Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue central to this appeal was whether Michael Rhem adequately raised an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim by including in his pro se reply brief, "Rhem would also request that this Court consider sua [s]ponte the ineffective appellate argument that the State broaches in their response. Or allow additional briefing." The Court of Appeals determined, among other things: (1) Rhem did not adequately raise an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim; (2) he did not demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice in supporting his claim of a violation of the right to a public trial; and (3) he did not timely raise a federal public trial right violation. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court’s judgment, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Rhem" on Justia Law

In alternative means cases where substantial evidence supported both alternatives submitted to the jury, jury unanimity as to the means is not required. In this case, Dennis Armstrong petitioned the Washington Supreme Court to reverse his felony domestic violence conviction for violating a court order because the trial court instructed the jury that it need not be unanimous as to which of the two means it relied on, so long as it was unanimous as to the conviction. Because that is a correct statement of the law, the Supreme Court found no reversible error. However, Armstrong further contended police violated his right to due process because they did not retrieve certain video surveillance tapes. The Court found Armstrong did not show the required bad faith. Thus, the Court affirmed Armstrong’s due process claim failed. View "Washington v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Fabian Arredondo appealed his accomplice liability convictions of one count of second degree murder and three counts of first degree assault. A jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Arredondo, a gang member, drove a vehicle from which his cousin and fellow member, Rudy Madrigal, fired gunshots into a vehicle occupied by alleged rival gang members. One shot struck the driver, Ladislado Avila, in the head, and he later died at the hospital as a result of his gunshot wound. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues: (1) the trial court allowed the State to introduce ER 404(b) evidence linking Arredondo to an uncharged 2009 drive-by shooting; and (2) the trial court barred Arredondo from cross-examining the State's key witness, Maurice Simon, about Simon's past mental health diagnoses, as well as past alcohol and drug use. Simon would later testify that Arredondo admitted his role in the shooting to him while they shared a jail cell. In neither instance did the Supreme Court find the trial court committed reversible error. View "Washington v. Arredondo" on Justia Law

The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed precedent that a trial court must consider whether such joinder will result in undue prejudice to the defendant. If it will, joinder is not permissible. The State charged Charles Bluford with one count of first degree robbery and one count of indecent liberties. The State later charged Bluford in a separate information with five more first degree robberies involving five new victims. Before trial, the State moved to join the two robberies accompanied by sexual offenses to the other five robberies, while Bluford moved to sever the five robberies from each other. The Court of Appeals held: (1) the trial court properly allowed joinder; (2) Bluford did not invite the trial court to erroneously deny his request for a lesser-included offense instruction on the indecent liberties charge; and (3) the State had not proved Bluford's prior New Jersey conviction for second degree robbery was factually or legally comparable to a most serious offense in Washington, so Bluford's persistent offender sentence was erroneously imposed. The Washington Supreme Court overruled certain Court of Appeals opinions that have departed from precedent, reversed Bluford's convictions, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Bluford" on Justia Law

David Woodlyn cashed a series of blank checks written by Dora Kjellerson, an elderly woman suffering from dementia. The State charged Woodlyn with theft in the second degree, an alternative means crime. The jury's "to convict" instruction required the jury to unanimously agree on Woodlyn's guilt-but not on how he committed the crime. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. Woodlyn appealed, arguing the general verdict violated his right to jury unanimity under article I, section 21 of the Washington constitution insofar as the evidence was insufficient to support conviction under the "wrongfully obtained" alternative. The Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence of this means was insufficient, but nonetheless affirmed, holding that any error was harmless. The court reasoned that the absence of evidence of the theft by taking alternative reasonably showed that the jury's verdict rested on the theft by deception alternative. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals reasoning, finding the State failed to support one or more alternative means did not establish that the jury relied unanimously on another, supported alternative. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in result because it concluded the evidence before the jury was sufficient to support both alternative means of second degree theft. View "Washington v. Woodlyn" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, petitioners were each charged with four serious violent offenses-one count of conspiracy to commit assault (an anticipatory crime) and three substantive crimes of assault. A divided appellate panel held that the anticipatory crime did not have a seriousness level at all, and hence that anticipatory crime could not form the basis for consecutive sentencing calculations under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). Instead it directed the sentencing court to calculate the sentence using the seriousness level and standard range for one of petitioners' substantive crimes-an approach that resulted in longer sentences. The majority's approach in “Washington v. Weatherwax” conflicted with another appellate court panel. In “Washington v. Breaux,” the appellate court held that RCW 9.94A.589(1 )(b) was ambiguous in cases where multiple serious violent offenses had the same seriousness level but produced different length sentences; it therefore held that the rule of lenity required courts facing that situation to start their sentencing calculations using the serious violent offense that yields the shorter overall sentence. The Supreme Court accepted review to resolve this conflict. The Court held that for purposes of RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b), anticipatory offenses carry the same seriousness level as their completed offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that when an anticipatory offense and a completed offense carrying the same seriousness level might both form the basis for calculating consecutive sentences under RCW 9.94A.589(1 )(b), the sentencing court must start its calculations with the offense that produces the lower overall sentence. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for resentencing using the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in “Breaux.” View "Washington v. Weatherwax" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case, Zyion Houston-Sconiers and Treson Roberts, were children. On Halloween night in 2012, they were 17 and 16 years old, respectively. They robbed mainly other groups of children, and they netted mainly candy. They were charged with crimes that brought them automatically into adult (rather than juvenile) court, without any opportunity for a judge to exercise discretion about the appropriateness of such transfers. They had lengthy adult sentencing ranges calculated under adult Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) rules. And they received lengthy adult firearm sentence enhancements, with their mandatory, consecutive, flat-time consequences, without any opportunity for a judge to exercise discretion about the appropriateness of that sentence increase, either. Both defendants appealed their sentences. Because "children are different" under the Eighth Amendment and hence "criminal procedure laws" must take the defendants' youthfulness into account, sentencing courts must have absolute discretion to depart as far as they want below otherwise applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing enhancements when sentencing juveniles in adult court, regardless of how the juvenile got there. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but remanded both cases for resentencing. View "Washington v. Houston-Sconiers" on Justia Law

