Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner John Johnson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal of conviction for second-degree theft of an access device. The outcome turned on the Washington Supreme Court’s determination of whether Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709 (2016) superseded its decision in Washington v. Hickman, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). Under Hickman, the State must establish all elements it agrees to include in the to-convict instruction, even if not required by statute, because unchallenged instructions become the "law of the case." In Musacchio, the Supreme Court rejected a "law of the case" argument and held that due process requires only that evidentiary sufficiency claims "be assessed against the elements of the charged crime, not against the erroneously heightened command in the jury instruction." Here, the jury was instructed that an element of the theft charge included Johnson's intent "to deprive the [victim] of the access device." The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding Musacchio superseded Washington’s “law of the case” doctrine. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding the State did not demonstrate that the "law of the case" doctrine was incorrect and harmful, or that its legal underpinnings have been eroded. Accordingly, the Court held the State was required to prove Johnson specifically intended to steal an access device. Because sufficient evidence supports this element, the Court affirmed Johnson's conviction. View "Washington v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Trial courts must engage in a full Batson analysis when a peremptory strike of a juror is the only member of a cognizable racial group. In 2013, Petitioner Matthew Erickson, a black man, was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with unlawful use of a weapon and resisting arrest. After voir dire, the city of Seattle (City) exercised a peremptory challenge against the only black juror on the jury panel. After the jury was empaneled and excused from the courthouse with the rest of the venire, Erickson objected to the peremptory challenge, claiming the strike was racially motivated. The court found that there was no prima facie showing of racial discrimination and overruled Erickson's objection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, (1986), guarantees a jury selection process free from racial animus. Yet, the Washington Supreme Court noted that Washington's Batson protections were "not robust enough" to effectively combat racial discrimination during jury selection. The Court used the opportunity of this opinion to "better effectuate the equal protection guaranties espoused in Batson." The Court amended Washington's Batson framework and held that the peremptory strike of a juror who is the only member of a cognizable racial group constitutes a prima facie showing of racial discrimination requiring a full Batson analysis by the trial court. View "City of Seattle v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Esmeralda Rodriguez petitioned for protection on behalf of her two-year-old son, arguing that Luis Zavala's repeated threats against her son constituted "domestic violence" under the plain language of RCW 26.50.010(3), and that she could petition for a protection order on her son's behalf based on her reasonable fear for him. Rodriguez feared Zavala would make good on his past threats and kill her, her daughters, their son, and then kill himself. Rodriguez petitioned ex parte for a domestic violence protection order for herself and her children, including L.Z. In her petition, Rodriguez described the assault that compelled her to seek the order, as well as Zavala's history of violence. The court issued a temporary order pending a full hearing. The temporary order restrained Zavala from contacting Rodriguez and all four children. The trial court issued a protective order for Rodriguez and her daughters, but excluded L.Z., explaining that the boy was not "present" during the assault or threatened at all. According to the trial judge, "[L.Z.] wasn't involved in any of this." Rodriguez appealed. Among other things, she argued that her son should have been included in the final protection order based on her fear that Zavala would hurt L.Z. The Washington Supreme Court agreed that Rodriguez could petition for protection of L.Z. under the plain language of RCW 26.50.010(3), and reversed the trial court's decision. View "Rodriguez v. Zavala" on Justia Law

While driving in Sunnyside, Washington, petitioner Andreas Gonzalez was stopped for speeding by Sergeant Scott Bailey. Gonzalez was driving a BMW with California license plates. Although Gonzalez had a Washington driver's license, the car was registered in California in another person's name. Bailey determined that Gonzalez's license was suspended and therefore placed him under arrest. Bailey became suspicious that Gonzalez was involved in criminal activity. Officer Skip Lemmon arrived with his canine partner to assist in the impound process. Gonzalez consented to a search of the car, which turned up a "[s]treet level amount, user amount" of cocaine and $5,940. The officers suspected that both the car and the money were connected to an illegal drug transaction, and seized both the car and money, and the city of Sunnyside (City) sought forfeiture. Gonzalez had no prior arrests or convictions for any drug-related activity, although he did ultimately plead guilty in superior court to one charge of possession of a controlled substance for the cocaine that was discovered in the car. Gonzalez testified at the forfeiture hearing that several days earlier, he had gone to California to visit relatives who offered t sell the BMW to Gonzalez, who wanted to buy it but did not have enough money with him. Gonzalez returned to Washington only two days before Gonzalez was pulled over, and the $5,940 was intended to pay for the car. The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether there was substantial evidence that the car and money were connected to drug manufacturing or distribution such that they were subject to forfeiture. The Sunnyside Municipal Court, acting as a hearing examiner, said yes. The Yakima County Superior Court, acting in its appellate capacity, said no and reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the forfeiture order. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated the forfeiture order, and granted Gonzalez's request for attorney fees. View "City of Sunnyside v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sione Lui challenged his conviction for the second degree murder of his fiancee, Elaina Boussiacos. He sought a new trial based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, Brady nondisclosure, jury misconduct, and newly discovered evidence. The record showed the trial judge was acutely observant of the courtroom and cautious of possible grounds for ineffective assistance claims. With respect to his other claims, the Washington Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals dismissed each claim as meritless and agreed with denying Lui's request for a reference hearing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Lui" on Justia Law

