Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

DH was taken into emergency custody on an involuntary 72-hour hold as authorized by former RCW 71.05.153(1) (2019). Instead of filing for a 14-day commitment court order, the State let the 72-hour hold expire and did not release DH, although he had been asking to leave for days. The State kept him detained overnight and evaluated him again the next morning for a new 72-hour hold and filed a petition for a 14-day commitment. At DH’s subsequent 14-day hold hearing, he argued that he was entitled to dismissal because the State had totally disregarded the requirements of the ITA. The court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the new 14-day petition. The Washington Supreme Court held that when the State totally disregards the requirements of the ITA by holding someone despite lacking the authority under the ITA to do so, the ITA petition shall be dismissed. in this case, the State totally disregarded the requirements of the ITA when it failed to release DH at the end of the 72-hour period as mandated by statute. The trial court abused its discretion when it did not so hold and did not dismiss the new petition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for dismissal of the petition and any further proceedings. The Court also granted review of whether failure to inform a committed person about a loss of firearm rights for involuntary treatment constituted a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right” such that the Court should review the unpreserved issue under RAP 2.5(a)(3). Given its resolution of dismissal of the petition the Court declined to reach this issue. View "In re Det. of D.H." on Justia Law

NG, CM, and AC were all involuntarily detained under the Washington involuntary treatment act (ITA). NG and CM were confined at Western State Hospital for more than a month after the court orders authorizing their continued civil commitments expired. Even after hospital staff realized the court orders had expired, they continued to hold NG and CM. Staff summoned designated crisis responders to initiate “new” ITA proceedings. AC was detained under a valid court order but was involuntarily medicated at an evaluation and treatment center before a court hearing despite asserting her statutory right to not be. The trial judge continued the hearing for a day to allow AC to appear un- medicated. The Washington Supreme Court held that when the State totally disregards the requirements of the ITA by holding someone despite lacking the authority under the ITA to do so, the ITA petition shall be dismissed. "Beginning 'new' ITA proceedings while someone is being held without authority of law is not an acceptable remedy." In NG’s and CM’s cases, the Court concluded the requirements of the ITA were totally disregarded and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial courts for dismissal. In AC’s case, the Court concluded the requirements of the ITA were not totally disregarded and that she was not held without authority of law. In that case, the Court affirmed the courts below. View "In re Det. of A.C." on Justia Law

In this case, three Latino voters from Franklin County, Washington alleged that the county’s system for electing its board of commissioners violated the Washington voting rights act of 2018 (WVRA) by “dilut[ing] the votes of Latino/a voters.” The plaintiffs (respondents on appeal) ultimately settled with defendants Franklin County and the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. The issues on appeal were raised by James Gimenez, a Franklin County voter who was allowed to intervene by the trial court. Immediately after his motion to intervene was granted, Gimenez moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing and that the WVRA was facially invalid. The trial court denied Gimenez’s motion to dismiss, and he was not an active participant in the case thereafter. After the trial court entered a final order approving the parties’ settlement, Gimenez appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court, arguing that in his view, the WVRA protected some Washington voters but excluded others. Based on this interpretation, Gimenez argued that plaintiffs did not have standing because the WVRA did not protect Latinx voters from Franklin County as a matter of law. Gimenez also argued that the WVRA was repealed by implication and was facially unconstitutional because it required local governments to implement electoral systems that favored protected voters and disfavored others on the basis of race. The Supreme Court disagreed with Gimenez's interpretation of the WVRA, and found plaintiffs had stnging and the WVRA was valid and constitutional on its face. View "Portugal v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

Interlocutory review was granted to challenge a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion of evidence observed during a warrantless entry into a dwelling. The trial court concluded that the entry was justified, applying what cases characterized as the “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement, based on rendering emergency aid and conducting a health and safety check. At issue before the Washington Supreme Court whether the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case, Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021), required the Washington Court to reevaluate the state constitution article I, section 7 cases recognizing exceptions to the warrant requirement. Petitioner Ului Lakepa Teulilo argued that the United States Supreme Court invalidated the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement as applied to the home, and therefore, under the supremacy clause, Washington state cases recognizing a health and safety check exception under the same doctrine were invalid. To this, the Washington Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the trial court. View "Washington v. Teulilo" on Justia Law