In 2004, respondents Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed began a committed, romantic relationship. In 2012, the Washington legislature passed Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6239, which recognized equal civil marriage rights for same-sex couples. Respondents intended to marry in September 2013. By the time he and Freed became engaged, Ingersoll had been a customer at Arlene's Flowers for at least nine years, purchasing numerous floral arrangements from Stutzman and spending an estimated several thousand dollars at her shop. Baroronelle Stutzman owned and was the president of Arlene's Flowers. Stutzman knew that Ingersoll is gay and that he had been in a relationship with Freed for several years. The two men considered Arlene's Flowers to be "[their] florist." Stutzman’s sincerely held religious beliefs included a belief that marriage can exist only between one man and one woman. Ingersoll approached Arlene's Flowers about purchasing flowers for his upcoming wedding. Stutzman told Ingersoll that she would be unable to do the flowers for his wedding because of her religious beliefs. Ingersoll did not have a chance to specify what kind of flowers or floral arrangements he was seeking before Stutzman told him that she would not serve him. They also did not discuss whether Stutzman would be asked to bring the arrangements to the wedding location or whether the flowers would be picked up from her shop. Stutzman asserts that she gave Ingersoll the name of other florists who might be willing to serve him, and that the two hugged before Ingersoll left her store. Ingersoll maintains that he walked away from that conversation "feeling very hurt and upset emotionally." The State and the couple sued, each alleging violations of the Washington Law Against Discrimination and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Stutzman defended on the grounds that the WLAD and CPA did not apply to her conduct and that, if they did, those statutes violated her state and federal constitutional rights to free speech, free exercise, and free association. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the State and the couple, rejecting all of Stutzman's claims. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc." on Justia Law

At his trial for premeditated first degree murder, petitioner Anthony Clark sought to introduce expert testimony regarding his intellectual deficits. Clark asserted this testimony would be relevant to contesting the State's mens rea evidence and to helping the jury understand Clark's affect while testifying. The trial court excluded Clark's proffered expert testimony, but it did allow relevant observation testimony about Clark's education history, Social Security disability benefits, affect, and actions on the day of the murder. The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in making its evidentiary rulings. The court did allow relevant observation testimony from lay witnesses to rebut the State's mens rea evidence, and Clark did not challenge the scope of this testimony on review. However, because Clark purposefully did not assert or plead diminished capacity and the proposed expert testimony was not relevant to any other purpose, the expert testimony was properly excluded. Clark also could not establish ineffective assistance of counsel or cumulative error, so the Court affirmed his convictions. View "Washington v. Clark" on Justia Law

Reginald Bell was convicted in 2009 of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and bail jumping. His judgment and sentence became final on direct appeal in 2012. In October 2015, Bell filed a personal restraint petition; the acting chief judge dismissed it as improperly successive. Bell then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court. The Court's commissioner denied review, and Bell moved to modify the commissioner's ruling. He argued that, procedurally, his personal restraint petition should have been transferred to the Supreme Court rather than dismissed because his successive petition did not assert an issue that was raised and determined on the merits in a previous personal restraint petition. The Supreme Court agreed: a successive personal restraint petition that does not seek relief on the same grounds as those adjudicated in a previous petition must generally be transferred to the Supreme Court rather than be dismissed. However, there is an exception: if the Court of Appeals determines that the successive petition was time barred, then the Court of Appeals should dismiss it. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals made no such determination. Hence, it erred in dismissing Bell's petition rather than transferring it to the Supreme Court. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Bell" on Justia Law