In Washington v. Smith, 334 P.3d 1049 (2014), the Washington Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to an open courtroom did not require trial courts to invite the public to attend sidebars. examples of sidebar discussions are often scheduling, housekeeping, and decorum. In this case, however, the topic of discussion was the proper extent of cross-examination of a confidential informant who was the State's key witness and the location of the discussion was not at sidebar but in the judge's chambers. In fact, the trial court rejected the State's request to address its objection to the scope of cross-examination at sidebar. Instead, the court adjourned the bench trial proceedings, called counsel into chambers, and discussed that critically important and factually complicated issue behind closed doors. The Court of Appeals ruled that this procedure violated the right to an open courtroom and conflicted with Smith. The State sought review, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reaffirmed its adherence to Smith. View "Washington v. Whitlock" on Justia Law

Limiting the scope of that cross-examination was within the court's discretion. Donald Lee was convicted on two counts of third degree rape of a child. The trial court permitted Lee to ask J.W. if she had made a false accusation to police about another person, but it prevented Lee from specifying that the prior accusation was a rape accusation. Lee claimed this violated his confrontation clause rights. Lee also contended the four year delay between his initial arrest and the trial was unconstitutional, warranting review for the first time on appeal. Lee also challenged the trial court's imposition of legal financial obligations (LFOs ). Because the State's legitimate interests in excluding prejudicial evidence and protecting sexual assault victims outweighed Lee's need to present evidence with minimal probative value, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it prevented Lee from specifying that J.W. had falsely accused another person of rape. When the court permitted Lee to cross-examine J.W. about her prior false accusation, it provided Lee with an adequate opportunity for confrontation. Furthermore, because Lee was not actually restrained and because charges had not been filed, the four year delay between his initial arrest and the trial was not a manifest constitutional error warranting review for the first time on appeal. View "Washington v. Lee" on Justia Law

During an investigatory stop of a vehicle, a traffic violator can be temporarily detained until the legitimate investigative purposes of the traffic stop have been completed. Michael Phelps appealed a criminal judgment entered after he conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. Phelps argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and the dog sniff unreasonably extended the traffic stop. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded: (1) the district court did not err in finding the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop; and (2) the dog sniff conducted on Phelps' vehicle did not require independent reasonable suspicion because it occurred contemporaneously to the completion of duties related to the initial traffic stop. View "Washington v. Estes" on Justia Law

Without alleging a defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Washington, thus invoking the benefits and protections of Washington laws, exercising jurisdiction would not comport with due process. Special Electric Company Inc. asked the Washington Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals because that court found Washington could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Special Electric under a stream of commerce theory without any allegation that Special Electric purposefully availed itself of Washington's laws. Because the parties and trial court did not have the benefit of the Court’s recent decision in Washington v. LG Electronics, Inc., 375 P.3d 1035 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 648 (2017), or the recently disclosed evidence of Special Electric' s unrelated contacts in Washington, the Supreme Court remanded this case back to the trial court for reconsideration. The Court accepted review in this case, however, because it disagreed with the Court of Appeals' application of “LG Electronics,” and this case offered an opportunity for the Supreme Court to give guidance to the lower courts on what a plaintiff must allege for specific personal jurisdiction. View "Noll v. Amer. Biltrite Inc." on Justia Law

Cecil Davis was sentenced to death for brutally murdering Yoshiko Couch. Davis raped, robbed, and killed 65-year-old Couch in her home in 1997. His direct appeal was unsuccessful. He challenged his death sentence in a personal restraint petition, arguing Washington's death penalty system unconstitutionally fails to protect defendants with intellectual disabilities from execution. He also argued the death penalty system was unconstitutional because it did not require a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant facing the death penalty did not have an intellectual disability. He also argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding his arguments unpersuasive, the Washington Supreme Court dismissed the petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Davis" on Justia Law