These cases concerned whether bail may be denied under article I, section 20 of the Washington Constitution for defendants charged with a class A felony. Patrick Sargent was denied bail and was in custody pretrial for charges of first-degree attempted murder, domestic violence, and felony harassment, domestic violence. As charged, and based on his offender score, Sargent faced a determinate sentence of about 20-25 years. Sargent appealed, alleging he was unlawfully restrained because he was unconstitutionally denied bail. He claimed his crimes, as charged, were not punishable by the possibility of life in prison. The Court of Appeals held that article I, section 20 applied to all class A felonies because all class A felonies carried a statutory maximum sentence of life. In the consolidated case, Leonel Gonzalez was similarly denied bail and was in custody pretrial for first-degree felony murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. As charged, he faced about 34-46 years. In denying bail, the trial court relied on Sargent and the plain language of article I, section 20, concluding that because Gonzalez was facing a class A felony with a maximum of life in prison, the trial court could constitutionally deny bail. Gonzalez appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in Sargent’s case and denied Sargent’s personal restraint petition (PRP). In addition, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in Gonzalez’s case. The Court agreed with the State and lower courts that the plain language of the constitution focused on whether the offense in general, not as charged, could possibly be punished by life in prison. The cases were remanded to the trial courts for further proceedings. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Sargent" on Justia Law

Petitioner Theodore Rhone asked the Washington Supreme Court to adopt a bright line rule establishing a prima facie case of discrimination when the State peremptorily strikes the last member of a racially cognizable group from a jury venire. “Without the benefit of the considerable knowledge we have gained regarding the impact of implicit bias in jury selection,” a “fractured” majority of the Supreme Court declined to adopt Rhone’s proposed rule in 2010. But seven years later, it did, in City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (2017). Although this case came to the Supreme Court as a personal restraint petition (PRP), the central issue was the Court’s 2010 decision in Rhone’s own case. The Supreme Court took the opportunity here to revisit and correct that decision. “Given the unique factual and procedural history of this case and in the interest of justice,” the Court recalled its prior mandate, reversed Rhone’s convictions, and remanded for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Rhone" on Justia Law

Petitioner Denver Lee Shoop kept a small herd of eight bison on his property. The State charged him with eight counts of animal cruelty in the first degree for his treatment of those eight bison. RCW 16.52.205(2) stated that one commits “animal cruelty in the first degree” when “he or she, with criminal negligence, starves, dehydrates, or suffocates an animal…” and causes considerably suffering or death. The State included “starves, dehydrates, or suffocates” in each of the eight counts. The jury convicted Shoop as charged, but without specifying which of those three means the State actually proved. Shoop appealed, arguing in part that RCW 16.52.205(2) constituted an “alternative means” crime, so either (1) the jury had to achieve unanimity about which means the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) the record had to show that sufficient evidence supported each of those multiple means. The Washington Supreme Court held RCW 16.52.205(2) described a single crime of animal cruelty in the first degree. “That statutory subsection’s list of ways of committing animal cruelty—negligently starving, dehydrating, or suffocating—constitute “minor nuances inhering in the same act [or omission],” not completely different acts, i.e., not “alternative means.” View "Washington v. Shoop" on Justia Law

A trial court granted Jeremy Dustin Hubbard’s motion to modify a court-imposed community custody condition approximately 15 years after sentencing based on a change in Hubbard’s factual circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Washington Supreme Court found the current statutory framework did not contain a provision authorizing Hubbard’s requested modification. "Outside a direct appeal or a timely collateral attack, a trial court cannot modify court-imposed community custody conditions after sentencing without express statutory authority to do so." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court to vacate its order. View "Washington v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

In early 2022, while Washington Governor Jay Inslee’s COVID-19 related mask mandate remained binding throughout the state, three of five Richland School District board (RSDB) members voted to make face coverings optional in Richland schools. This vote conflicted directly with the then effective statewide masking requirement. Two months later, a group of Richland voters filed petitions to recall those three RSDB members. The petitioners alleged that the three RSDB members violated the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 RCW, and knowingly violated state law in different ways when they voted to lift the mask mandate from the Richland schools. The trial court agreed that many of the counts containing those allegations were factually and legally sufficient to be placed on the ballot for the voters to decide. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with most of the trial court’s decisions. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopses 1, 3, and 5: petitioners sufficiently alleged that the RSDB members knowingly violated both the OPMA and the statewide mask mandate. But the Court reversed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopsis 4: the aspirational, nonbinding, RSDB “Code of Ethics” could not form the legal basis for a recall charge. View "In re Recall of Bird, et al." on Justia Law

A child was removed from his mother and placed with his grandparents out of concern that she could not care for him. Years later, the State sought to terminate that mother’s parental rights. On advice of counsel, she declined to answer questions related to her recent drug use. The trial judge chose to draw a negative inference from her assertion of that right. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether, under the Fifth Amendment, that was permissible. The Court stressed that such a negative inference could not be the only evidence supporting termination. Here, the Supreme Court concluded the trial coud did not err by drawing a negative inference from the mother’s refusal to answer specific questions about her drug use. View "In re Dependency of A.M.F." on Justia Law