrantless search, and a driver has no constitutional right to refuse a breath test because such a search falls under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Further, although the implied consent statute gives a driver a statutory right to refuse the test, by exercising the privilege to drive, a driver consents to admitting that refusal to take the breath test into evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that a driver's refusal was admissible as evidence of guilt under Washington's implied consent law. View "Washington v. Baird" on Justia Law

Mark Black challenged his commitment as a sexually violent predator under chapter 71.09 RCW. He contended that his commitment had to be vacated because he was not present when some potential jurors were questioned individually in open court about their prior experiences with sexual abuse. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded Black waived his right to be present while jurors were individually questioned about these sensitive subjects. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "In re Det. of Black" on Justia Law

Noel Caldellis shot into a crowd of people outside a party, killing one. He was charged with first degree murder "[u]nder circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." The jury was given a "to-convict" instruction modeled on the relevant pattern jury instruction, which itself was modeled on subsection RCW 9A.32.030(l)(b). After Caldellis' trial, the pattern jury committee amended the relevant pattern instruction to require an additional "element" that "the defendant knew of and disregarded the grave risk of death." Among other things, Caldellis argued his conviction should have been set aside because the jury was not required to find this new "element" in his case. The Supreme Court held the instruction given in Caldellis' trial included the required elements of the crime and was sufficient. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Caldellis" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Earl Flippo of four counts of child molestation in 2008. Flippo timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the verdict and sentence in 2010. The Court of Appeals dismissed Flippo's first personal restraint petition (PRP) in 2011. In 2015, Flippo filed his second PRP, arguing for the first time that the sentencing court imposed discretionary legal financial obligations without having performed an individualized inquiry into his ability to pay. The Court of Appeals dismissed Flippo's PRP on the basis that it was untimely, and Flippo appealed that decision. The Washington Supreme Court granted discretionary review, found no reversible error in the dismissal of Flippo's case, and affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Flippo" on Justia Law

In decriminalizing recreational use of cannabis, a Washington State initiative set the legal concentration limit for the psychoactive compound in cannabis, tetracannabinol (or THC), in the bloodstream. The initiative also amended the implied consent statute to direct police officers to warn drivers of the legal consequences of a breath test that revealed that THC concentration. No breath test available at the time measured THC concentrations in the blood. The Washington legislature has since amended the implied consent statute so that it no longer requires officers give the warning that suggested the then-current breath test measured something it could not. Before that amendment, Judith Murray and Darren Robison were given implied consent warnings that conformed to the ability of the breath test but not to the specific language of the statute. The issue these cases presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the breath test results should have been suppressed because the THC warnings were not given. The Court found that for the breath tests given, the warnings did not omit any relevant part of the statute, accurately expressed the relevant parts of the statute, and were not misleading. Accordingly, the warnings substantially complied with the implied consent statute and the test results were properly admitted. View "Washington v. Murray" on Justia Law

Kevin Case was convicted of felony violation of a domestic violence no-contact order. Violating a no-contact order became a felony when an offender had at least two prior convictions for violating a no-contact order or similar order issued under qualifying provisions listed in RCW 26.50.110(5). Case stipulated that he had been convicted of violating no-contact orders before. However, his stipulation did not explicitly state that the previously violated orders had been issued under qualifying provisions listed in the statute. For the first time on appeal, Case argued the State failed to prove its case because his stipulation was inadequate. After review, the Supreme Court found that whether the prior convictions were issued under qualifying provisions listed in RCW 26.50.11 0(5) was a threshold legal matter to be decided by the judge and that Case's stipulation, in context, was sufficient. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Case's conviction. View "Washington v. Case" on Justia Law